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A historical analysis of the Iraqi military suggests that certain actions should be 
taken if the state building process of the United States led coalition is to be successful. 
The fulcrum of power in Iraq has always been the internecine ethnic, religious, and tribal 
relationships and interactions. This thesis studies the recently constructed security 
structure of Iraq, particularly the new Iraqi Armed Forces, by focusing on likely 
influences of the ethnic and sectarian factions and social structure of the country on 
security and reconstruction/reintegration of the new Iraqi Military. The thesis brings into 
sharp focus a singular fact that the military of Iraq has always been used in one way or 
another against one section of the population or another by the prevailing political power 
using the time-honored virtues of patronage and corruption. The use of the military in 
Iraq as an internal political tool more than anything else contributed to the lack of 
national identity, the prerequisite for a sound military structure. The thesis presents some 
situational operating methodologies that if followed should provide a structurally sound 
modern Iraqi military rather than a supernumerary police force. The recommendations 
would not only provide a military as a strong basis for national unity and identity, but 
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The excesses of United States optimism about the potential to reconstruct Iraq 
after invading that country, alongside coalition partners in 2003, are well-known. The 
U.S.-led Coalition forces failed to establish security and a nasty insurgency festered. Now 
domestic military forces are vital to secure state authority for a new, democratizing Iraqi 
government. As a natural consequence of this security environment, the construction of 
the new Security Forces, and particularly the Iraqi Armed Forces, which had been in the 
past the foremost institution in Iraq to maintain the state authority, has emerged as the 
most crucial requirement of the new Iraqi Government.  
After the success of major combat operations in Iraq, U.S. officials and scholars 
cited the reconstruction of Germany and Japan as models for the reconstruction and 
stabilization or ‘nation building’ in Iraq. These cases were not applicable to Iraq due to 
their social, economic, demographic, and cultural differences with Iraqi society and in 
particular, the form of the Iraqi State that had emerged after the First World War. Iraq 
was an artificial state founded as a monarchy with a heterogeneous society and had no 
real democratic experience since its emergence under the British Mandate. It had a state 
authority in its territory; however it never had a state structure in which its factions could 
be represented without restriction. A key feature of Iraq after 1921 was the dominance of 
one sectarian faction within the state structure, at the expense of other groups. Iraq has 
been governed by tyranny for 24 years and this eroded state institutions including the 
security services and the military. The State had lost its authority in some part of the 
country due to sanctions after the first Gulf War. Ultimately, the Iraqi state lost its 
functional capacity with the collapse of the former Saddam Hussein Regime after the 
decisive military operations against Iraq in May 2003.  
After the end of the Second Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition directly ruled the 
country for a period of approximately one year via the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), alongside an Iraqi Governing Council that lacked authority. The CPA could not 
provide security, the primary responsibility of any occupying force. The Coalition did not 
have sufficient military force for this requirement. Besides, it could not conduct suitable 
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policies neither in providing security nor in creating a capable security structure. The 
main intention of the U.S.-led Coalition was to construct the necessary conditions and 
institutions for Iraqis by Iraqis. This was a worthy goal that would reduce the cost of 
stabilization and reconstruction. However, the implementation did not match the 
announcement. The Coalition made severe mistakes, which would challenge the long-
term stability of Iraq and even repeated mistakes made by the U.K. during its mandate 
period from 1921 to 1932 in Iraq. 
In June 2004, the CPA “transferred authority” to another interim regime, the Iraqi 
Interim Government led by Ayad Allawi. This was officially a sovereignty transfer. 
However, the second interim government did not have real authority due to shortages in 
the security service, including the Iraqi Armed Forces, and deteriorating security 
circumstances. In this environment, the Multinational Forces became the real authority of 
the country to provide security. However, the security condition worsened dramatically. 
Tensions between the ethnic and religious factions escalated. Consequently, Iraq faced 
threat of civil war just before the January 30, 2005 elections. Fortunately, the election 
period was exercised without any major clashes amongst the factions. Yet, the election 
was only a new start for a period that will shape the future of the country. Before such a 
critical period, what the third Iraqi Interim Government would take over from the second 
Iraqi Interim Government is not a monopoly on the use of force.  There are an estimated 
30,000 members and 200,000 active supporters of insurgents in Iraq and existing militia 
structures of different ethnic and religious parties, estimated at 100,000. The new Iraqi 
Government will have a 127,000 strong security force with dubious effectiveness.  
Therefore, the establishment of an effective security structure is a crucial step in the state 
building process in Iraq.   
The reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces or security services should be 
evaluated along with the construction of a working state structure and creating a state 
capacity that will maintain order in the country without intervention from the 
international community in a unified territory. Ongoing security problems, including 
aggravating ethnic and religious tensions, underline the importance of the Iraqi Military 
as a historically significant organization to provide state capacity. Iraq does not have 
sufficient conditions for a nation-building process. Iraq urgently needs a state that will 
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include the necessary means in an institutionalized structure, and will be respected and 
acknowledged by all its factions as the unique authority in its territory. In this context, the 
establishment of an effective security and defense organization that will offer the Iraqi 
Governments the necessary capability to claim a monopoly on the use of force in the 
entire country without damaging long term concerns of the country, particularly in terms 
of ethnic/sectarian affiliations and civil-military relations, has emerged as a natural result 
of the deteriorating security conditions in Iraq and specific characteristics of the Iraqi 
society in an ethnically and religiously heterogonous structure with different political 
agendas for the future of the country.  
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the reconstruction process of the new 
Iraqi Military, the significance of the Iraqi Armed Forces for the success of stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts and the long term stability of Iraq, and the possible impacts of 
ethnic and sectarian differences within Iraqi society on this process. While looking for the 
answers to these questions, the thesis assumes that the end state of the Second Gulf War 
was ‘to construct a sovereign country with a representative self-government in its ensured 
territorial integrity.’ The thesis will explore historical episodes and current incidents to 
underline similarities and to exploit lessons for future efforts. In order to find the 
satisfactory answers:  
• First, the thesis examines the role and influence of the military in Iraq 
since its emergence under the British mandate;  
• Next, the thesis will examine the Iraqi Society. What are the expectations 
of different groups and the likely effects of social reorganization within 
the Iraqi society upon the security circumstances and the Iraqi military? 
• Third, the thesis will scrutinize ongoing construction of the new security 
structure. What will this process contribute to state capacity for the new 
Iraqi Government? How might it temper hostile tendencies of different 
factions? Finally, according to the findings of these three chapters, an 
effective Iraqi Armed Forces should be built without domination and 
reflection of any ethnic or sectarian group. Officers loyal to the values of 
democracy and the unified Iraqi Government will be the main institution 
to provide the most significant state function, ‘monopoly of the use of the 
force in its territory,’ and protect the stability and security of Iraq. Caution 
is needed, however, as ethnic and sectarian factions will seek to exploit the 
new Armed Forces for their political agendas. A likely ethnic or religious 
dominancy in the Iraqi Armed Forces will degrade security and the long-
term stability of Iraq.  
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 The thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. The orders, regulations, 
memoranda, reports, speeches, testimonies, briefings and interviews issued on the CPA, 
U.S. Defense Department and State Department websites, news, speeches and interviews 
of or about the Coalition and Iraqi Officials published by the mass media, and reports, 
researches and polls prepared by United States General Accounting Office for the 
Congress comprise the primary sources. As the secondary resources, the thesis utilizes 
articles and research papers issued by think-tanks, Army War College, journals, the 
websites of U.S. Military, Defense Department and State Department, the commercial 
websites, electronic databases, and books on Iraq, Iraqi Society and Iraqi Security Forces. 
All sources exploited in this thesis are unclassified and available to the public.  
The thesis will comprise five chapters including this introduction, which presents 
general view, and a conclusion chapter. 
• The second chapter will review the former Iraqi Military to explore the 
principal factors that could apply to the ongoing process. In this context, it 
will inquire about the major policies conducted by the U.K. and then 
Hashemite Monarchy while creating the Iraqi Army, principal ideologies 
that dominated the Iraqi Army and its officer corps, and the role of the 
Iraqi Army in domestic politics of Iraq during different periods.  
• The third chapter will examine the structure of the Iraqi Society and its 
ethnic and sectarian factions by exploring both historical episodes and the 
current situation in order to evaluate likely threats posed by ethnic and 
sectarian diversities. Considering the current security problems, the 
chapter will focus on the security problems emanating from ethnic 
geography in Iraq, ethnic nationalism and secessionist desires, militia 
capacities, traditional elites including religious and tribal leaders and their 
political views for the future of Iraq. 
• The fourth chapter will study the post-war security policies of the U.S.-led 
Coalition and its efforts and strategies in the construction of a new security 
structure. While evaluating these policies, the chapter will explore the 
long-term challenges resulting from the policies and strategies conducted 
to provide security and to build the new security forces, and particularly 
the new Iraqi Armed Forces. 
• Finally, the fifth chapter will conclude the thesis by giving a brief 
background and presenting a summary of findings and some 
recommendations for the ongoing process of the reconstruction and 
reintegration of the new Iraqi Armed Forces. 
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II. THE IRAQI MILITARY IN HISTORY 
Modern Iraq emerged from the First World War to undergo three periods of 
regime type in which the military played an increasing role in the political process of 
Iraq. The first era was a period of monarchy that began with the invasion of Iraq by the 
British and ended in 1958 with the military coup and the demise of the monarchy.  The 
second era was a period of a military authoritarian regime between 1958 and 1968. The 
third period started as a civilian authoritarian regime, under the reign of a single party 
with pan-Arabic nationalist ideology.  This regime became totalitarian under Saddam 
Hussein in 1979. It ended with the American and British-led invasion that overthrew 
Saddam Hussein and ended Ba’th rule on May 1, 2003. As a general trend of these three 
periods, the Iraqi Military, with the support of the Iraqi Police Service, became the 
principal organization for the governments to achieve internal security and to claim state 
authority in the country and on its ethnic and religious diversities. This chapter examines 
the former Iraqi military and its influence on the political process and stability of the 
country between 1921 and 2003. In particular, this review will highlight the factors that 
influenced the stability of the country in order to identify lessons from the reconstruction 
process for the new security structure in Iraq.   
A. PREVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
During the period 1921-1936 the Iraqi army had non-interventionist 
characteristics, as the Syrian army had during the period of 1920-1948, or the Egyptian 
Army had from 1882 to 1936.1 The British authority that relied on the Royal Troops, 
Royal Air Force, and Iraqi Levies was the most powerful actor in Iraqi politics until the 
independence of Iraq.2 Besides the British authority, the nonexistence of a powerful 
structure based on the failure of the Hashemite administration to legitimize the 
conscription law, and the personal influence of King Faisal were the most valuable 
reasons for the non-interventionist position of the Army during this period. However, 
King Faisal’s attempts to create a powerful military structure as the symbol of the Iraqi 
                                                 
1 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 128. 
2 Matthew Elliot, ‘Independent Iraq’: The Monarchy and British Influence, 1941-1958, (London:  
Tauris Academic Studies, 1966), p. 8. 
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nationalism resulted in the emergence of an Army with a Sunni hegemony, which caused 
suitable conditions for the intervention of the Army into the politics of the country. 
Consequently, after the sudden death of King Faisal, the Iraqi Army with its Sunni 
identity, made the first coup of the Arab World in the 20th century. However, this coup, 
or the other six coups that occurred until 1941, did not aspire to remove the monarchy, 
nor was it intended to create a military regime. The 1936 coup was the result of the 
cooperation of the army with a civilian organization, the Ahali Group.3 Consequently, the 
result of this intervention was a kind of ‘the Arbitrator Regime’ in which “they [the 
military] indirectly control the political and civilian institutions, but they do not dominate 
the executive, the government, or the bureaucracy.”4  
The order formed by the 1936 coup survived until the second British invasion in 
1941, a result of the pro-German policies of the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi 
Monarchy entered a new period under British influence that would be carried out until the 
1958 coup. As the most crucial policies of this period, particularly enacted in the initial 
phase, the British occupiers and the new Iraqi Government purged the army and the 
administration in Iraq from the nationalists.5 The British Embassy, the palace and the 
certain politicians, especially Nuri Said who was the prime minister of ten of 30 cabinets 
constructed during this period, were the most influential players of this era. Although 
1941-1958 can be characterized as a period of some liberalization that caused as an 
increase in the “representation of Shias, Kurds, effendis and younger politicians in 
government,”6 a range of civil opposition appeared in Iraq against the regime and Britain. 
Despite relative progress in internal reforms and British assistance, a military coup by a 
group of nationalist officers grown underground and led by General Abd al-Qasim, with 
the support of Communist groups in the country, overthrew the Monarchy.7   
The outcome of the 1958 coup was a military regime under the authority of 
General Qasim, which was different from the result of the coup series between 1936 and 
                                                 
3 James A. Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, (October 1969), p. 51. 
4 Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, p. 141. 
5 Elliot, ‘Independent Iraq,’ p. 14. 
6 Ibid., p. 163. 
7 Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” pp. 52-53.   
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1941. Besides the military, Qasim also relied on the Iraqi Communist Party and its 
militias, at least during the period of 1958-1960. However, a power struggle started 
within the military and regime just after the coup, as generally occurred following a 
successful takeover in the Middle East, and as a result of this power struggle, the military 
regime under the rule of Qasim was removed from power by another military coup led by 
Abd-al Salam Arif in 1963.8 The alliance of some nationalist officers opposing Qasim for 
his lack of concern with Arab unity,9 with the reorganized Ba’th party gave rise to 
another coup and a “party-army regime”10 emerged in the country. However, the military 
removed the Ba’thists from the administration nine months after the coup, dramatically 
with the support of some Ba’thist officers, and the military regime survived until its 
collapse with the Ba’th takeover in July 1968, when another military coup occurred with 
perfect coordination between the civilians and military.  
After the coup in 1968, the Ba’th Party did not make the same mistake in its 
second reign. Despite the initial balance between the Ba’thists and the influential officers 
in the administration to begin with, the Ba’th party started to remove officers from 
administration posts. Consequently, what emerged in Iraq under the rule of the Ba’th 
Party was a civilian authoritarian regime led by Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, a senior Free 
Officer, and a second very influential man in the administration, a civilian, Saddam 
Hussein, supported by the armed forces. Finally, the regime turned over an “authoritarian 
personal regime” 11 in 1979, with the presidency of Saddam Hussein. 
During the Ba’th Party and Saddam Hussein reign, the Iraqi military was strictly 
under civilian control. However, this was a kind of Communist regime type civilian 
control with a politicized military. In particular, the politicization of the military became 
greater during the Ba’th authority. The military became a tool of the Ba’th regime rather 
than a force that served the nation.  Ideological indoctrination became one of the main 
                                                 
8 Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” pp. 53-54. 
9 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship, 
(London:  I. B Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1990), p. 95. 
10 Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, p. 146. 
11 Elizabeth Picard, “Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State,” in 
The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani, (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1990), p. 
196.  
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tools of the regime to control the military. The party influence eroded military morale. In 
particular, the injection of party apparatchiks into the force undercut established lines of 
military authority. Particularly after Saddam Hussein’s presidency, the military lost most 
of its professional capabilities owing to the destructive policies employed by Saddam 
Hussein for the control of the military, even on decisions on a tactical level during war 
time. Consequently, what was left of the Iraqi Military when the U.S invaded Iraq in May 
2003, was a de-moralized institution. This structure was disbanded by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority as a result of a de-Baathification policy in order to construct a new 
security structure.  
B. THE BRITISH MANDATE (1921:1932) 
When Great Britain invaded Iraq in1918, during WW1, they relied on two types 
of security forces (British Imperial troops including 33 battalions, along with the 
superiority of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Iraqi Levies numbering 4,000 men, mostly 
from Assyrians under the command of British officers) for the internal and external 
security of the country in the first years of their mandate. Although a ‘Ministry of 
Defense’ structure was established simultaneously with the construction of an Iraqi 
government by British officials in January 1920, “the only army the country could claim 
was limited to a skeleton Headquarter Staff of ten Iraqi officer.”12 
The main concern of Great Britain at that time was to maintain a maximum 
influence in the region with the lowest cost. Therefore, the British Colonial Office 
decided to create a new security configuration, including an Iraqi Army of 15,000 men 
for the defense of the country, two detachments of the Royal Air Force, and the Levies. 
Besides the economic and security concerns, it was a political decision to create an 
indigenous force that would symbolize national sovereignty. While creating a national 
army, the main concern in the preservation of the Levies was to provide a shock-absorber 
for the duration of the British authority in Iraq against the central Government in 
Baghdad and the tribal elements of the country.13 
                                                 
12 Mohammad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941, 
(London: KPI Limited, 1985), pp. 75-76. 
13 Ibid., pp. 75-77.  
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The British recruited heavily from the tribal elite. While the Hashemite 
administration saw the urban areas as the main and appropriate human resource for the 
recruitment of the officer corps of the new Iraqi army, the British High Commissioner 
“constantly encouraged the recruitment of tribal soldiers for the rank and file and sons of 
the Sheikhs for the officer class”14 in recruitment for the military college. However, these 
conscription and education efforts by the British Mandate officials also concentrated on 
the Sunni population of Iraq and ultimately, “the overwhelming Majority of high-ranking 
officers continued to be the ex-Turkish and ex-Sharifian officers,”15 in particular from the 
Sunni population, within the Iraqi officer corps.  
The Iraqi people did not display much enthusiasm to join the army as enlisted 
personnel, as was expected by the Iraqi Government and the British officials. The lack of 
a national spirit and relatively low salaries of the private soldiers, when compared to 
Levies, were two principal reasons for this reluctance.16 Although the first decision of the 
British Colonial Office was to create a relatively small and efficient army based on a 
voluntary system, particularly in order to guarantee internal order of the country without 
bankrupting the state, the main intention of the Iraqi administration, especially King 
Faisal and his Hashemite officers, was to build an army that would be an instrument and 
a powerful symbol of a strong Hashemite Arab State in order to protect the Hashemite 
monarchy against the well-armed tribes and to contribute to the nation-building process 
through conscription.17 Therefore, they favored mass conscription as a mechanism of 
Iraqi nationalism within a Hashemite interpretation in order to achieve national unity.  
King Faisal’s use of conscription in order to expand the army was not so easy to 
justify and employ, due to the opposition of the British mandate officials and the strong 
resistance  of  the  tribal  sections  of the population, especially from the Shi’a and Kurds.  
                                                 
14 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2003), p. 142. 
15 Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics, p. 78. 
16 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
17 Ahmed Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy 
and Power,” The Middle East Journal, 57, 1, (Research Library, Winter 2003): pp. 12-13. 
10 
British officials did not display their opposition for the conscription directly, but 
conveyed it by means of recommendations and covered warnings as stated by the British 
High Commissioner in 1926: 
If the Iraqi Government desire[s] to press on with the project of 
conscription, H.M.G. will not oppose it, although fully aware of the great 
difficulties which lie in its way. But in their judgment conscription is not 
in [the] present circumstances essential and it should be possible for the 
Iraqi Government to maintain and pay for a sufficiently efficient army on 
the voluntary system. If the Iraqi Government nevertheless insist[s] on 
attempting to apply conscription, British forces will not be available for 
the purpose and Iraq must rely on her own forces.18 
Besides the British officials’ implied opposition, the main resistance to 
conscription came from the tribal sections of the population, especially from the Shi’a 
and Kurds. As a result of this resistance and insufficiencies of the Government, Iraq did 
not have the necessary circumstances for conscription until 1932, for the admission of 
Iraq into the League of Nations as an independence state. 
C. INDEPENDENCE AND IRAQI MONARCHY (1932:1958) 
After the Anglo-Iraq treaty in 1930 that agreed on Iraq’s independence of and the 
admittance of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independent state, the Iraqi 
administration focused on the legalization of the Conscription Bill despite the ongoing 
resistance of the tribal sectors and the majority of the ulama, even after the death of King 
Faisal in September 1933. While the negotiations for independence continued between 
the Iraqi Monarchy and the UK, Iraq faced another domestic problem. The Assyrians 
displayed their desires for secession or at least autonomy and applied to the League of 
Nations. Since their aspiration was refused by the U.K., the League of Nations, and the 
Iraqi Monarchy, the Assyrians revolted in July 1933. The Iraqi Army, with the support of 
the Kurdish Tribes, suppressed the Assyrian uprising.  The victory of the army against the 
Assyrian revolt in August of 1933 also encouraged the Iraqi Government to put the 
conscription decision into action. Consequently, conscription was enacted in June 1935 
with a royal decree in early 1934 along with the necessary arrangements, such as a census 
                                                 
18 Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics, pp. 92- 93. 
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made in 1934. After conscription, “the army’s total strength, which had stood at less than 
12,000 in 1933, had risen to 15,300”19 by the end of 1935. 
Fifteen years after the British Colonial Office decided to create a small national 
army, Iraq possessed a relatively large conscript army of 20,000 with a Sunni hegemony 
in the officer corps, particularly within the upper ranks, as “an important vehicle of social 
climbing for rural Sunnis.”20  Despite the use of British Officers, manuals and style in the 
education of young Iraqi officer cadets, anti-British, anti-colonial, radical, and 
revolutionary ideologies became predominant in the education of young officer cadets.  
The newly established army became the most substantial organization of the Iraqi 
monarchy, enabling the King to assert government authority over the several ethnic and 
sectarian diversities of the country. The officer corps, as the most educated and 
sophisticated ‘class’ of Iraqi society, had the personal favor of the king, and therefore, 
enjoyed significant privileges and benefits.21 Even though the main intention of King 
Faisal was to construct a National Army as a main instrument of the nation-building, Pan 
Arab Nationalist ideas, which were not appropriate for the ethnic and sectarian structure 
of the country, became the predominant ideology within the army, particularly among the 
Sunni origin officers, against the “Iraq-First” ideology favored mostly by the Turcoman 
and Kurdish origin officers who “saw Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Pahlavi in Iran 
as models”22 for the future of Iraq. Consequently, pan-Arabic ideology grew during the 
British mandate within the officer corps, (as happened in Syria during the French 
mandate), and became a significant rationale for the interventionist tendency of the Iraqi 
officer corps.  
Despite pan-Arabic nationalist ideology, the Iraqi Army did not have an 
interventionist attempt until 1936. The existence and influence of the British in Iraq, the 
relatively insufficiencies of the Iraqi Army, particularly in so far as the size and 
equipment based on economic constraints and the failure of the government in 
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legitimizing the Conscription Bill, and finally the personal authority of King Faisal 
prevented the Iraqi Army from intervening in politics during the first 15 years of Iraq. 
However, after the death of King Faisal in 1933, the authority vacuum of the country 
opened the door for the army, particularly the officer corps, to intervene in the political 
process. The success of the Army against the Assyrian revolt in 1933 and its “campaign 
against the tribes of Southern Iraq [Shi’a tribes] and the Kurds of the North”23 also 
increased the prestige and influence of the Army in Iraq. The first coup of the 20th 
century in Iraq and indeed all of the Arab Middle East occurred on October 29, 1936. 
General Bakir Sidqi, General Commander of the Iraqi Army, overthrew the government, 
the Cabinet of Yasin al-Hashimi but not the King and Monarchy, by a coup in which the 
army officer corps teamed up with a progressive civilian organization, the Ahali Group.  
Although the army became the foremost institution of the political environment 
and army officers appeared as the most influential political force of the country,24 the 
Iraqi military did not directly rule the country during this era. Nor did they seek to change 
the 1924 constitution and to entrench their position. However, they destabilized the 
political system. Assassinations, plots and a sequence of coups became a part of such an 
unstable political environment.25  Seven cabinet changes after the 1936 coup in Iraq 
during the period of 1936-1941 were caused by a coup or pressure of the army on 
civilians. On 1 April 1941, as the last coup of this period, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, a pro-
German civilian and pan-Arabic nationalist, took control of the country after a coup 
associated with the nationalist officers. The Rashid Ali Government collaborating with 
the Nazi Administration in Germany directly threatened the interests of the U.K. in Iraq 
and the Middle East. Therefore, Great Britain had to intervene militarily in order to re-
order the Iraqi politics according to its interest in the county and region. As a result of 
this intervention, the Rashid Ali Government collapsed on May 30, 1941, after the defeat 
of the Iraqi Army and the invasion of the country by Great Britain. 
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The British presence in Iraq continued between 1941 and 1945, until the end of 
the Second World War. Although Iraq functioned as an independent state during this era, 
this period was described by the Iraqi nationalists as the Second Occupation, because of 
the extreme influence of the British over the new Iraqi governments in this era and the 
existence of a large number of British forces and advisers within the country. While the 
Iraqi Army and its officer corps were purged from Iraqi politics, the British, the palace, 
and some certain politicians, particularly Nuri Said, became the principal actors of this 
era. During the second British occupation, particularly in the first stage between 1941 and 
1945, the elimination of the army and bureaucracy, mostly in the education sector, from 
the nationalist and pro-Axis elements became the priority of the British and the new Iraqi 
government. The British influence in Iraqi politics, even after the departure of the British 
troops from Iraq at the end of the Second World War by means of the British advisers, 
was decisive in this era and affiliations between the Iraqi Monarchy/Iraqi Government 
and the U.K. arrived at the highest level in the 1950s.26  
The army was forced to withdraw from politics by the new Government with the 
encouragement and support of the British officials and hundreds of nationalist officers 
were detached from the service. There was no successful coup in Iraq between 1941 and 
1958.  However, the nationalist movement survived and spread within the army, even 
underground. Besides the internal dynamics of the country, a number of outside events of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s igniting pan-Arabic view such as, the Palestinian issue, the 
1948 Arab-Israel War and the defeat of Arab armies, the nationalization of Iranian oil in 
1951, Nasser’s reign in Egypt in 1952 and the bold move against Britain and France over 
the Suez Canal in 195627 sparked nationalist demonstrations against the Iraqi Monarchy 
and its Cabinets cooperating with the U.K. As a result of this political dissatisfaction in  
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the Army and society, a military coup of “free officers”28 overthrew the Iraqi monarchy 
in July 14, 1958 and the Iraqi military became again one of the active and decisive 
participants in Iraqi politics.  
D. AUTHORITARIAN RULE (1958-1968) 
The 1958 coup had been planned and executed by the ‘free officers,’ consisting of 
less than five percent of the entire Iraqi officer corps, led by Abd al-Qasim and Abd al-
Salam Arif, who were generally not known. However, there was large support from the 
rest of the Army and Iraqi Society for the coup and for the abolition of the monarchy. The 
new regime removed some officers in higher ranks from the army, civil service, and 
police due to suspicion about their loyalty to the new regime, and the ‘Free Officers’ 
dominated the new existing cabinet.  
It was immediately obvious that there was lack of a common ideology among the 
new emerging rulers of the country. While Qasim and his followers were described as the 
‘left wing’ with the Iraqi nationalist ideology and relied on the support of the Communist 
Party for their political endurance, Arif and his followers were depicted as the ‘right 
wing’ with their Arab nationalist ideology. In this political environment, competition for 
the supreme power resulted in the removal of Arif by Qasim, with the support of the 
Communist Party as the largest political force in Iraq at that time, due to the lack of 
powerful support based on tribal or kinship relations as Saddam Hussein had later.  
After a power struggle between two wings of the coup plotters, Qasim emerged as 
the sole leader in the aftermath of the revolution, particularly after the elimination of Arif 
from the political theater of the country in February 1959. Yet, Iraq did not have a stable 
political environment. Besides the Arab nationalists and the Iraqi Communist Party, the 
Iraqi Ba’ath Party that was established in Iraq during the period of the Monarchy in 1949, 
began to expand its influence within the society and army after the second half of 1958.29 
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The government formed a militia group, the people’s resistance (al-Muqawama al-
Sha’biya), with 11,000 volunteers, at the request of the Iraq Communist party for the 
protection of the new regime. In return for the Qasim Government’s attempts to solidify 
its authority, the opposition, including Arab nationalists and the new emerging Iraqi 
Ba’athists, organized underground and addressed the Iraqi Army, particularly the Officer 
Corps in order to employ them for their political efforts against the Government.30  
Despite the general support from the Army and society for the 1958 Coup and 
overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy, the final results of the 1958 coup d'état were not 
encouraging for Iraq in terms of political stabilization. Neither the Government nor the 
opposition chose democratic means in order to seize or maintain their authority. Alliance 
with some units of the military against the Government, exploitation of tribal structure 
and tribal militias against the government, construction of party militias (by both 
government and opposition), assassinations and coup attempts were the main instruments 
of the power struggle in this era, and also as generally occurred in Iraq. In this context, 
Rashid Ali al-Gailani, who had come back to the country after a 17 year exile, attempted 
to overthrow Qasim by encouraging the tribes in the Middle Euphrates to rebel against 
the government. Another upheaval attempt occurred in Mosul, on March 8, 1959, by 
participation of some nationalist ‘Free Officers’ led by Colonel Shawaf, the commander 
of the Mosul Garrison. An assassination attempt on Qasim was planned by the Ba’ath 
Party and carried out by a 23 year old Ba’athist, Saddam Hussein, on October 7, 1959. As 
well as the power struggle between the government and opposition, conflict amongst the 
ethnic, sectarian and tribal structures erupted, particularly in the north. Two most 
remarkable instances occurred. A grave outbreak of fighting coincided with the Mosul 
Coup in March 1959 amongst the ethnic residents of Mosul comprising the Arab, Kurd, 
Turcoman and Christian population of the city and between the Arab tribal factions. A 
similar conflict exploded in Kirkuk, in the first anniversary of the 1958 Coup, among the 
Kurds, supported by the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Turcoman “who had always 
dominated the socio-economic and political life of the town.”31 The result was the death 
of 79 people, mostly from the Turcoman population of the city.  
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Despite the attempts of Qasim to re-gain the support of the Arab nationalists and 
the Iraqi Army, he could not prevent the coup, plotted by a group of nationalist and 
Ba’thist officers in 1963. Eventually, “on February 8, 1963, the [Ba’th] Party overthrew 
Qasim in a bloody coup d’état with the help of Nasirite and other pan-Arab army officers 
headed by Col. ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif ”32 and a new period in Iraq began under the Ba’th 
authority. 
After removing its rivals with the execution of Qasim and replacing the Ba’thists 
and nationalists in strategic points of the state in the initial stage of its reign, an intensive 
struggle within the new regime between the Ba’thists and nationalists occurred for the 
distribution of power.33 Instead of the president Abd al-Salam Arif and the Cabinet, Ali 
Salih al-Sadi, who was the Ba’th secretary-general and Deputy Prime Minister, emerged 
as the real authority of the country by using the ‘National Guard,’ the irregular 
paramilitary force of the Ba’th Party in the period of February-November 1963. Yet, his 
power survived for a short period and the nationalists, interestingly with the support of 
some Ba’thist officers opposing al-Sadi, removed him from his post.34 Consequently, the 
first Ba’th supremacy ended and President Arif took control of the country with the 
support of the Army and some “‘centrist’ Ba’th officers (including General Ahmad Hasan 
al-Bakr) and politicians”35 in November 1963. The National Guard, along with al-Sadi 
and his team were dismantled, and Iraq entered a five-year period under the Arif 
Brothers’ reign dominated by the military.   
For the endurance of his reign, Abd al-Salam Arif relied on the Army and his 
kinship with tribal relations. While eliminating the Ba’athists, he also disbanded the 
‘National Guard’ because it was an instrument of the Ba’th Party as the militia wing of it 
and loyal to al-Sadi. After disbanding the ‘National Guard,’ he created the Republican 
Guard as a new and special security unit within the Army for the protection of his regime. 
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The centrist Ba’thist officers and politicians, who helped in the purge of al-Sadri, were 
removed from their posts. The key points within the army, air force, intelligence and 
security forces were occupied by the friends and relatives of Arif. Besides the Republican 
Guard, the Arif Government created the National Defense Council as a new institution.36 
Ultimately, instead of the cabinet, the National Defense Council and the Republican 
Guard became the core instruments for Abd al-Salam Arif in order to maintain his 
authority in the country. 
Abd al-Salam Arif died suddenly in a helicopter accident in April 1966. His 
brother, Abd al-Rahman Arif, became the new president of Iraq. However, an authority 
vacuum occurred in his reign.  Besides the leadership problem within the existing regime 
after the death of Abd al-Salam Arif, economic constraints within the country and 
insufficiencies of the government to generate proper solutions, the failure of the regime in 
creating the necessary policies for the ongoing conflict with the Kurds in the North, the 
loss of society’s confidence in the government based on the defeat of the Arab Armies 
against Israel in 1967 and “the failure of the Iraqi Army to support Jordan and Syria 
effectively in their war”37 provided favorable conditions for the Ba’th Party, waiting for 
the right circumstances and having made the connections with the key elements of the 
government, particularly in the security sector on which the regime relied, to overthrow 
the regime. Finally, the Ba’th Party, along with its supporters within the nationalists and 
the Army, took power in a classical military coup on July 17, 1968.38 
E. THE MILITARY UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN  
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a senior Free Officer, a Ba’thist from Takrit, and vice-
president of the first Arif Government became president after the 1968 coup. Colonel 
Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, Director of the Military intelligence during the Arif brothers’ 
reign, and Colonel Abd al-Rahman al-Da’ud, the commander of the Republican Guard, 
occupied the prime minister and the minister of defense posts, as the strong supporters 
and executers of the coup within the military. A cabinet, including eight Ba’th officers 
and six supporters of al-Naif and al-Da’ud, was formed and a ‘Revolutionary Command 
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Council’ was created with the participation of seven powerful officers within the 
Ba’thists and the Army, as the real authority of the country.39 
At first, the distribution of the posts within the government reflected a balance of 
power among the Ba’thsits and the Army. However, in a very short period, the Ba’thists 
determined not to repeat the mistake of 1963.  They would not share authority with the 
military and give the officer corps the opportunity to eliminate the Ba’th Party from the 
government. Al-Bakr started the consolidation of his authority by the elimination of the 
Minster of Defense, al-Daud, and the prime minister, al-Nayif from their posts within the 
government and the Revolutionary Command Council, and “by appointing over 100 
Ba’thist officers to [the] positions in the Republican Guard and other key units.”40 
After the elimination of two powerful officers, al-Daud and al-Nayif, from the 
administration, al-Bakr re-formed the Cabinet and Revolutionary Command Council. In 
this political environment, the Revolutionary Command Council, and in particular al-
Bakr, due to his strong ties with the army and Party, emerged as the real authority of the 
country. In the initial phase of the Ba’th reign, al-Bakr and his colleagues concentrated on 
the strengthening of the Ba’this ideology and the isolation of the opposition within the 
country. The Ba’th authority focused on the Iraqi Military and other security structures of 
the country in order to insure the survival of their regime, as generally happened in the 
history of Iraq after 1920. They employed an intensive replacement and isolation policy 
against untrustworthy officers, the officers whose loyalty to the Ba’th Party was doubtful, 
and started the Baathification of the military.  
Although the Ba’th Party took power with the support of the Iraqi Army and 
officer corps, the Ba’th regime looked at the military both as the necessary means and the 
most substantial challenger for its authority. The decisive factors in this thought and in 
the relations between the Ba’th regime and the Iraqi Military (the control mechanisms 
over the military and Iraqi officer corps, and the position of the military within the 
regime) were the general trend of the Iraqi military for intervention in the political agenda 
of the country, the ideas of the Ba’thist ideology about the role of the military in political 
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life, and the presence of sympathy for the Egyptian leader Abd al-Nasr within the Iraqi 
Military.41 As a result of this view, besides the Baathification of the Army, the Ba’th 
Regime constructed a personal security structure led by Saddam Hussein and formed a 
new Regional Council with the appointment of the Ba’thists mostly made up of civilians 
with a non-military background, except al-Bakr and Ammash, as the initial stages of the 
elimination of the military from the political agenda of the country and consolidation of 
the Ba’th regime within the country and military.42 
According to Shibli al-Aysami, a Ba’thist ideologue, “the military must be 
prohibited from interference in the political process because the military cannot rule 
effectively.”43 It was and also is possible for the foreign powers to exploit the military’s 
political ambitions. As a result of this ideological approach and the lessons learned from 
the failure in 1963, the Ba’th Party, particularly the civilian wing, emphasized the 
necessity of the “hegemony of the party over the military and instituted a series of wide-
ranging controls.”44 However, rather than democratic control over the military, based on 
democratic institutions, procedures, and norms, conveniently the general characteristics 
and policies of the regime, Civilian Control over the Iraqi Military under the Ba’th and 
Saddam reign occurred as a kind of subjective civilian control in a totalitarian regime, as 
described by Samuel Huntington: 
In a totalitarian regime,…., the power of military may be reduced by 
breaking the office corps up into competing units, establishing party 
armies and special military forces (Waffen-SS and MVD), infiltrating the 
military hierarchy with independent chains of command (political 
commissars), and similar techniques. Terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and 
force are the methods of governments in a totalitarian state; terror, 
conspiracy, surveillance, and force are the means by which the civilians in 
such a state control their armed forces.45  
Similar to Professor Huntington’s description, the Ba’th regime and Saddam 
Hussein used stringent mechanisms such as rotations, retirement, mass purges and 
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executions in order to prevent the military and officer corps from interfering in the 
political process of the country.  The Ba’th regime started to use these means in 
weakening the officer corps following the July, 1968 Ba’th takeover. Between two and 
three thousand officers whom the new regime considered politically unreliable were 
retired. While rotation was used to prevent officers from building up a close relationship 
with their units, execution was used mostly against the officers endeavoring to bring 
down the Ba’th regime. These methods were used not only against the officers whose 
loyalty were suspect, but also used to remove the officers who had distinguished 
themselves in battle and became popular and powerful within the military and society, 
especially during the Iran-Iraq war.46 
Besides the mechanisms mentioned above, Saddam Hussein created an 
overlapping structure of security services in order to watch each other and the armed 
forces and created a parallel military structure including the regular army, the Ba’th 
popular Army(constructed as a counterweight to the regular armed forces), Republican 
Guards Force (constructed in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war), and Special Republican 
Guards Force (constructed in 1995 under the supervision of Qusayy, the younger son of 
Saddam Hussein, in order to protect the president).47 In addition to these factions within 
the military, the new internal security organs (the most important was al-Mukhabarat) 
were created and recruited from the young men who were poorly educated and from a 
low socio-economic environment mostly within the Sunni population and from the Tikrit 
area.48  
Another control mechanism of the Saddam regime over the military was political 
penetration. In Iraq, the Ba’th regime and Saddam Husayn used the principles of 
Ba’thism, the concept of Pan-Arabism in an interpreted version, and a type of supervising 
mechanisms similar to communist regimes in order to maintain the ideological control 
over the military and in order to ensure the survival of the regime against the likely 
threats from the regime and in order to prevent the involvement of the military in the 
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political process of the country by creating a politicized or ideological military, as can be 
seen in the case of Syria. Additionally, Saddam Hussein constructed a security and 
intelligence oversight over the military by means of an enormous architecture of security 
and intelligence services, which occurred as the main device for the survival of the 
regime including 100.000-150.000 personnel and a wide-spread spy network.49 
In addition to the control mechanisms mentioned above, corporate interests of the 
military, personally or organizationally, such as promotions, appointments, assignments, 
retirement policies, budget allocations, payments, benefits, and living conditions were 
also used by Saddam in order to maintain control over the officer corps.50 However, these 
never included institutional processes or professional norms and instead, relied on the 
loyalties to the Ba’th Party and leadership, tribal and/or kinship relations, and personal 
choices and decisions of the leadership became the decisive factors, as occurred in 1976 
with the promotion of Saddam Hussein to the rank of four star general without any 
military background by President al-Bakr, or the promotion of Ali Hasan al-Majid, a 
cousin of Saddam who served as a driver of a fuel tanker as his most significant military 
career to a four star general by Saddam Hussein.51 
Besides harmful control procedures over the officer corps, Saddam used a 
personal decision making process and pacified the officer corps not only about strategic 
and political issues of the country, but also in operational and even in tactical decisions of 
the military in battle. This kind of intervention influenced the performance of the 
military, particularly in the Iraq-Iran War between 1979 and 1989. Similarly, the invasion 
of Kuwait was Saddam Hussein’s decision after a meeting with his cousins, Husayn 
Kamil and Ali Hasan al-Majid, and “the General Staff and the minister of defense learned 
of the decision only from a public radio broadcast.”52  
Despite the firm control mechanisms, there was always a tension between Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi officer corps, including not only the officers of the regular army, 
but also some of the officers of the Republican guards and special republican guards. In 
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addition to Saddam’s disrespectful policies, worsening relations between Saddam and the 
tribes providing the majority of the officers and the decline of the benefits provided by 
Saddam for the officer corps due to the sanctions on the regime after the first Gulf War 
affected the relations between the officer corps and Saddam Hussein. Based on this 
tension, and sometimes with the support of foreign intelligence services, several coup 
attempts occurred in Iraq. However, it is a reality that none of these attempts had mass 
support within the military and society because of the fear based on the terrible 
punishment methods and the overlapping security structure within the military and 
society.53 As a result, the Iraqi military under Saddam’s rule lost its efficiency as an 
institution and became a victim of the regime, together with most of the Iraqi Society. By 
employing these policies, Saddam destroyed the professionalism of the Iraqi Armed 
Forces, damaged its traditions, honor and self-respect as an institution and its officer 
corps.   
F. LESSONS FOR TODAY  
Exercising elections is not enough of an indicator for democracy. Even though 
Iraq has had several elections since 1924, this does not necessarily mean that Iraq has had 
the experience of democratic government in its history. For instance, while the first 
constitution was relatively democratic, this was only on paper and implementation was 
far from reality. Despite the electoral process, the traditional elites that occurred before 
the Saddam Hussein Regime or fear as happened in the elections during the Saddam 
Hussein era were the real influential factors instead of the public’s view. In such an 
environment, the Iraqi military has played a significant role in the political process of the 
country since the appearance of the Iraqi State under the mandate of Great Britain in 
1921.  
The military was a tool of civilian authoritarian regimes which emerged in Iraq, or 
it ruled as a military regime directly. It has regularly intervened in the political life of Iraq 
between the periods 1936 to 1968. Despite the fact that the intention of King Faisal and 
his administration was to create an institution as a means for the nation-building process 
of the country, the military did not have the required attitudes for this kind of vision. 
While conscription, despite resistance particularly from tribal sectors of the country, 
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started to weaken tribal loyalties in one respect, what replaced it was the rise of a pan-
Arabic ideology within the military instead of a nationalistic approach based on the idea 
of citizenship, and “the ideological indoctrination of Iraq’s officer class undermined the 
state-building role that militaries have traditionally played in developing some states.”54 
Even during the period of 1941-1958 under the influence of British policies, or under the 
Ba’th and Saddam Hussein Authority after 1963 coup, with severe control mechanisms, 
the Iraqi military’s intension was that of intervention mixed with its political anxieties.  
The former Iraqi Military was dissolved by the Coalitional Provisional Authority 
in 2003 as the initial step of the creation of a new security formation.  However, it is most 
likely that the new security architecture will be the target of several ethnic and sectarian 
groups of the country and they will attempt to employ similar initiatives in order to attain 
their special interests. The creation of a western style security structure will not be so 
easy in this political environment. Therefore, historical experiences, as recapitulated 
below, will be important for the effectiveness of the re-constituted Iraqi Military, or in a 
broader term Security Structure in Iraq: 
• The ethnic and sectarian factions, or political elites can tend to 
dominate the key positions in the Military or other Security Services 
in order to employ them as a repression instrument against other 
groups according to their political agenda: Nationalism based on pan-
Arabic ideology and Sunni hegemony within the officer corps, particularly 
in the top ranks, were predominant factors within the Iraqi Military and 
defense/security structure. This structure not only prevented the military 
from unifying the Iraqi society with its ethnic and sectarian diversities, but 
also provided the emergence and existence of several types of 
authoritarian, or in some cases, totalitarian regimes, particularly with a 
Sunni hegemony of 15-20 percent of the population. These regimes, either 
civilian or military, utilized the military as a means of suppression, 
particularly over the other ethnic and sectarian groups. In the new process, 
this phenomenon should not be neglected, because the ethnic or sectarian 
factions of the country can have the same tendency to use the military for 
their special intentions in the future, which will be able to cause the 
emergence of a new authoritarian regime in Iraq.  
• The ethnic, sectarian, or party militias and parallel military 
formations will probably weaken the state authority against 
traditional social structure and ethnic/religious factions, and cause 
hostilities amongst the factions of Iraq: All the groups that operated 
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against the government had the intention to cooperate with the military to 
overthrow the previous regime in the past. Additionally, they mostly relied 
on a dual military architecture or existence of paramilitary groups besides 
the regular military structure for the protection of the regime, such as the 
People’s Resistance after the 1958 coup, or the ‘National Guard’ during 
the first reign of the Ba’th Party, or Republican Guards, Special 
Republican Guards, and other special security formations in an 
overlapping structure during the Saddam Hussein Period. The exploitation 
of the Army to intervene in the government caused the coups and 
instability in the country. Additionally, the militia groups and armed 
groups of ethnic, sectarian, or tribal factions increased internal security 
problems in the country. Correspondingly, the existence of the militia 
groups of the several ethnic and sectarian parties threatens the success of 
the reconstruction process and long-term stability of the country. 
• The Military is likely to intervene as soon as foreign powers depart: 
Nationalism in Iraq arose, particularly during the British mandate and the 
second invasion period. Although the military did not display 
interventionist behavior during these periods, as a result of rising 
nationalism, also with the contribution of some internal or external 
episodes such as the Assyrian uprising or the Palestinian issue, the military 
had a tendency to intervene in the political process of the country, in 
particular, after the departure of the foreign powers as happened in 1936 
and 1958. This kind of a phenomenon can occur after the withdrawal of 
the U.S.-led Coalition, as a result of nationalist thoughts that can rise 
within the new Iraqi Military during the existence of the Coalition Forces 
in Iraq. 
• Civil-military relations in Iraq will be problematic not only from the 
military perspective, but also from the civilian perspective in 
reconstruction and post-reconstruction period because of the lack of a 
democratic tradition in either the military or civilian side of the 
country: Since its creation in 1921, democratic civilian control over the 
Iraqi Military has not occurred. Despite the fact that the military was 
under civilian control during the Saddam Hussein regime, this period did 
not include the institutionalized norms, rules, and procedures. Instead, the 
non-institutionalized procedures in terms of the professional process of the 
military, such as appointments, promotions, or assignments based on 
personal or political loyalty; the political intervention into the military 
structure, especially after the rise of Ba’th regime, and the politicization of 
the military; the general intention of using the military as a means of 
enforcing domestic politics emerged as the most highlighted 
characteristics of civil-military relations in Iraq. All these methods 
damaged the professionalisation and effectiveness of the military. 
Therefore, in order to create an effective military structure, it would be 
essential to re-formulate and institutionalize the civil-military relations and  
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National Security Process in post-war Iraq, not only from the point of the 
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III. IRAQI SOCIETY AND THE IRAQI MILITARY TODAY 
There are two main theoretical explanations of the linkage between ‘the collapse 
of a state’ and ‘ethnic and/or internal conflict.’ One argument assumes that ethnic or 
internal conflict causes the collapse of state. Another argument assumes that “state 
collapse causes ethnic or internal conflict.”55 In this context, Pauline H. Baker and Angeli 
E. Weller argue that: 
When the center dissolves, factionalization increases as loyalties shift 
from the state to more traditional communities and local leaders that offer 
psychic satisfaction and physical protection. Unless the process is 
reserved, it may result in communal violence, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide.56 
One of the main concerns for the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq after 
Saddam was, and still is, the possibility of a conflict amongst factions on the basis of its 
heterogeneous ethnic and sectarian composition. Additionally, the ethnic/religious 
composition and structural characteristics of a society are significant since they are the 
human source of the security services of the new Iraqi State. Divisions within Iraq and 
possible threats emanating from this structure will affect the reconstruction processes of 
the country and the reconstruction and reintegration of security systems. One must 
understand the multiethnic and sectarian diversities, tribal and family affiliations and 
middle class living in cities as the basic framework of an Iraqi society in order to create 
new security structures for the country.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Iraqi society with its ethnic and 
sectarian diversities and tribal structure in order to identify historical patterns and to 
figure out the current situation. What are the possible influences of Iraqi social structure 
on the security and political stability of the country generally and on the reconstruction 
and reintegration of the security structure of Iraq specifically? The first part of the chapter 
draws a general view of Iraqi society with its ethnic and sectarian factions by underlining 
their proportion of the population of the country, and their geographical location. Next, it 
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gives an historical overview to highlight the historical experiences and examples for 
future assessments. After that, it examines the current position of the ethnic and sectarian 
communities in order to ascertain their possible influences over the security and 
reconstruction and reintegration of the new Iraqi Security forces by focusing on their 
relations with the United States and the Iraqi Interim Government constructed after the 
war; the ethnic geography of the country; the political agenda of each group and their 
elites, such as tribal chiefs, and religious leaders; and their security concerns and 
paramilitary capabilities. Finally, it presents a summary of findings for use in the last part 
of the thesis.  
A. A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The Iraqi Military, although a key institution of the Iraqi State, has not been an 
instrument for Iraqi identity formation.  Despite its role as a core institution in providing 
the state capacity to govern, the military has not represented a unified national identity 
with a discussible exception of the regular Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq war. It was not 
an institution in which all the people of Iraqi society, without discrimination on the basis 
of his/her ethnic, religious, or social statues, had a chance to join and to be promoted to 
the high ranks and top positions with institutionalized norms and procedures. Instead, the 
military was an instrument of the repression of a minority dominated regime to guarantee 
his authority in the country. At this point, the failure of the Iraqi Military to emerge as a 
national institution and keep the people from all social and demographic factions of the 
country in its body with a unified view in terms of the role and missions of the Military is 
far from the collapse of an institution. Failure of the Iraqi Military as a national institution 
corresponds to the failure of the Iraqi state and society to unify. The explanatory factors 
for this failure were political structure, dominant ideologies unfitting for the nation 
building vision, influence of the traditional social structure over the formation and 
procedures of the military, the influence of traditional elites on the process and 
institution, the personal security anxieties of political/military leadership, security 
challenges of the country, and security policies of the government, including the dual 
formations of security organizations and reliance on militia forces.  
The British had created a state, not a nation, after World War I. The Hashemite 
Monarchy and military under British mandate was not based upon consensus amongst the 
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people living on Iraqi territory. Instead, the British rulers relied on a minority group, the 
Sunni Arabs, to maintain their authority. The main intention of the British rulers was to 
create a state structure, which would not challenge their interests, but also operate 
functionally in its territory. The emerging military was dominated by the Sunni officer 
corps, even after the expansion of the military via the conscription bill. This dominance 
was also a preference of the ruling elite, King Hussein and his Sunni Arab politicians and 
bureaucrats (civil and military) in order to survive their authority by using sectarian ties. 
Even though the participation of the Shiite Arabs and other ethnic communities in the 
bureaucracy and military increased numerically, the dominant position of the Sunni 
Arabs in key positions continued.  
The traditional social structure of the country (ethnic/sectarian/tribal/clan 
affiliations) and the influential role of the traditional ‘strong men’ also affected the 
process of the creation of strong institutions reflecting a national identity. Opposition 
from the Shiites and Kurds towards conscription in this period was not only a result of 
their anxieties concerning the emergence of a powerful military structure as a tool of the 
Sunni Arabs, but also was a consequence of the traditional elite’s fears that a powerful 
military could enable the central government to break their dominant positions over 
society. Meanwhile, pan-Arab ideology emerged as an ethnic based national view within 
the military but was not proper for Iraq with its ethnic diversities. Moreover, the Shiite 
Arabs also did not favor pan-Arabism, because it was seen as a means of eventual Sunni 
Arab dominancy. Consequently, discrimination policies of the British Colonialism and 
the ruling elites that banned the other ethnic and sectarian communities from participating 
in the military and other state institutions, the obstacles based on traditional social 
structure and elite anxieties, and an improper ideology that was not appropriated by most 
of the population resulted in the failure of nation-building. In these circumstances, the 
Iraqi Military, having been created under Sunni domination, could not be transformed 
into a respectful national institution with a unified national view embracing the entire 
Iraqi society. 
The collapse of the monarchy after the 1958 revolution and the Republic of Iraq 
was welcomed by Iraqi Society and the Iraqi military. However, the Sunni Arab 
domination within the state structure did not change.  The new regime could not offer the 
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proper ideology that would unify Iraqi society. Neither communism nor Arab nationalism 
was suitable ideologies to create a national identity in Iraq. Furthermore, these ideologies 
deepened the frictions within the society and caused grave security problems. Despite 
some major reforms, particularly carried on by Qasim, and the relative decline of the 
traditional social structure in favor of the growing urban population, the ruling elite, 
either Qasim or the Arif Brothers, seeking support to maintain their authority, utilized the 
traditional approach, as in the period of the Monarchy: family/clan affiliations (Arif 
Brothers) or party alliances (Qasim).  
It was a phenomenon that Iraq always had– and still has, that of a well-armed 
society. Tribes had their own militias to further their interests and to provide their own 
security against other tribes. The use of the militias by the governments to provide state 
authority, particularly in rural areas, was also another phenomenon that also occurred 
during the British Mandate and Monarchy.  
In the period of 1958-1969, government reliance on militia groups dramatically 
escalated. In fact, the formation of militia became an unwritten policy of the government 
and they were used by all the rulers until the collapse of the Saddam Hussein reign in 
2003. The escalating role of the militia groups harmed the construction of an 
institutionalized state structure with efficient security services that would provide security 
for all parts of the society, not only just for the ruling elite. 
The Ba’th Party period and particularly Saddam Hussein’s reign was a 
catastrophe in terms of the deepening diversities within the ethnic and sectarian factions 
and increasing hostilities between the state and its citizens. While the ruling elite were 
still from the same group as before, it was much more narrowed and personalized during 
the Ba’th party period and particularly after the presidency of Saddam Hussein in 1979. 
The top positions, key points and high ranks in government, bureaucracy and security 
organizations were appropriated according to personal loyalties. The procedures, 
principles and norms, which were not strong, were totally replaced by un-institutionalized 
methods. Even though the Ba’thist ideology viewed the tribal structure clan/family 
relations as the main obstacle to social development, the policies used to destroy this 
architecture in the initial period of the Ba’th regime were abandoned by Saddam Hussein 
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in order to cement his rule by exploiting this structure. The Iran-Iraq war was also 
decisive in these policies, because Saddam Hussein viewed tribes as a main source for 
recruitment.  
The essential expansion of the military due to the Iran-Iraq war resulted in two 
paradoxical incidents. The first was an increase in the number of soldiers from the Shiite 
population within the regular Army, and the construction of the Republican Guard, in 
some respects a Sunni militia force, and its dramatic rise as a repression tool of the 
regime against its ethnic and sectarian rivals. The Iraqi Army had a role for the first time 
in its history, with a small exception of the Arab-Israel War in 1967, “to defend the 
country against a foreign enemy, rather than to meddle in domestic politics.”57 The Iraqi 
Shiites, on the contrary, to the trepidation of the government, fought against Iran within 
the regular Iraqi Army and displayed loyalty to the Iraqi State, despite ongoing 
discrimination and repression policies that had been conducted for years by the 
governments. However, they could not gain their social and political desires. Besides, the 
Iraqi regular Army could not have the honor of its performance in the war. Additionally, 
the cooperation of the Kurds with Iran during the war to achieve their political demands58 
and the harmful response of Saddam Hussein by using the Republican Guard units and 
chemical weapons worsened the relations between the state and ethnic/sectarian 
composition of the country. 
The situation, in terms of the relations between the state and its population, 
worsened during the aftermath of the First Gulf War.  The Shiite uprising in the south, the 
revolts of the Kurdish groups in the north and military response of Saddam Hussein 
resulted in the establishment of ‘safety heavens’ and economic sanctions. While safety 
heavens caused the collapse of the state authority in northern Iraq in favor of two Kurdish 
groups, KDP and PUK, economic sanctions weakened the economic power of the state 
that was the main instrument to providing the support of the tribes. Additionally, 
economic sanctions damaged the social and economic circumstances of the middle class 
in favor of tribal and religious architecture. In this worsening situation, Saddam Hussein 
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enlarged his personal security web, such as the Special Republican Guard under the 
command of his younger son Qussay.  
Personal loyalties and family/clan affiliations became more important. Even 
though state structure did not disappear, with the exception of northern Iraq under the 
domination of two Kurdish groups, the state-society collaboration collapsed totally. In 
sum, despite the fact that Iraq has not faced a broad ethnic conflict amongst different 
factions of the country until now, it also could not have a unified society with sustainable 
security, “which refers to its ability of a society to solve its own problems peacefully 
without an external administrative or military presence.”59 In these circumstances, the 
Iraqi Military, despite the conscription conducted since 1935, in some respect, with an 
exception of the regular military during and after Iran-Iraq war, could not transform into 
an institution that would reflect a national view respected and appropriated by the 
majority of the population.  
When the state structure almost totally collapsed under the weight of the coalition 
invasion in 2003, what remained from the former Iraqi state was a divided society with 
different political agendas for the future of Iraq and a social structure on the basis of 
tribal, clan, or religious affiliations that deepen ethnic and sectarian fragmentations. 
Furthermore, recent events that occurred in Iraq since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein 
Regime have indicated that it is too hard to provide a sustainable peace environment in 
which all groups will seek the future of Iraq by means of negotiations without the support 
of the international community in deteriorating security circumstances. 
B. A SYNOPSIS OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY 
The social and demographic structure of a society and ethnic and religious 
formation of a country is a significant variable for the future predictions about security as 
a risk factor of internal conflict.60 Iraq is a varied society with its ethnic and religious 
diversities and lack of a cohesive identity. The estimated population is approximately 22 
million according to the 1997 census. However, there is no trustworthy data about the 
exact numbers of the population and precise portions of the ethnic, sectarian, or religious 
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groups and assertions are mainly based on estimations. While there is a tendency to 
examine the Iraqi population as three main ethnic/sectarian groups, the Shiite Arabs (55 
percent), the Sunni Arabs (17 percent), and the Kurds (15 to 22 percent), and other 
minorities,61 the Turkmen community, “not least the estimated 2 million Turkomans who 
live mainly in the north-east,”62 constitutes another major ethnic group according to the 
final results of the 1957 Census (the last reliable census in Iraq) declared by the Iraqi 
government in 1958. In accordance with the final results of 1957 Census, the Turkmens 
represented 9% of the total Iraqi population of 6,300,000 with 567,000 counted 
Turkmens, while the population of the Kurds was placed at 819,000, 13% of the Iraqi 
population.63  In addition to these four ethnic and religious groups, there are the Jewish 
and Christian minorities including the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, 
Armenians and Catholics.64  
The Shia community is the largest sectarian group in Iraq with an estimated 60 to 
65% of the Iraqi population. While Southern Iraq is considered the major geographic area 
of the Shia population in Iraq, there is a tendency to consider the Shia population in Iraq 
as only ethnically Arab. There are also “the Kurdish Failis in [the] northeastern 
provinces, the Turkmen in Kirkuk and Mosul, and the Iraqis of Persian origin in [the] 
Holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Kadmiya.”65 Despite the sectarian ties of the Shi’i 
population to the other ethnic groups with Shi’i Arabs, they have mostly their own 
political agenda. The Shi’i Arabs within the Shia community are the majority in Iraqi 
society with a population of approximately 55%.66  
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Even though the Shiite Arabs constitute the majority in Iraq, they have also 
factions including the religious and secular groups. Additionally, each sub-group has 
their own splinter groups. In this respect, one of the major issues in the post war era is 
“the fierce struggle within the Shi’ite religious circles [that] took an ominous turn on 
April 10 with the murder of Abd al-Majid al Kohei,”67 who was a representative of the 
idea of ‘quietism’ that “shield[s] the highest Shi’ite religious leadership, the marjaiyya, 
from politics.”68 Al-Dawa Islamiyah (the oldest Shiite Islamist political movement that 
was founded in 1957), the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 
Sadr Group (led by the young radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a follower of the 
Iraqi exile Ayatollah Kazim al-Husseini al-Haeri that accepts cleric rule with an Iranian 
view) and Hawza al Ilmiya (circle of scholars) and its leader Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani 
have become the main competitors of power struggle in Iraq, not only with other political 
establishments, Shiite or non-Shiite, but also amongst themselves in the post-war period. 
However, the Shiites are also aware that the post-Saddam era has offered them an 
opportunity to seize power for the first time since the emergence of Iraq from under 
British rule. Finally, despite their diversities, they are politically the most organized 
community in Iraq.   
The Sunni Arabs, comprising approximately 17% of the population and who have 
been in power for 83 years, constitute the predominant population in the west of the 
country, particularly in the areas of Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tikrit (the so-called Sunni 
Triangle). A large number of Sunni Arabs are also living in Baghdad, and the north and 
north-west provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. Due to their dominant position in the Ba’th 
Party, especially during the Saddam Hussein era, they are now concerned about their 
future, particularly in terms of a de-Baatification process and a new possible state 
formation that will be predominantly Shiite. Sunni Arabs have been usually the most 
secular Arab community in Iraq. However, there is skepticism that they will remain the  
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same, particularly with a growing Sunni militancy that is emboldened by emerging 
outside extreme religious terrorist organizations that provoke their circumstances and 
fears in the post-war era. 
The Kurds are one of the major non-Arab ethnic communities in Iraq with an 
estimated 13-22% of Iraq’s population. While most of the Kurdish population are Sunni 
Muslims, a small portion of them are also Shiite Muslims, named Feili Kurds.69 They 
fought with the Baghdad government several times for broad autonomy. Even though 
they gained autonomy from the Ba’th government in 1970, the clashes continued due to 
the dimension of the autonomy, particularly for their territorial demands on the oil-rich 
Kirkuk province, also with the encouragement of the external powers, such as Iran and 
the United States. After the Iran-Iraq war, they were exposed to a massive military 
campaign by Saddam Hussein, including the use of chemical weapons, because of their 
collaboration with Iran during the war.70 After the end of the first Gulf War, they enjoyed 
a de facto autonomy without the supremacy of the Baghdad regime provided by the 
safety havens established after the war. By using this de facto situation, they improved 
their political, economic, and militia capacities during the 1990s.  
The two main Kurdish Groups (KDP and PUK) operated in cooperation with the 
U.S.-led Coalition during and after the Second Gulf War and as a result of this 
cooperation, they emerged as the most benefited group in the post-war era. Despite the 
fact that they have unified their political efforts in the post-war era, the two main political 
groups, KDP and PUK, have their own administrative organizations and their own militia 
capacities. Additionally, the Kurdish Islamic Union is another political organization 
“formally established in 1994 and is said to be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, a 
moderate Sunni party well established in the Middle East.”71 In addition to these political 
compositions, tribal ties are a significant factor in the Kurdish population, as can be seen 
as  a  general  social  characteristic  in  Iraq.  Demands  of the Kurdish Groups on Kirkuk  
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because of its rich oil fields and their independence aspirations stated by their political 
and tribal elites have been a source of tension amongst the other ethnic and religious 
factions.  
The Turkmens are another non-Arab community in Iraq with close cultural and 
linguistic ties to Turkey. They include populations in both Shiite and Sunni belief.  
Geographically, they mainly live in the northern and north-west provinces of Kirkuk, 
Mosul, Irbil, Salahaddin, and Diyala. Additionally, a Turkmen population lives in 
Baghdad.72 Even though the presence of the Turkmen population and their cultural and 
linguistic rights were recognized by the Iraqi governments in the declaration of the 
Independent Iraqi Monarch in 1932 and in the decree of the Revolutionary Council issued 
on January 24, 1970, these were not continued by the later Iraqi governments. 
Furthermore, the Turkmen community was subjected to assimilation policies of the Iraqi 
governments, particularly after 1980, even including the massacre, as occurred in Irbil, in 
1996, which was registered in a report of the U.N. Human Right Commission 
(A/51/496/add. 18 November 1996).73 Additionally, a number of Turkmens, together 
with the Kurds and Assyrians, were forced to leave the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, as a 
result of the ‘arabisation’ policies of Saddam Hussein. In the post-war era, the Turkmen 
population in Iraq has been represented by two political organizations both of which are 
in favor of a democratic Iraq: the Turkmen Front and the Turkmen National Association.  
In addition to the Muslim population of Iraq, ethnically from the Arabs, Kurds, 
and Turkmens, there are also Christian and Jewish minorities. While the Christian 
population, including the Assyrians, the largest Christian community in Iraq, the 
Chaldeans, and small numbers of Syrian Orthodox, Armenians and Catholics, constitute 
approximately 3 to 4% of the entire Iraqi population, the Jews are only a few hundred, 
since approximately 150,000 of them were forced to leave Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Except for a large number of Assyrians living in the north-west provinces of the country, 
the Christians and Jews live in Baghdad.74 In the recent history of Iraq, while Iraq was 
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transforming to an independent monarchy in 1932, the Assyrians revolted on the basis of 
their autonomy demands, and were repressed by the Iraqi military. During the Ba’ath 
regime and Saddam Hussein rule, they were subjected to “internal deportation programs 
[together with the Kurds and Turkmens] aimed at maintaining the Arab and Sunni 
dominance of the country’s oil regions.”75 In the post-war era, the Assyrian Democratic 
Movement has been the political organization of the Assyrians and is also represented by 
a member in the Iraqi Governing Council. 
Besides the ethnic and religious multiplicity, the tribal structure and kin 
affiliations are also fundamental characteristics of Iraqi society that should be considered 
in the reconstruction and stabilization of the country. “There are an estimated 100 major 
tribes, 25 tribal confederations and several hundred cohesive clans in Iraq, and experts 
estimate that perhaps 40 percent of Iraqis still feel a close affinity to their tribes,”76 
although 72% of Iraqis live in urban areas where tribal structure is not so effective. Tribal 
structure and tribal chiefs were significant in the political life of Iraq and were exploited 
by the governments during the British mandate and the Iraqi monarchy in order to 
solidify their authority. After the emergence of the Ba’th Party regime in 1968, the tribal 
structure, the influence of tribal chiefs, and tribalism weakened on the basis of the 
Ba’thist ideology that tribal structure is one of the main obstacles to the improvement of 
society and the spread of Ba’th ideology within society. As a paradox, the unsuccessful 
land reform conducted in 1969 influenced this trend by increasing immigration from rural 
to urban areas. However, the Iran-Iraq war enhanced the significance of tribes for the 
Saddam Hussein regime and escalated the relations between Saddam Hussein and the 
tribes.77 Even though these relations worsened, even in the Sunni areas, as a result of the 
economic weaknesses of the State to reward the tribes and tribal chiefs, they have 
emerged as a critical actor in Iraq in the post Saddam era. 
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While tribal relations are significant, particularly in rural areas of the country, the 
middle class emerged in the large cities as a result of “the process of urbanization [that] 
has resulted in the erosion of traditional social structures and the old loyalties of extended 
family, tribe and religion.”78 Another factor that accelerated the role of the middle class 
in Iraq was the increase in the educated population. However, both factors could not 
broadly break the ethnic and sectarian ties in favor of an Iraqi citizenship concept. This 
social establishment can make a significant contribution to the construction of a post-war 
order in the country. On the other hand, their deteriorating economic conditions and 
security concerns are challenges in the new era that may be exploited by the ethnic and 
religious elites due to their ethnic and religious ties. This can cause security problems 
such as the riots against the new emerging state authority or intercommunity conflicts as 
a result of provocations of the ethnic or religious groups living in the large cities with 
their intermingled population. 
C. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY 
Historical experiences of a country are significant, particularly since nations that 
have experienced civil war are likely to experience it again.79 Iraq has not fortunately had 
an ethnic civil war since its genesis in 1921.80  Also, it has not had a unified society 
based on citizenship or a democratic structure in which citizens have equal rights. 
Instead, a minority Sunni Arab community, even only the elite part of it with clan 
relations, generally dominated the key points of the government and bureaucracy. From 
this standpoint, the other communities tracked their political desires via other means, 
including conflict and violence. The response of the governments against these actions 
was violent and included the use of overwhelming military force and even the use of 
chemical weapons against civilians.  
1. The British Mandate and Iraqi Monarchy (1921:1958) 
The Iraqi state that emerged under the British mandate in 1921 “was weak, 
unstable, poor, and underdeveloped … [with its] tribal, ethnic, sectarian, and regional 
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differences.”81 Before the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy under the British mandate, 
several groups had different ideas for the post-Ottoman configuration in Iraq. For 
instance, some tribal chiefs, particularly those who were benefiting from the British 
invasion during the First World War, wanted the continuation of British rule. On the 
other hand, the Shi’a clergy’s desire was an Islamic state, while the Kurds and the 
Assyrians were seeking autonomy.82 
Before the solidification of British rule in Iraq after the invasion of the country in 
the First World War, the Shiite religious leaders in Southern Iraq and the Sharifians based 
in Syria had a consensus on the formation of an Arab Islamic State “ruled by an Arab 
Muslim king, one of the sons of … Sharif Husayn, bound by a national legislative 
assembly [as an oversight mechanism of the Shiite Clerics over the legislative process] 
based in Baghdad.”83 After the San Remo resolutions, which had placed Iraq under the 
mandate of the U.K., “both the Sharifians and Mujtahidts [Shiite clerics] … gave the 
highest priority to achieving unity between Shi’is and Sunnis.”84 The Shi’i tribes in the 
lower Euphrates rebelled in August 1920 after the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed 
Taqi Shirazi that proclaimed “none but Muslims have a right to rule over Muslims.”85 
When the rebellion was suppressed by British forces, the Sunni Arabs were given the 
leadership role in the country by the British as a consequence of their cooperation with 
the British authorities in order to insure their communal interests,86 and as a result of the 
general intention of colonialism to rule the colonized country with “a weak minority-
based client regime,”87 as could be seen in Syria under the French mandate after World 
War I. Consequently, the rule of the Sunni Arab minority started in 1921, despite the 
majority position and displeasure of the Shi’ite Arabs and dissatisfaction of other ethnic 
and religious communities of the country. 
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The reluctance of the British to work with the Shiite majority was not the only 
reason for the emergence of Sunni domination in governmental and bureaucratic posts. 
The unwillingness of the Shiites to accept ministerial and bureaucratic posts on the basis 
of the ‘fatwas’ of the Shiite clerics that prohibit working with an ‘unjust reign’ and the 
inadequate number of educated population due to the lack of secular schools in the Shiite 
provinces were other significant reasons for the British not to work with the Shiites. 
Additionally, the governments utilized discrimination and repression policies. Eventually, 
these policies resulted in the disenfranchisement of the Shiites from the government, 
bureaucracy, civil-services, and Iraqi security organizations in favor of the Sunni Arabs 
and “the state caved to tribal Arab Sunni pressures, whose influence became dominant in 
the army and security organizations.”88 As an example, in the cabinet posts in the period 
of 1920 to 1936, “the Shi’a who formed 56 percent of the population of Iraq, provided 
only 24 percent of cabinet members.”89 As another instance to display the degree of 
disenfranchisement applied to the Shiites, while “the Kurds [as another community 
ethnically different from the Sunni Arab rulers] … held 22 percent of the high-ranking 
government posts [in 1930], the Shi’is, who formed the majority of the population, hold 
only 15 percent."90 Although the prohibitions on the basis of the fatwas of the Shi’ite 
religious leaders for the acceptance of posts in ministries and bureaucracy was removed 
in 1927 and the Shi’ites started to express their preference to work with the British, 
indeed to be ruled directly by the British instead of the Sunnis, they could not have 
enhanced their numbers in ministerial and bureaucratic posts due to the reluctance of the 
Sunni governments to share the authority and British disinclination to change the balance 
of power between the Sunni and Shi’i Arab communities of Iraq.  
Besides discrimination against other ethnic and sectarian groups to participate in 
the government and bureaucracy, the political system did not offer real choices for the 
population, even the Sunni Arabs’. The traditional tribal structure and the power of the 
tribal chiefs over the population, insufficient education that fed this structure, and 
reward/punish policies utilized by the governments to cooperate with tribal sheikhs were 
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effective on this phenomenon.  This structure was also encouraged and exploited by the 
Iraqi governments and their British supporters for the maintenance of their authority. For 
example, after the 1920 Shiite revolt, the Iraqi governments and British mandate 
attempted to break the power of the Shi’ite religious leaders by cooperating with tribal 
sheikhs and strengthening their ties with the central state via economic and political 
privileges, such as offering them seats in the Assembly.91 Consequently, rather than the 
vote of the ordinary people, “election results in the country side were the outcome of 
various clashes and compromises between the will of the government… and the wishes 
of the major chiefs of landlord.”92 
The main security problems in Iraq during the Hashemite Monarchy were ethnic 
and/or tribal uprisings with different political and economic desires, such as autonomy, 
objection to conscription, or local issues, such as taxes, land or irrigating privileges, and 
riots, particularly as a consequence of the deteriorating economic conditions of the urban 
population during and after the Second World War. While the Iraqi government was 
exploiting the authority of the landlords and local power holders, with the exception of 
the Iraqi Shiite clergies, it also attempted to strengthen the state authority in the country 
overall. The army emerged as the main instrument to claim state authority and to provide 
internal security, especially after crushing the Assyrian rebellion in 1933.  Arabic identity 
and Arab nationalism emerged as the favorite ideology of the ruling elite to create a 
national identity, which was paradoxical with the ethnic and sectarian structure of the 
country. Arab nationalism, contrary to the intention of the governments to create a 
national identity, escalated the ethnic movements and revolts of non-Arab communities. 
On the other hand, the state policies to strengthen the central authority, such as the 
conscription bill to expand the size of the military, were seen as a threat by the Shiite 
Arabs and Iraq’s non-Arab ethnic communities, especially the Kurds, and particularly in 
tribal areas. In addition to the motivating influence of these policies, particular stimulates 
such as the personal security concerns of tribal chiefs, or their anxieties on taxes, land or 
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irrigation benefits given to some particular tribes by the government resulted in unrest in 
the country as had occurred in the mid-Euphrates region.93 
The number of communities other than the Sunni Arabs, particularly the Shiites in 
ministerial positions and bureaucracy increased in the 1940s and 1950s. This was a result 
of the increase in the number of educated young Shiites with a secular mentality. 
However, the Sunni Arabs were in the key positions in the civilian and military 
bureaucracy and there were strict restrictions for “the Shi’is [in the entry] to the military 
and police academies, as well as against the very small number of Shi’i officers in the 
army and on the police force.”94 In this context, a political attempt of the Shiites in 1952 
with the demand for direct elections instead of official candidate lists to balance the 
power of the Sunnis in the government via parliamentary majority was suppressed by the 
army that was called by the Iraqi government.95    
The failure of the ethnic and sectarian communities, particularly the Shiite Arabs 
to reach their political demands resulted in the spread of radical movements, such as 
communism and Islamic ideology in the late 1940s and 1950s, the last years of the Iraqi 
Monarchy, even though they were opposing ideologies. In this perspective, the 
Communist Party became effectual within the Kurdish population, with the catchwords 
emphasizing Kurdish rights and autonomy,96 and among the educated young Shiites 
mostly from urban areas, who controlled the high level party organizations, as a response 
to the government’s reluctance to share power, the revival of Islamic Ideology and its 
politicization with the al-Dawa Party, was not only a result of an intent to create an 
Islamic State in Iraq, but was a consequence of the fear of the Shiite clerics over the 
spread of communism within the young generation of Shiites.97  The worsening 
economic conditions of the country due to the Second World War were also an influential 
factor that escalated the opposition to mobilize the population and caused the riots, “most 
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spectacularly the Parsmouth Riots of January 1948 and the 1952 intifada.”98 Eventually, 
the Monarchy was ended by the coup of July 14, 1958 led by free officers.  
2. The Collapse of the Monarchy and the Period of 1958-1968 
The 1958 coup and the emergence of the new government under the reign of 
General Qasim was a result of the alliance between the army and the Iraqi communist 
Party (ICP). The alliance with the ICP and its supporters, including the party militias, ‘the 
People’s Resistance’ was a necessity for General Qasim, “who had neither kin nor 
regional networks at his disposal,”99 in his struggle with Abd-al Salam Arif, to provide 
mass support for his authority. As the most highlighting characteristics of the Qasim era, 
in the period of 1958-1963, the land reform, housing policies, and developments in 
education and health services weakened the influence of the Shi’a land owners in favor of 
the poor Shi’ite population in the cities and the Shi’te peasants. Additionally, some 
obstacles to the Shiites to join the military academy and the Staff College were removed. 
Yet, the successors of Qasim, the Arif Brothers, did not track the same policies with their 
pan-Arabic nationalist view. Finally, the representation of the Shiites in top positions was 
limited to 16% in the top governmental and bureaucratic positions, while it was 35% in 
the secondary level positions during the period of 1958-1968.100     
The rise of the ICP and Communist ideology also escalated the security problems. 
The communist ideology was opposed not only by the Arab nationalists, mostly from the 
Sunni Arabs, but also by the Islamists, including both the Shiite and the Sunni religious 
leaders and Islamic political formations. Consequently, this resulted in a political hostility 
that emerged within the society and was fed by the ethnic, sectarian and tribal enmities, 
which caused “serious political violence, the most evident of which were the infamous 
massacres in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad.” 101 
The Mosul incidents started as a clash based on the political aggression between 
the local nationalist and communists, on March 7, 1959. The next day some army troops 
led by nationalist commanders revolted. Eventually, the violence escalated as a result of 
                                                 
98 Elliot, ‘Independent Iraq,’ p. 18. 
99 Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, p. 55. 
100 Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq, pp. 7-8. 
101 Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p .67. 
44 
“long standing ethnic and inter-tribal rivalries between Arabs and Kurds and between 
different Arab tribal factions, and with the hatred of peasants for their landlords.”102 On 
the other hand, the Kirkuk incident was mainly an ethnic based conflict between “the 
Turcoman population of the city and the more recent Kurdish incomers.”103 The violence 
started as a result of political appointments in the city in favor of the Kurds on the basis 
of their close relations with the ICP “with the result that the Turcomans, who had always 
dominated the socio-economic and political life of the town, now felt themselves 
increasingly disadvantaged.”104 
Besides the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, and deteriorating security conditions in 
the large cities, the refusal of the autonomy demand of the Kurdish groups by the 
government resulted in the Kurdish revolt. The fighting was not only between the 
rebelling Kurdish tribes and government forces, but also between the rebellion groups 
and some other hostile Kurdish tribes. While the government could not suppress the 
revolt totally, the rebellions could not achieve their political desires either and 
consequently they looked for another alliance connected with the Ba’th Party that had a 
Pan-Arab nationalist and secular view.105 After Qasim was taken over in 1963 by another 
military coup with the alliance of the Ba’th Party, the negotiations started just after the 
coup between the new government and the Kurdish Groups, particularly ‘Kurdistan 
Democrat Party’ (KDP). However, the negotiations collapsed with the demands of the 
Kurdish Groups, including “an expanded Kurdish province administrated exclusively by 
Kurds, defended by Kurdish Armed Forces, with independent finances based on local 
taxes and on a fixed proportion of oil revenues,”106 and a military campaign continued 
until the break down of the revolt in 1975 during the Ba’th authority.  
3. The Ba’th Regime and the Period of Saddam Hussein  
The Iraqi Ba’th Party was founded by Fuad al-Rikabi, a Shi’ite engineering 
student from Nasiriya, in 1949. Its first members were mostly the Shiite Arabs who were 
the relatives and friends of Rikabi. While the Party was small in size with only a few                                                  
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hundred members before the 1958 coup, it expanded dramatically underground between 
the period of 1958 and 1962, particularly after its assassination attempt on Qasim in 
1959. Just after the overthrown of the Qasim government in 1963, three fractions 
emerged in the party on the basis of personal, factional, and sectarian ties. Among these, 
the group named as “centrists,’ consisting of mainly Sunni Arabs, held power in the 
party. Eventually, the representation of the Shiites in various regional leadership 
positions declined from 54% to 14% during the period of 1963 and 1970 in favor of the 
Sunni Arabs, particularly in favor of the Sunni Arabs mostly from Tikritis, when the 
Ba’th Party took over the Iraqi authority in 1968.107    
The role and representation of the population was more narrowed in the period of 
the Ba’th Party and especially after the presidency of Saddam Hussein. Despite the initial 
policies attempting to break down the tribal structure, the ruling elite was mostly from the 
Tikritis, a tribe in the town of Tikrit in the north-west part of Iraq. Moreover, family 
kinship and personal loyalties became more decisive in holding the key points in Party, 
government, bureaucracy, and security services. Despite the fact that the Shiites and non-
Arab population were motivated to join the Party organizations, “the most important 
positions in the government, army and internal security remained safely in Sunni-Arab 
hands (and, to a large extent, in the hands of people hailing from Tikrit, General Bakr’s 
and Saddam Husayn’s home town).”108 Additionally, while “in many symbolically 
prominent positions, as well as in local organizations, the whole range of Iraq’s diverse 
population was well represented”109 as a strategy of Saddam Hussein to provide a 
unifying identity, all so-called national organizations were under the personal control of 
Saddam Hussein. Consequently, the Ba’th party, and particularly during the Saddam 
Hussein Period, can be characterized as the peak of the family/tribe affiliations and 
personalization of the rule in Iraq. In this respect, “the ideology of the Ba’ath party was to 
be whatever he [Saddam Hussein] said it was”110 during the Saddam Hussein reign. 
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In the first years of its rule, “the Ba’ath government contained a major Kurdish 
rebellion in the north, as well as a small scale communist guerilla movement in the marsh 
areas in the south.”111 The aggression between the government and the Shiites in the 
south and the Kurdish revolts, sometimes as guerilla movements, continued as the most 
important security issues throughout the Ba’th regime and the Saddam Hussein reign. 
The major differences of the movements of these two communities were the following. 
While the Shiite movements were against the type of regime and its repression policies 
over the Shiite community, particularly in religious and religious education, the main 
reason for the Kurdish rebellions concerned the type and geographic area of their 
autonomy. The rebelling Kurdish groups mostly interacted with Iran, and were 
encouraged and supported by Iran either during the Shah period in order to solve the 
border dispute in favor of Iran or after the Iran Islamic revolution during the Iran-Iraq 
war. However, the Iraqi Shiites were not involved in a broad alliance with Iran, even 
during the Iran-Iraq war, and “fought against their Iranian coreligionists, showing that 
their loyalty to the Iraqi state overrode their sectarian allegiance and their discontent with 
the Sunni-dominated Baath regime.”112  
The response of the Ba’th regime against the security problems and political 
demands of the ethnic and sectarian communities included violence, with some 
exceptions such as the autonomy given to the Kurds in 1970. The state violence was not 
only against the rebelling groups but also against the civilians and “the level of violence 
initiated and orchestrated by the state against its own citizens [was] one of the worst 
throughout the region.”113 The use of chemical weapons in Halabja, named al-Anfal, in 
March 1988 against the Kurdish population that resulted in the death of an estimated 
4,000 people including women and children and the harsh suppression of the spontaneous 
Shiite uprising in Basra, Nasiriyya, Najaf and Karbala after the first Gulf War in March 
1991 by using the Republican guards with a cost of an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 
civilian causalities114, were the most brutal instances of the Ba’ath regime. 
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Besides the conflict between the state and its different ethnic and sectarian 
communities, the clash among the sub-groups of the Kurdish communities was another 
phenomenon during the Ba’ath and Saddam era. The most prominent example of this 
type of fight occurred between two Kurdish groups, KDP and the Popular Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). In this respect, while the KDP was supported by Iran during the 1970s 
for its actions against the Iraqi government, the PUK cooperated with the Ba’ath 
government.115 Paradoxically, in 1996, during the fight between the two groups, the PUK 
was supported by Iran, while the KDP cooperated with Saddam Hussein,116 despite the 
al-Anfal campaign of 1988 mentioned above. 
The first Gulf War was very decisive in terms of the current situation of the Iraqi 
population and its ethnic/sectarian factions. Particularly the establishment of the ‘safe 
havens’ just after the first Gulf War, including no-fly zones over the north of the 36th 
parallel and below the south of the 32nd parallel, which was extended to the 33rd parallel 
in 1996, as an effort to protect the Kurds and Shiites from a military campaign similar to 
al-Anfar in 1988117 and the UN sanctions that “meant that Iraq was unable to sell its oil 
to earn foreign currency and was severely limited as to what it could import”118 were two 
major incidents that shaped the current circumstances of ethnic and sectarian 
communities and national unity in Iraq. In this context, while the Kurdish groups enjoyed 
de-facto sovereignty as a result of the international restrictions on the Baghdad 
administration, and improved their political autonomy and paramilitary capacity, “the 
Shiite Arabs were not so lucky and continued to suffer the regime's oppression.”119 On 
the other hand, the UN sanctions weakened the economic and social circumstances of the 
Iraqi middle class living in the large cities, particularly in Baghdad, representing ‘an Iraqi 
national identity’ in favor of the ethnic, religious/sectarian, tribal, or ideological sub-
identities of the country.120 
                                                 
115 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 229. 
116 Terrill, Nationalism, Sectarianism, p. 26. 
117 Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane’s Security Assessment-The Gulf States, November 16, 2004, p. 15. 
Available at http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/iraqs070.... 
accessed on 12/29/2004. 
118 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 261. 
119 Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane’s Security Assessment-The Gulf States, p. 16 
120 Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p. 69. 
48 
According to a common view, the fundamental reason for the Coalition Forces in 
the First Gulf War in 1991 not to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime was a general 
anxiety about the emergence of an authority vacuum and chaos environment in post-
Saddam era in Iraq. Consequently, what emerged after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
in the second Gulf War was a similar portrait of Iraq with a more fragmented society with 
its ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, and ideological identities and political agendas. 
4. Implications of History 
A fortunate indicator from its 83-year history is that Iraq has not had an ethnic 
war. On the other hand, Iraqi society did not have a ‘national identity’ either.  In this 
respect, the most significant historical experiences of Iraqi society, and its ethnic and 
sectarian factions that should be considered for the future security assessments and 
policies follow. 
• Minority dominated governments, since the emergence of Iraq as a nation 
state in 1921, have been a source of instability. Other ethnic and sectarian 
communities could not have a chance to be represented in the key points 
of the governmental and bureaucratic (civil and military) positions; 
• Tribal structure, family relations and elite relations have been more 
effective in the politics and institutions of Iraq than individuals. Therefore, 
it is not possible to discuss options for the entire population, even for the 
ordinary Sunni population, to compete for the key positions in government 
and bureaucracy; 
• The Sunni Arab dominated regimes attempted to mobilize pan-Arabism 
instead of an Iraqi identity based on citizenship, despite the dissatisfaction 
of the other ethnic and sectarian groups, indeed including the Shiite Arab 
majorities; 
• The Iraqi society was, and still is well-armed and the ethnic, sectarian and 
tribal structures have had militia forces. This portrait resulted in the revolts 
of ether the Shiite Arabs or some of the other ethnic groups, particularly 
the Kurds and Assyrians, against the government in order to achieve their 
political or economic desires. However, each group had fractions within 
their own communities due to the political fragmentation and traditional 
social structure including tribes, family affiliations, or sub-sectarian 
formations, which was exploited by the governments via the temporary 
cooperation and alliances with these fractions for the maintenance of their 
authority; 
• Shiites and Kurds share resentment of Sunni dominance, but political 
objectives differ. Shiite objectives were mostly related to the type of 
regime. The Kurds have generally a political agenda with the goal of 
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autonomy or independence. Kurd separatism threatened the territorial 
integrity of Iraq and resulted in the frictions with the other communities, 
particularly the Sunni Arabs and Turkmens, living in the same 
geographical area with the Kurds; 
• Iraq has not had an ethnic war, but governments have used the military 
against the civilians.  This includes use of overwhelming force and the use 
of chemical weapons, to suppress the political desires of the other ethnic 
or sectarian groups in all periods of modern Iraq.  
D. ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN INFLUENCE ON RECONSTRUCTION  
One of the main pre-war discussion topics was the possible reactions of different 
ethnic and sectarian communities to a U.S. led military campaign against Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.121 In this respect, in the north, while the Kurds were considered a 
natural alliance based on a 12 year de-facto, the fundamental issue on the Turkmen 
population of the country was generally related to Turkey and the main intention was to 
ignore the Turkmen population despite their 9% (at least) population in Iraq according to 
the final results of the 1957 census and their demographic, social and economic position 
in the oil rich provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. On the other hand, while there was a 
consensus that the Sunni Arabs would resist in the north-west, west, and Baghdad, the 
general thought about the possible reaction of the Shiite Arabs was that they would 
welcome a military campaign that would end a long period of repression.  
Not surprisingly, the Kurdish groups, particularly paramilitary forces of KDP, led 
by Barzani, and the PUK, led by Talabani operated in cooperation with the U.S. forces in 
the north. In contrast to general expectations, “large segmentation of the population [with 
the exception of a small resistance in the south] remained neutral in the confrontation 
between the U.S.-led coalition and Saddam’s defenders.”122 Besides the neutrality of the 
population, the reluctance, and insufficiencies of the Iraqi military offered a quick victory 
to the Coalition Force. However, this quick victory paradoxically influenced the post-war 
era due to the sensitivities of the country and the inadequate preparedness of the Coalition 
Planners for these sensitivities, either to exploit or to oppose them. The multi-ethnic and 
multi-sectarian structure of the country, security problems based on this structure, and 
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“its potential for communal and political violence”123 emerged as the biggest threat for 
the reconstruction and stabilization of the country. 
Despite the fact that multi-ethnic demography is not always a threat for the 
security and stability of a country, this idea is acceptable mostly for the countries that 
have a well institutionalized democratic structure with a population connecting to each 
other, with the concept of a civic nationalism. In this respect, historical tensions among 
the factions, the ethnic geography of a country, along with the national ideologies and the 
economic circumstances, including the share of economic resources (particularly crucial 
in Iraq), security concerns of ethnic and religious communities and their independent 
militia capacities, and the political agenda of each group and their elites are significant 
intervening variables as “the underlying causes of ethnic and internal conflicts.”124 
1. Ethnic Geography, National Identity and Secessionist Demands  
The existence of the ethnic minorities in a country is a risk factor for stability and 
the possibility of an ethnic/internal conflict. On the other hand, geographic distribution of 
the ethnic/sectarian communities is another factor affecting the possibilities. In this 
respect, while “in some states with ethnic minorities, ethnic groups are intermingled; in 
others, minorities tend to live in separate provinces or regions of the country.”125 
Additionally, secessionist tendencies are more likely in countries where ethnic and 
sectarian factions are not intermingled geographically. It is another risk factor for the 
security and stability of a country that secessionist demands can result in “direct attacks 
on civilians, intense guerilla warfare, forced expulsion, and genocide.”126 Furthermore, if 
there is a competition for the resources of the country that are existing in particular 
territories with mixed ethnic or sectarian population, as happened in Iraq, security 
problems are much more likely. 
In terms of ethnic geography, Iraq has a both separate and intermingled 
demographic structure. In the south, the population is mostly Shiites with some small 
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exceptions. In Baghdad, there is an intermingled population while the majority is Shiite 
Arabs. In western Iraq, particularly in the so-called Sunni triangle, the population is 
mostly Sunni Arabs, generally in tribal structure. On the other hand, the north-western 
part of the country is a composition of Sunni Arabs, Turkmens, Kurds, and other 
Christian minorities. Finally, the majority of the population in the provinces of northern 
Iraq is the Kurds, in mostly tribal structure and including two main political groups in a 
political, economic and military competition before the war, and Turkmens and 
Assyrians. 
The population of southern Iraq and the cities of Karbala and Najaf are mostly 
Shiites, ethnically with a majority of Arabs. Additionally, Karbala and Najaf are two 
significant religious centers of Shiite belief. As mentioned in the section of historical 
experiences, the Shiites did not have secessionist demands and actions in general, even 
during the Iran-Iraq war, despite the discrimination policies conducted by the Iraqi Sunni 
political elites since the emergence of Iraq under the British mandate in 1921. The 
Second Gulf War and the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime have offered an 
opportunity to the Shiites “to emerge as dominant in Iraqi politics.”127 Moreover, 
territorial integrity of Iraq has been significant for both the Shiite and Sunni Arab 
communities since the emergence of Iraq in 1921.  In this respect, the Shiite Arabs are 
most likely aware that  a new state that will be constructed in southern Iraq will result in 
the loss of the holy cities of Kazimain and Samara,  and the capital city, Baghdad, an 
important historical and political center with its Shiite population that constitute 
approximately half of the population of the city. Additionally, such a division will 
deprive the Shiites of the oil revenues of Kirkuk and Mosul provinces.128  At this point, 
the surprising resistance in the initial stage of the War by some Iraqi Military units and 
militia groups against the Coalition Forces and the reluctance of the Shiites in the 
southern Iraq not to cooperate with the U.S.-led Coalition can be explained in two ways. 
First was their feeling that the U.S.led Coalition betrayed them during the spontaneous 
uprising in 1991, which resulted in hundred of thousands of Shiites killed as a result of 
the military campaign of the Baghdad regime. The second was their skepticism about the 
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long-term objectives of the United States and their abhorrence of “the idea of an Iraqi 
government installed by the United States to further America’s interests, just as the 
Sharifians were brought in by the British in 1921.”129 
While these are not secessionist intentions in the Shiite dominated areas of 
southern Iraq, the attacks targeting the civilians, the Shiite religious leadership, or the 
Shiite templates can ignite the counter-attacks against the minor Sunni population living 
in this part of the country, which will be able to result in a wider sectarian conflict. The 
recent attacks that occurred in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in December, just 
before the upcoming elections in January, and were reacted to with the warning of the 
Shiite leaders to be calm can be evaluated in this perspective that the aim of the attacks 
was to inflame the sectarian division by provoking the Shiites to respond with violence 
against the Sunnis.130   
Baghdad, contrary to southern Iraq, has an intermingled population in terms of 
ethnic and sectarian factions of the country. In this respect, the city is a risk area, 
particularly for a Sunni-Shiite clash. The deteriorating economic and social 
circumstances of the middle class residents of the city, the attacks to the religious and 
political leaders and temples of the Shiite and Sunni population in Baghdad, and such 
incidents in other cities, as mentioned above, which will result in clashes between these 
sectarian communities by provocations of extremists and terrorist organizations are the 
factors that will increase the possibility of a clash, particularly between the Sunni and 
Shiite Arabs. 131  Emerging hostilities after these kinds of incidents can cause the conflict 
between the communities on a larger scale in the future.  
The main concern of the Sunni Arab population in the post-war era is to maintain 
their social and economic benefits that they gained since 1921.  In this respect, the 
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incidents in the Sunni dominated provinces, particularly in the so-called Sunni triangle, 
occurred as insurgencies and terrorist acts against the U.S. forces, Iraqis cooperating with 
the Coalition Forces, and foreigners participating in the reconstruction and reintegration 
process. The former Ba’athists and outsiders, particularly the foreign Sunni terrorists like 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are the contributing factors that provoke and accelerate the 
violence in the Sunni areas.132 
The north and northeast of Iraq are the most problematic territories in Iraq in 
terms of ethnic geography, secessionist desires, and the possibility of an ethnic conflict.  
In this context, the Sunni Arabs are in favor of a unified Iraq. However, their main 
concern is about the loss of their power in the government and their social and economic 
privileges before the war. The Turkmen groups are also looking for a unified democratic 
Iraq in which they will be secure and their cultural rights will be protected. Their main 
concerns are the existence of an ethnic based authoritarian government that will restrict 
their cultural and political rights or the construction of an ethnic based federal structure, 
particularly under the rule of the Kurdish groups. In this respect, during the debates on 
the ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period,’ Songul 
Chapouk, the Turcoman member of Iraq’s Governing Council, stated that “Turcomans 
would declare their own ‘Turkmanistan’ if the Kurds looked like fulfilling their 
ambition.”133 On the other hand, the political agenda of the Kurdish groups includes their 
desires for the construction of an ethnic based federalism in Iraq, their territorial demand 
for the oil rich Kirkuk province, and their reluctance to disband their militia forces, 
namely peshmerga, which are in contradiction with the other ethnic groups, interim 
government, and even with the U.S.-led Coalition. 
Despite the autonomy given by the Ba’ath government according to the 1970 
agreement, the Kurds were in conflict with the Baghdad government. In addition to the 
policies conducted by the government, the demands of the Kurds to expand their 
autonomy, to keep the peshmerga under their control independently from the central 
government, and to take the Kirkuk province under the control of Kurdish groups were 
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the main reasons for the clashes between the central government and the Kurdish groups. 
After the first Gulf War, the Kurds have enjoyed de-facto autonomy in the north under 
U.S. protection and strengthened their political circumstances and militia capacities. Even 
during this period, their political desire on the city of Kirkuk continued, and as a result of 
this political agenda, “the Kurdish parliament that met in late 2002 agreed that Kirkuk … 
must be the capital of a common autonomous Kurdish region with virtual independence 
from Baghdad except in national Defense.”134   
Before and during the second Gulf war, the Kurdish Groups cooperated with the 
U.S.-led Coalition, and as a result of this cooperation, they have had the chance to hold 
critical positions in the interim government and bureaucracy in Iraq since the end of the 
war. Despite their cooperation with the CPA, the major problem of the Kurdish groups 
with the interim government, the other ethnic groups, and with the CPA is on the type of 
government for the future of Iraq. In this respect, despite the ‘Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’135 confirmed on March 8, 2004 and 
declarations of the United States and CPA officials, emphasizing their desire for a unified 
Iraq, the leaders of the Kurdish groups have continued to make announcements for a 
federal ethnic based structure. In fact, Mesud Barzani, the leader of KDP and a member 
of the ‘Transitional Governmental Council’ in Iraq before the interim government, 
declared that not only federalism but also independence is the right of Kurds in Iraq.136 
As a last attempt on this issue, the Kurdish groups gave the UN a written application 
stating their desire for an independent state in the north of Iraq.137 At this point, a 
demand including a separatist movement or an ethnic based federal construction is a 
threat to the security and stability of Iraq, because the other ethnic groups have strong 
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objections on this issue. In this respect, the representatives of the Arab and Turkmen 
population in the Kirkuk city council made a declaration indicating their concerns for the 
demands of the Kurdish groups for an ethnic based federal structure and emphasized that 
such an attempt can result in a civil war in Iraq.138 
Another issue emerging as a threat in northern and northeastern Iraq is related to 
the political agenda of the Kurdish groups mentioned above: their territorial demands on 
the Kirkuk provinces. Kirkuk is an oil-rich province of Iraq with its mixed population 
including the Arab, Turkmen, Kurd, and Assyrian communities. While there is no exact 
data on the proportion of the ethnic population of the city, “the last census considered 
reliable, done in 1957, showed a Turkmen majority in the city.”139 The Kurdish groups 
“view the city as an essential part of a future Kurdish state, because of its oil-fields.”140 
In this respect, they fought with the Iraqi government in 1970s. One of the major 
incidents on the Kirkuk issue is that “under Saddam Hussein’s ‘arabisation’ policy, 
uncounted thousands of Kurds, Turcomans and other non-Arabs were driven out of 
Kirkuk to make way for mainly Shia Arabs brought up from the south.”141 
At the end of the Second Gulf War, the Kurdish militias came into the city along 
with the U.S. forces and destroyed some records in Public Registration and deed offices. 
There were clashes between the Kurdish Peshmarga and the other ethnic groups in 
Kirkuk. After these incidents, Kurdish immigration was encouraged by the Kurdish 
groups to change the demographic structure of the city for a possible population census 
and an estimated 72,000 Kurds immigrated to the city. Additionally, it was reported that 
an intimidating policy has been started by the Kurdish groups, particularly against the 
Arab population of the city. On this issue, Major General John Batiste, the commander of 
the first U.S. infantry Division located in Kirkuk, emphasized that attempts to change the 
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demographic structure of the city can result in long term instability.142 Despite the 
declarations of the U.S. officials that emphasize the situation in Kirkuk as a part of a 
unified Iraq, the Kurdish leaders stated their demands on the city. In this context, Mesud 
Barzani declared their desires in a speech with a covered threat: “We had the power to 
force people out of area. We avoided that … but if things don’t go right, maybe things 
will get beyond our control and people will take matters in [to] their own hands.”143 
Eventually, it seems that Kirkuk, most probably together with Mosul, another oil rich 
area, in the north-west with an intermingled population, will be another risky area for a 
possible ethnic conflict amongst the ethnic communities and their militia capacities will 
increase the risk factor on this issue. 
2. Security Concerns and Militia Capacities of Ethnic and Sectarian 
Communities 
Ethnic and sectarian security concerns motivate each group to form their own 
defenses. This is particularly common in countries with limited security for its territorial 
borders,144 as in Iraq today. Supporters of Saddam Hussein, comprising the core 
members of the Ba’ath regime, ‘local Sunni extremists,’ ‘Shiite extremists,’ ‘external 
terrorist groups,’ and ‘local criminals’ have been the major sources of the threat to 
security in Iraq.145  
As stated in U.N. reports, the security situation began to worsen after the 
bombings of the Jordanian Embassy and the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad and the 
assassination of an important Shiite leader, Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim, in a massive car 
bombing in the Shiite holy city of Najaf in August 2003.146 After these incidents, the 
violence against the CPA, international organizations, Iraqis cooperating with the 
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coalition authority, international civilian aid groups, and contractors working for the CPA 
increased. Simultaneously, anti-Shiite violence escalated with bombings against the 
Shiites in the cities with a large Shiite population. These attacks and the emerging 
sectarian threat has been  
more the product of a deeply rooted rivalry in the region [Middle East] 
than the direct result of recent developments in Iraq. In other words, the 
Shi’a revival and the decline in Sunni Power in Iraq ha[ve] not created 
Sunni militancy; it has invigorated and emboldened it.147  
Sunni Arab fear and disappointment of loosing power provided recruitment for 
terrorist organizations and insurgencies, as understood from the Al-Zargawi’s letter to 
Bin Ladin.148 Severe insurgencies occurred in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit (the so-called 
Sunni Triangle), and two uprisings have occurred in Najaf led by cleric Moqtada al-
Sadr.149 Actions taken by the radical Shiite militias against the coalition forces increased 
in April 2004 particularly in the southern cities of Karbala, Kut, Nassiriyah, Kufa, Najaf, 
Basra, and in parts of Baghdad. Finally, the instability has expanded to the Kirkuk and 
Mosul areas where there are severe tensions amongst the population based on the ethnic 
composition and rich oil resources of these provinces.150  Iraqis are the victims of these 
attacks and the worsening security conditions, but discouragingly they also became a part 
of it. In this respect, the number of the people participating in the attacks and 
insurgencies is estimated at 200,000, according to Iraq Intelligence Chief General 
Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani.151 
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While the security situation deteriorated in Iraq in 2004, “the only bright spot was 
in the south where Shia unrest was quelled.”152  The main reason for this progress was 
that the Shiites expect to take power, for the first time in Iraq, via the upcoming election 
in January 2005. In this respect, even Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical young Shiite Cleric 
whose militias, namely ‘Mehdi Army,’ “staged [an] uprising in Baghdad and the Shia 
holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in March 2004,”153 has indicated his intent for the 
establishment of a party for the national elections in January 2005.154 While the 
upcoming elections are welcomed by the Shiites, it also has increased the tension, and the 
violence escalated in the last weeks of 2004, particularly in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, and 
Mosul. Eventually, “fears of civil war in ethnically divided Iraq have again been voiced 
after the twin attacks on Shia cities Karbala and Najaf”155 on December 19, 2004, which 
resulted in at least 60 people killed and more than 120 wounded. While the main 
intention of the attacks was to provoke the Shiite population for a reaction including 
violence and to ignite a conflict between two sectarian communities of Iraq in order to 
ban the elections, the leaders of the Shiite community warned the people to be calm 
before the elections.  
Tension and violence increased before the election in January, making ethnic and 
sectarian based militia groups attractive to provide a security guarantee for their 
communities. However, these militias have emerged as another threat, as a security 
dilemma, for the security of other communities, and security and stability of the country 
by creating distrustfulness among the ethnic and sectarian communities and by damaging 
the state authority in terms of the monopoly on the use of force in its territorial border. 
Almost all ethnic and sectarian groups have their own militias with an estimated number 
of 100,000. Of these militia groups, the larger ones are the Kurdish Pashmarga (almost 
70,000 under the control of two Kurdish groups, PUK and KDP), the Badr Brigade, the 
militia force of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 20-
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30,000 militias, although it was named as “the Badr Organization after coalition officials 
banned party militias in September 2003,”156 and the militia force of Moqtada al-Sadr, 
the Mahdi Army, “the first Shia militia to organize on the ground”157 in the summer of 
2003. After the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Sunni Arabs have started to 
establish their own militias in order to employ them in possible future problems with 
other groups.158 In addition to these militia organizations, almost all of the other tribal 
and political factions of the country have their armed militias in order to provide security 
for their leaders or communities.159  
In the post-war era, the Kurdish Pashmargas, the Badr Brigade and some tribal 
militias cooperated with the Coalition Forces against the insurgencies and terrorist threat. 
In this respect, while “Badr Corps units have apparently resisted Sadr’s militia 
operations, some tribal units have been engaged to protect transmission lines and 
pipelines passing through their communal areas.”160 However, they also posed a threat 
for the security of other groups and for the stabilization of the country. In this respect, the 
Mahdi Army, which is already declared illegal by the CPA, emerged as the main actor of 
the Sadr uprising in Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. Additionally, the Mahdi Army also 
was involved in ethnic cleansing, as occurred in Qawliyya, as stated by Larry Diamond:  
On the night of March 12, [2004,] apparently in alliance with fighter from 
the other Shi’ite militias and with the local Diwaniyya police force, the 
Mahdi Army invaded the Gypsy town of Qawliyya, after a dispute over 
what Sadr’s forces alleged were morals violations by the town. After 
pumping round upon round of automatic rifle fire, mortars, and RPGs into 
Qawliyya, the Mahdi Army brought in bulldozers and literally leveled a 
town of some thousand people.161 
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While the Mahdi Army has already been declared illegal, it was not the only militia group 
involved in illegal violence. The militia groups of two Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK 
have been employed in an attempt at ethnic cleansing to alter the demographic situation 
in Kirkuk.162 
 In these circumstances, the CPA started negotiations with the militia groups, 
except the Mahdi Army, “for their disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
into the new Iraqi police and armed forces.”163 Even though there was an agreement in 
June 2004 for the integration of a significant number of militias into the newly 
constructed security organizations, it also envisaged a large number of the Kurdish 
militias to be under the command of the Kurdish political organizations, which “could 
spark friction among Shiites and Sunnis wary that an armed Kurdish force could 
potentially push for independence.”164 The agreement could not be put into practice yet, 
and the militia problem remained a potential problem before the elections in January 
2005. At this point, even if the militias were transferred to newly formed security 
services, it is doubtful that they will be actually under the command and control of the 
state authority without the influence of their ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political ties. On 
the other hand, it is another issue that while some groups still have their militia 
capacities, whether the other communities, tribes, or political organizations will accept to 
dismantle their militias, or will not attempt to strengthen their capacities due to their 
security concerns. Additionally, when the power and influence of the Iraqi elites, 
including the tribal chiefs, religious and political leaders, is considered, it is another 
threat that they will attempt to use these militias to repress their political rivals in order to 
pursue the political agenda of their personal or communal interests. Consequently, the 
militia issue will be a major challenge for the security and stabilization of Iraq emanating 
from the ethnic, sectarian and tribal structure of the country. 
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3. Political Agenda and Elites 
 After 24 years of tyranny, what type of regime will emerge in Iraq with its 
ethnic/sectarian diversities and their different political agendas for the future? In 
countries in which the ethnic, religious, or tribal factions “have ambitious objectives, 
strong senses of identity, and confrontational strategies,”165 there is a great possibility of 
ethnic or political violence. The political demands of each community in conflict with the 
other communities will affect the security and stability of the country. Additionally, since 
the ethnic/religious/tribal ties are strong, the attitude of the powerful elites in each 
community, including religious, political, or tribal leaders will be crucial in the inter 
group politics of the country.  
 From the point of view of the Shiite community, the post-war era has offered 
them the opportunity to take power in Iraq for the first time. Despite different views 
about postwar strategies within the Shiite community, they are politically the most 
organized faction in Iraq. Additionally, because they constitute the majority, the Shiite 
Arabs and their leadership, particularly the Shiite clerics will be more prominent in 
shaping the future of Iraq. However, the influence of the Shiite clerics on Iraqi politics 
also means that the Shiite belief will be influential within the state structure, including the 
legislative, government, bureaucracy, security services, etc., which “will be welcomed by 
the Shi’a and not by Sunnis, underscoring rather than erasing sectarian ties.”166 The 
growing Sunni militancy, particularly within the Sunni Arabs, as a result of their postwar 
anxieties and the provocations of outsider radical groups, will also inspire the hostilities, 
if a religious government model emerges with the supremacy of the Shiite belief in the 
country. At this point, maybe the most significant question emerging in the postwar era in 
terms of the future assessments and predictions in Iraq is that “will the newly energized 
Shi’ite majority seek an Islamic government modeled after Iran, or will its members 
agree to share power with other communities?”167 
 Even though almost all the Shiite groups have the same idea for a unified Iraq for 
the future of the country, they have different views in terms of the type of government. In 
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this respect, the differences are not only between the secular and religious groups, but 
also within the Shiite religious factions. Despite the fact that an Iran type regime 
constructed on the basis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of Jurist was not appropriated 
by the majority of the Iraqi Shiites, the terror policies of the Saddam Hussein regime 
contributed to the growth of the jurist idea within the Shiite population.168 In this context, 
the conflict between the supporters of two different concepts, ‘quietism,’ which dictates 
that the Shiite religious leadership should be out of politics, mainly represented by Grand 
Ayatollah al-Sistani, and ‘activism,’ the main supporters of which are SCIRI, al-Dawa 
party, and Sadr movement, has emerged as a source of tension in postwar Iraq. In 
addition to these different views between the supporters of two traditional approaches, 
there are also diversities within the activists, particularly in terms of the strategies 
conducted in postwar era. In this respect, while al-Dawa and SICIRI have participated in 
the Interim Governing Council established by the U.S.-led Coalition, the Sadr group 
clashed with the Coalition forces, and “Muqtada al-Sadr called in mid-July for the 
establishment of an alternative Iraqi government and army to compete with the U.S.-
appointed body.”169 In this environment, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani emerged as the most 
reliable Shiite cleric with his moderate views that emphasizes the necessity of elections, 
the significance of the demobilization of all militias and “the need to respect other 
traditions.”170  
 While the Iraqi Shiites rise as the new power center of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs have 
not only fears about their political position in the future of Iraq with their sectarian 
anxiety, but they also are a diverse group in terms of their political representation. 
Additionally, “the blanket de-Ba’athification program carried out by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) hit the Sunni Community disproportionately hard, creating a 
sense of victimization, communal guilt by association, and disentitlement.”171 The 
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anxiety of the Sunni Arab community also provides the available conditions for the 
growing Sunni Militancy as a security and instability concern in postwar Iraq. In this 
context, the Sunni Arabs are attempting to strengthen their militia capacities. 
Additionally, it is also likely that they can “pay considerable attention to the sectarian 
composition of emerging national military and police institutions since these are the 
traditional instruments of Sunni Arab domination.”172 
 The KDP and PUK, as the most prominent Kurdish groups, unified their political 
efforts in the postwar era. In this respect, they will look for, at least, the continuance of 
their de-facto autonomy with an expansion of their territories by inserting the Kirkuk 
Province. It seems that their demand will emerge as one of the discussion topics while 
writing the new constitution and shaping the future of Iraq. Such an attempt, along with a 
possible desire to be dominant through political or militia capacities can result in a clash 
between the two major Kurdish groups. As another ethnic community, the Turkmens will 
most probably look for an alliance with other factions, having similar opinions for the 
future of Iraq. It is most likely that they will spontaneously resist any attempt that will try 
to ban their political preferences.  
 The political, religious and tribal elites of each community in Iraq will play 
crucial roles in the pre and post election period of the county. The result of the elections 
will mostly reflect the choice of traditional elites.  In this respect, the elites’ anxieties of 
loosing power over their own communities can result in a resistance to the efforts to 
construct a democratic structure.173 The alliance of the Sunni Arab elite, most likely from 
the core of the former Ba’athists, should be examined from this point. The elites of the 
other communities, particularly the possible losers of the national elections can indicate 
similar reactions in a post election period with the fears of loosing their traditional 
authority on the basis of ethnic, religious and tribal connections. On the other hand, the 
possible  winners  can  conduct  a  policy to dominate within the state structure, including  
                                                 
172 Terrill, Nationalism, Sectarianism, p.25.  
173 Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq, Challenges and Opportunities,” International 
Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Summer 2003): p. 68. 
64 
the judicial and security services. Such an attempt can result in a conflict between the 
winners and losers, or the emergence of another authoritarian regime based on ethnic or 
sectarian connections. 
 There is a threat to the security and stability of the country in the post-election 
process that the groups who will not gain their political interests by means of elections 
can attempt to use other strategies including violence and the use of their militias. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that the boycott of the elections by the Sunni Arabs and 
exclusion of the some of the population from the national elections on the basis of 
security concerns will not only enhance the friction and fragmentation within Iraqi 
Society, but also can increase secessionist demands. In this respect, the militia capacities 
of different factions and an Iraqi society as a well-armed population, even in the Saddam 
Hussein era, are a multiplying factor for a possible ethnic conflict and long term 
instability in Iraq. On the other hand, to be dominant in the security services, and 
particularly in the newly constructed military, will most probably be one of the main 
intentions of the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups with their ethnic nationalist or 
religious extremist views as a traditional way of seizing authority in the country.   
E. CONCLUSION  
Despite the fact that Iraq has not faced an ethnic conflict since its emergence in 
1921, the Iraqi State and its institutions mostly failed to create and/or reflect an Iraqi 
identity that would be accepted by all the ethnic and sectarian factions of the country and 
that would offer equal circumstances and opportunities to participate in the state 
organizations on all levels. The major reasons for the failure of the nation building 
process within the Iraqi State after 1921 can be categorized as the divisive policies of the 
British colonialism; the anxieties of the ruling elites to maintain their authority and their 
reliance on the narrow social affiliations; unfitting ideologies that were not appropriated 
by the majority of the population; dual military formations and dependence on the 
militias to provide regime security; the failure or reluctance, in some respect, to break 
down traditional social structure and influence of powerful local leaders; security 
problems emerging as opposition to the central government and improper state responses 
mostly in the type of military campaigns that targeted not only rebellious but also 
civilians; and an un-institutionalized state organization based on personalities, 
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tribal/family/religious affiliations, and private loyalties. In this context, the lack of a 
cohesive identity in the country, its ethnic and sectarian factions and traditional tribal 
structure are some of the principal factors that will be influential in the security and 
stability concerns, and in the reconstructed security organizations.  
Since the historical practice of a country in terms of ethnic conflict is significant, 
Iraq’s history is an encouraging factor for future assessments. However, increasing 
tension between the ethnic and religious factions of the country is a risk factor that can 
result in a large-scale conflict, particularly by the provocations of the extremist groups 
and extraordinary demands of ethnic/religious factions, such as ethnic autonomy or 
separation from Iraq, or a rule of law based on the principles of a religious faction.  From 
this perspective, some territories of Iraq need to be monitored specifically because of 
their ethnically and religiously mixed demographic structure and specific economic, 
politic, and religious positions. Additionally, the areas consisting of a majority and a 
small minority should be watched closely since such attacks will provoke the majority 
population towards a larger incident against the minority population, which will result in 
the massacre of an ethnic or sectarian community. These kinds of events can easily ignite 
an ethnic conflict on a larger scale.  
Baghdad, with its intermingled population, is the most risky area for a massive 
conflict between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. Moreover, Baghdad has a specific position 
for its political and historical significance. Kirkuk and Mosul are other critical areas in 
terms of the possibility of an ethnic conflict on the basis of their cosmopolitan 
demography, rich oil resources, and territorial demands of the Kurdish groups, 
particularly on Kirkuk. The clashes that occurred in Mosul and Kirkuk between the ethnic 
communities in the past are an alarming factor on this issue.  
Increasing tension and possible clashes between different groups can influence the 
effectiveness of the security forces. The tension between the communities can result in a 
clash within the security units including recruits from different communities. On the 
other hand, troops constituted from one community can support their own community in 
a conflict and can attempt to put illegal pressure on the other groups. Close ethnic, 
religious, tribal and family ties are a dominant factor that would influence the 
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performance of the security services, particularly on the basis of local assignments of 
recruits while serving in their hometowns. These factions can also attempt to be 
influential in the new constructed Iraqi Armed Forces.  In this context, it is a possibility 
that some personnel of the armed forces would continue his/her loyalty to his/her 
ethnic/religious/tribal ties instead of their services. Additionally, the elites can attempt to 
influence the promotion, appointment or other systems for the benefit of their colleagues 
by enrolling in the security services by using their political power.  
The militia capacities of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal or political groups constitute a 
security dilemma in Iraq. The exploitation of tribes and militia capacities of ethnic and 
religious parties to provide local security and recruitments for the security services will 
be another factor that can damage stabilization and reconstruction. These kinds of 
policies would strengthen the power of the influence of ethnic, religious and tribal 
structure and their elites to place political pressure over the government and bureaucracy. 
This can pose long term problems for an institutionalized state structure. Indeed, some 
militias have been employed by the CPA in the post-war era. As a result of this 
employment, they now pose a threat to the security of other communities and the legality 
of the government, and increase the risk of secessionist movements and ethnic conflict. 
Moreover, it is also a possibility that the leaders of ethnic and religious communities will 
have a tendency to use their militias as a means of pressure over the other parties to 
achieve their political agendas while shaping the future of Iraq in the post-election period. 
Therefore, to disband these groups or to transfer them into the new constructed security 
services has been a vital obligation for the long term stability of Iraq. At this point, there 
are three challenges emerging on this issue: 
• The demand of the Kurdish groups to keep some of their militias under 
their command or the change of the name the ‘Badr Brigade’ to the ‘Badr 
Organization’ is in contradiction of the main principle for the legitimacy 
of the state, the monopoly of the use of force on its territory. Additionally, 
these kind of demands or attempts increase the worries of other groups for 
their own security; 
• Disbanding the militias or transferring them into the state security services 
is not enough for the long term solution. To conduct available programs 
for the integration of disbanded militias into civil life, including providing 
a job or transferring them into the security services as individual, but not 
as a total unit is also significant. Additionally, it is also a phenomenon that 
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most of the militias transferred into the security services will most likely 
tend to maintain their loyalty to their former command structure; 
• The third challenge on disarmament, demobilizing, or reintegration of the 
militia groups is about state capacity. It seems impossible for the emerging 
state structure with limited capacity to conduct and enforce this process. 
Therefore, it is inevitable that the militia problem be resolved by 
contributions from the international community.  
Ethnic based nationalism and/or a religion based government model are not 
appropriate for the security and stability of Iraq with its multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian 
demographic structure. In this context: 
• Historical tendencies of the Shiite population, as the majority community 
in Iraq, in favor of an ‘Iraqi’ identity instead of a pan-Arab nationalist 
view are an encouraging factor for the future assessments. On the other 
hand, a possible demand of the Kurdish groups for an ethnic based 
federalism or independence is a risk factor that can activate ethnic based 
nationalistic thoughts of other communities and result in an ethnic 
conflict; 
• A secular state formation that will respect and guarantee the religious 
beliefs of each group and individual, and that will separate the government 
and bureaucracy from religion will be the key factor in Iraq, not only to 
provide the security and stability, but also to construct a working 
democracy with its institutions. At this point, the secular groups and 
religious leaders with moderate views, particularly Ayatollah al-Sistani 
with his ‘quietist’ idea and popularity within the Shiite population should 
be monitored and motivated by the international community as the key 
actors of post-election period; 
• In the current portrait, the conditions of the Sunni Arabs are suitable for 
the provocations of the Sunni extremists. The exclusion of a population 
constituting approximately 20% of the society would result in a chaos and 
instability in the country and provide the available conditions for the 
radical organizations to expand their influence. Therefore, the Sunni Arab 
population should be encouraged to participate in the process and the 
newly established state institutions including the new Iraqi armed Forces 
and other security organizations, by getting rid of their fears and anxieties 
in the post-war era. 
The groups, including the radical elements and extremists, that will not achieve 
their political objectives by negotiations will most probably attempt to dominate state 
institutions and particularly security services as a traditional instrument of the authority, 
and attempt to exploit these structures in order to pursue their goals. It is a possibility that 
such an occurrence will result in the emergence of another authoritarian regime, in a 
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religious form or dominated by an ethnic/sectarian minority that will result in long term 
instability. Such an incident can also cause a civil war that will create long-term 
hostilities among the ethnic and sectarian diversities of the country.  
Deteriorating security conditions influence the daily life of Iraqis. Additionally, 
the security concerns damage the legitimacy and trustfulness of the government in favor 
of ethnic, religious, tribal authorities, and sometimes terrorist organizations, who fill the 
authority vacuum. In worsening security circumstances, elections have been evaluated as 
a hope for the future of Iraq. However, it also includes difficulties and threats for present 
security and instability. The results of the elections mostly reflect the decisions of the 
tribal, religious, and political elites, and ethnic or religious tendencies. Moreover, the 
main objective of the elections was to constitute an assembly that will decide the future 
of Iraq. Therefore, the post-election period will be more problematic because it will cause 
new disputes amongst the factions with different political agendas. Accordingly, a 
possible escalation in security problems and tension between different groups should be 
considered in this context. In such an environment, it is inevitable that the government 




IV. SECURITY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
POST-WAR ERA AND THE NEW IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 
Designation of an achievable ‘end state’ for stability operations in the post-war 
era is a significant step that will be decisive in the determination of the policies and 
strategies, in the mobilization of the resources (including international intervention), and 
in the assessment of progress in reconstruction and stabilization according to criteria that 
would be designated from the ‘end state’ perspective. There is not an end state officially 
declared by the U.S.-led Coalition. However, it can be interpreted from the statement of 
the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz that construction of a state structure that 
could provide security for Iraqis by themselves has been the foremost priority of the 
reconstruction efforts174. It is also vital to evaluate the situation of the country in terms of 
state capacity (at least in providing basic functions, security and the monopoly of the use 
of force in its territorial borders, judicial authority, and the defense of its territorial 
integrity) in a realistic view in order to designate reachable objectives and a realizable 
‘end state.’ From this point of view, Iraq in January 2005, just before the national 
elections, can be described as a collapsed state that is in danger of mass violence 
according to the definition of Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller: 
A collapsing state is one that is losing physical control of its territory, 
forfeiting the authority to make collective decisions for the national 
population, lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and cannot 
interact in formal relations with other states as a fully functioning member 
of the international community.175 
Iraq had an election on January 30, 2005. However, this election has not provided 
an absolute solution. Moreover, it has been a new starting point for a period of severe 
discussions, power struggles and most likely a continuing of conflict. Indeed, this 
election has individually sparked a dispute on the basis of security circumstances of the 
elections, threats to the people by insurgents and extremist religious terrorist groups, 
abuses in registrations and polling, the Sunni boycott of voting, the shortages of 
international observers, and finally the legitimacy of the election and the Transitional                                                  
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National Assembly that will be formed according to election results. Additionally, it has 
been a kind of competition amongst ethnic or religious factions of Iraq rather than a 
political competition amongst democratically organized political parties. Finally, the 
main objective of the elections was to elect a Transitional National Assembly that will 
decide a new ‘interim government,’ which will govern Iraq until the approval of the new 
constitution to be written by the Assembly.176 In this context, it is apparent that the 
January 30th election is a starting point of a new era that will be more problematic than 
the pre-election period with totally different political agendas and fractional visions for 
the future of Iraq. 
Iraq exercised the January 2005 election under the authority, at least officially, of 
the Iraqi Interim Government led by Ayad Allawi. Yet, it was a government without the 
necessary means to govern. It was declared before the elections that the Iraqi Government 
and its security forces would provide the security for the elections, certainly with the 
support of the Multinational Forces. However, it was a security environment of 127,000 
Iraqi Security Forces with a questionable efficiency, a number of insurgents and terrorist 
groups estimated as 30,000 active fighters, as well as 200,000 active supporters. 
Moreover, there are 100,000 ethnic, religious, or party militias under the authority of 
their local leaders. In such an environment, the Allawi cabinet could not be seen as a 
sovereign government. It is obvious that its successor, which will be the third interim 
government of Iraq in the post-war era, will not initially have the necessary means in 
order to rule the Country, because the policies of the United States and U.K. led Coalition 
in the post-war era has failed in providing security and the construction of the necessary 
instruments to provide security for a sovereign Iraq.  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the policies and decisions of the U.S.-led 
Coalition that influenced the security situation of the country. First, it examines the 
decision of the demobilization of the former Iraqi Military by focusing on the worsening 
security circumstances, the state’s incapacity to provide security, the influence of this 
policy on the former soldiers and the population (particularly in the Sunni Arab 
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Community), and the use of the militias in providing security in the post-war era and its 
occurring and possible long term challenges. Second, the chapter inspects the process of 
the reconstruction of the new security services, particularly the new Iraqi Military and 
Defense sector. In this respect, the chapter mainly looks over the process of the 
reconstruction of the new Iraqi security formations by inquiring into the effectiveness and 
shortages of the strategies, and the influence of ethnic/sectarian factions on this process.  
A. OVER DE-BAATHIFICATION AND DISBANDING THE FORMER 
IRAQI MILITARY 
One of the main assumptions made by U.S. officials in the planning phase of the 
Second Iran-Iraq war was that “large numbers of the Iraqi Army units and Iraqi police 
would welcome the U.S. military and would be in place to assist in the rebuilding of 
Iraq.”177 However, Paul Bremer, the civil administrator of Iraq appointed by the Bush 
Administration, ordered the dismantling of the all military organizations of the regime, 
including the regular military services, in his May 23, 2003 decree.178 This was a part of 
the de-Baathification policy of the United States that was started by Lt. General Garner 
(retired) who was in charge as the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
before Ambassador Bremer and signed the Coalition Provisional Authority Order 
Number 1, ‘De-baathification of Iraqi Society,’ on May 16, 2003. The initial intention of 
Mr. Garner, as could be understood from the CPA Order Number 1, was to remove the 
senior members of the Ba’ath Party in high ranks and key positions, and the junior ones 
who served in repression policies of the regime as full members of the Ba’ath Party.  
The first plan for the former Iraqi Military in the post-war era favored by Mr. 
Garner was “downsizing of the Iraqi Army and employing the dismissed army units on 
public works projects.”179 However, Ambassador Bremer enlarged the de-Baathification 
program and disbanded the entire military organization of Iraq, without considering the 
affiliations between the regime and regular military services during the Saddam Hussein 
Government and without discussing the strategic results of such a decision for the future 
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security concerns and state capacity of the country in post-war Iraq with the Iraqi political 
identities and civil society.180 Additionally, it was declared that “any person holding the 
rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a 
Senior Party Member, provided that such persons may seek, under procedures to be 
prescribed, to establish to the satisfaction of the Administrator, that they were not a 
Senior Party Member.”181 
The decision to disband the former Iraqi Military, particularly the regular military 
services other than security organizations of Saddam Hussein182 was questionable for the 
security issues of post war Iraq. Since the force structure of the United States and its 
coalition partners has not been proper and sufficient to provide security in the entire 
country and to achieve stabilization missions, this decision caused a security vacuum. 
Additionally, releasing the former Iraqi Military members without an effective 
disarmament and reintegration policy provided human sources and armaments for the 
insurgencies, radical organizations, and militia establishments of the ethnic, sectarian, 
and tribal diversities of the country.  
1. Security Vacuum and Post-War Security Policies 
The Second Gulf War can be examined in two parts in terms of the type of the 
military operations: major combat operations (that ended on May 1, 2003, at least 
officially) and military operations other than war (or stability operations). The first part of 
the war was accomplished with a decisive victory of the U.S.-led Coalition. One of the 
foremost innovative characteristics of the Second Gulf War was the successful use of the 
‘Overmatching Power’ concept. In this context, while Baghdad was taken over by the 
Coalition Forces, the number of U.S. ground forces was just over 100,000, and this was, 
according to U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the result of “overmatching the enemy 
with advanced capabilities, and using these capabilities in innovative and unexpected 
ways.”183 Despite the fact that ‘overmatching power’ concept and the force structure 
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deployed on the basis of this concept worked well in the first part of the Second Gulf 
War, the force structure and number of the Coalition Forces has not been adequate in 
providing and maintaining the security in reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq. The 
force requirement of the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq for the stabilization of the country had 
been estimated in pre-war planning as an approximate number of half a million according 
to force structure and numbers that were deployed for the peace operations in Bosnia.184 
However, the number of the forces deployed by the U.S. was approximately 150,000, one 
third of this number, in the first days of the January 2005, as the largest number of the 
post-war stabilization and reconstruction period.185 In this security environment, 
disbanding the entire security structure of the country with an exception of the Iraqi 
Police Service (IPS) did not only create a security vacuum in the country, but also it 
provided human sources and public support for the resisting groups, insurgency 
provocateurs, and terrorist organizations existing in Iraq after the invasion. Even Jay 
Garner, the retired American general who headed the first occupation government in Iraq 
and started de-Baathification, “criticized his successor, L. Paul Bremer, for disbanding 
the Iraqi Army, which left a large number of Iraqis jobless at a time manpower was 
needed for rebuilding.”186 Even though the CPA declared its intention to create a new 
security structure for Iraq, different means and methods were employed on the basis of 
increasing security requirements. In this context, the militia capacities of the ethnic, 
sectarian and tribal entities and the former Iraqi soldiers in a kind of paramilitary 
structure were utilized along with the operations of the Coalition Forces. However, these 
policies were also discussible in terms of their long-term challenges for the stabilization 
of the country.    
One of the major impacts of disbanding the former Iraqi Military without any plan 
to integrate the former Iraqi soldiers was to provide available socio-economic and 
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psychological circumstances for the emerging insurgencies, ethnic/sectarian/tribal 
militias and terrorist organizations in post-war Iraq to have human resources for 
recruitment, particularly in the Sunni Arab area. When the former Iraqi military was 
dismantled, “hundreds of thousands of former soldiers, most of whom had displayed no 
loyalty to the regime and many of whom were too young to have participated in the 
atrocities in which the army had played a part, found themselves without pay, future, and 
honor.”187  This policy influenced not only the soldiers released from service, but also 
their families in a worsening post-war economic environment and provided a multitude of 
people to participate in or support the insurgencies and other radical movements 
threatening the security and stability of the country. Eventually, disbanding the former 
Iraqi Military created 450,000 newly un-employed, an estimated 100,000 of them being 
from the Sunni triangle, created a recruitment pool for the emerging insurgency groups 
and terrorist organizations. It is notable that this area has been one of the main places 
when the insurgents and attacks against the Coalition are concentrated. Disbanding the 
former Iraqi Military contributed to the emerging anxieties of the Sunni Arabs that they 
would be excluded politically in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. These rising 
concerns were exploited by the Sunni militancy appearing in Iraq in the post-war era.  In 
this context, “of 10,000 unemployed former Iraqi Security service members, an estimated 
2,000 of them, most especially those without any source of finance at all, are likely to be 
recruited by Islamic fundamentalist groups, like Ansar al-Islam.”188  
While all conscripts were demobilized from service by the decision of disbanding 
the military, the officer corps of the military was also eliminated from their military 
ranks. Furthermore, the officers in high ranks, namely colonel and above were banned 
from the participating in the newly constructed Iraqi security services, since they were 
delineated as senior members of the Ba’ath Party.189 The elimination of the former Iraqi 
officers from their ranks and from the services was also influential, because this most 
probably  has  become  one  of the major reasons in the emerging ‘leadership problem’ of  
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the new Iraqi Military and other security organizations, which would be critical for the 
efficiency of the new security formations in the fight against insurgencies, terrorist 
activities, and other criminals. 
a. The Fallujah Brigade 
On the basis of worsening security circumstances and insufficiencies of 
the coalition forces in post-war security missions, the CPA utilized the former Iraqi 
military members and created, in some respect, its own militia forces. In this context, the 
so-called Fallujah Brigade was the first instance of such a formation. The Fallujah 
Brigade was formed by the CPA under the operational control of the U.S. 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force by employing the former Iraqi Soldiers under the command of a 
former Iraqi Republican General. The main intention in the creation of the Fallujah 
brigade was stated by the United States competent authorities as “to have Iraqi security 
forces completely cooperative and cooperating with the coalition forces to provide 
security tasks and eventually to assume responsibility for security and stability 
throughout Iraq.”190 While creating this formation, the U.S. military officials also 
expressed their ‘initial confidence’ for the Iraqi General who would command the 
Fallujah Brigade.  
Considering particularly the time and location of the formation of the 
Fallujah Brigade, it is noticeable that the decision was a result of the operational 
necessities in a critical area with increasing insurgencies. However, it was in 
contradiction to the initial assertion of the CPA that was asserted while disbanding the 
former Iraqi Military services. At this point, it is controversial that the CPA preferred, or 
had to prefer to create a local militia structure, particularly by employing the former 
soldiers and officers of the Republican Guard Units, instead of the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of the former Iraqi Military (particularly regular military services in which 
almost all the population are represented) in a central and hierarchal chain of command 
under the control of the new Iraqi Government. The Fallujah Brigade was dismantled in 
September 2004 because of its inefficiency, reluctance of its members to fight against 
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insurgencies and in fact, the cooperation of some members of the Brigade with 
insurgents. However, “its members [were] better armed, better equipped and better off, 
having received salaries and weapons from the Marines,”191 when the Fallujah Brigade 
was dissolved by the Coalition Forces. In sum, while the Fallujah Brigade was a result of 
the intention to provide security in one of the most problematic areas in post-war Iraq in 
terms of security, it was also the creation of “a new sectarian militia”192 in a country 
where the militias of ethnic, sectarian and tribal diversities have already posed grave 
problems for short term security and long term stability.  
b. The Exploitation of Ethnic/Sectarian Party Militias 
In the face of enhancing the security requirements of the post-war era, the 
U.S.-led Coalition also exploited the ethnic, sectarian or tribal militias with the concern 
of providing security.  Iraq always had a huge militia capacity. Despite the fact that the 
estimated number of militia establishments with the country is approximately 100,000, 
this number should be re-evaluated when it is considered that Iraq had a well-armed 
society even during the period of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Moreover, the post-war era 
circumstances and disbanding of the Former Iraqi Military without conducting a 
disarmament policy has increased this capacity. In this context, whereas almost all ethnic, 
sectarian, tribal, or political groups have their own militia formations, the most prominent 
militia groups in post-war Iraq have been the Kurdish Peshmargas with approximately 
70,000 personnel under the control of two major Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, KDP 
and PUK; the Badr Corps, the militia wing of the SCIRI with an estimated number of 
20,000-30,000, and Al-Mahdi Army, the militia of the Sadr Movement. Additionally, 
the militia of Iyad Allawi led Iraqi National Accord, Free Iraqi Forces (FIF), the militia 
of Ahmat Chalabi led Iraqi National Congress, the militia wing of al-Dawa Party, 
Turkoman Front militia, and Communist party militias have been other important militia 
establishments of post-war Iraq.193  
                                                 
191 Alissa J. Rubin, “Dissolution of Brigade is Setback for Marines,” Los Angles Times, September 11, 
2004, Available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/091204B.shtml Accessed on 11/12/2004.   
192 “Testimony of Larry Diamond to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Washington, D.C., 
May 19, 2004, p. 10. http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Senate_testimony_051904.htm Accessed on 
10/14/2004 
77 
The cooperation and alliance of the U.S.-led Coalition with some militia 
groups, particularly with the Kurdish Peshmarga and INC Militias, started before the war.  
The Kurdish Peshmarga groups of KDP and PUK operated together with the U.S. Army 
173rd Airborne Brigade and U.S. Special Forces in the northern front. In the post-war era, 
the alliance with the Kurdish Peshmargas has continued increasingly. The United States 
led Coalition used the Kurdish Militias against insurgencies in Fallujah, Najaf and Sadr 
City. For instance, 2,000 Kurdish Peshmargas operated along side the Coalition Forces in 
Fallujah during the operations in November 2004.194 Additionally, these groups “have 
been deployed in the provinces of Northern Iraq, particularly in the cities of Kirkuk, 
Mosul, Baqubah, and Tal Afar.”195  
A similar de facto contribution was made by Badr Corps and al-Dawa 
militias that clashed with Al-Mahdi Army. In this respect, “the U.S. military was forced 
to rely on the cooperation (or at least forbearance) of the SICIRI and Dawa militias to 
evict and defeat the Mahdi Army, and this sharply reduced the CPA’s leverage over 
them.”196 In addition to party militias, some tribal militia units were involved in security 
missions such as the protection of transportation lines and pipelines in their local areas, as 
mentioned in Chapter III. Moreover, “the leaders of a number of southern tribes have 
been installed as new replacement governors and police chiefs in areas where they 
assisted the Coalition in opposing Sadr's uprising,”197 as a result of the security policies 
of the U.S led Coalition that envisaged the employment of the local paramilitaries 
accompanied by the Coalition Forces until the security institutions of the central Iraqi 
government were ready to provide security in the country. 
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c. Construction of New Militia Structures: The Political Battalion  
Besides the use of the militia capacities of different factions separately, the 
CPA also evolved a plan to construct a new type militia establishment that would be 
called the ‘counter-terrorism’ battalion in early December 2003 with the participation of 
approximately 750-800 militiamen from five political parties of Iraq, the Iraqi National 
Accord (INA), the Iraqi National Congress (INC), SCIRI, the Kurdistan Democrat Party 
(KDP), and the Patriuc Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The idea to create a new militia 
formation was opposed particularly by independent members of the Iraqi Governing 
Council their concerns being about the risk of a possible internal conflict in Iraq and the 
likely role and influence of the existing militias for and in such an incident.198 It was 
another concern that the militiamen employed in this formation would continue their 
loyalties to their former organizations and leaders. There were also warnings asserting 
that the creation of “a force of party-based militias would only legitimize the existence of 
various militias around the country, which have the potential to turn Iraq into a Lebanon 
or Afghanistan.”199  
Despite the anxieties and opposition for the creation of a new type of 
militia formation by the participation of the ethnic or sectarian based political parties, it 
was observed that a paramilitary force called ‘the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion’ or ‘the 
political battalion’ was created within the structure of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,’ 
which was also a militia type security force constituted as a part of a new security 
structure of Iraq and recruited locally in the post-war era, and employed along with the 
Coalition Forces against insurgencies in Fallujah in April 2004. The Iraq’s 36th was a 
composition of the militias of five political parties, as first envisaged in 2003. At this 
point, three major challenges were scrutinized according to the Fallujah experiences. The 
first one was about the ineffectiveness of the battalion. It was announced that some 
militiamen mostly from the militias of SCIRI, INC, and INA refused to fight against 
insurgencies, The second challenge concerned the members of the Battalion who did not 
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obey the rules of engagement, which is more crucial in stability type operations 
conducted in areas with a high density of civilians. In this respect, it was asserted that 
“Kurdish members also ha[d] a reputation for brutality, and [for] shooting anyone in the 
field of fire,”200 which could, and in some respect, did enhance and ignite the hostilities 
between ethnic and sectarian communities.201 As the third challenge, the battalion was 
formed within the structure of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. However, it was observed, 
and indeed stated by some military officials, that the members of the 36th battalion 
continued their loyalty to their former command chain and their ethnic, sectarian, or 
political leaders instead of the interim government of Iraq.202  Moreover, this was also a 
problem of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps on the basis of its recruitment system. 
Consequently, not only the 36th Battalion, but also the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, was 
problematic in terms of their efficiency on duty and loyalty to the new Iraqi Government 
as militia formations. 
The exploitation of the militia capacities of different factions was not the 
only occurrence in terms of the security concerns of post-war Iraq. Additionally, the 
ethnic, sectarian, tribal or political militias were employed by their communities and 
leaders in order to provide their local authority in a post-war environment with the lack of 
a powerful state authority after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. The militias 
have engaged in actions to provide security for their leaders and communities. For 
instance, SCIRI deployed its militias, Badr Corps, “to the streets to enforce security in 
Al-Najaf when the leader of the party, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was 
assassinated in August 2003.”203 However, the function of the militias has not been only 
defensive. The Al-Mahdi Army, indeed was declared illegal and involved in insurgencies, 
took over public buildings, attempted to control the schools and daily life of the people, 
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and in fact “set up illegal sharia courts, imposed their own brutal penalties, and generally 
made themselves a law onto themselves.”204  While the existence of some militia groups, 
such as Badr Corps or Dawa militias, has been kind of de facto in the post-war security 
environment, the Kurdish Pehmargas have been legitimized in some respect by the ‘Law 
of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,’ approved on March 8, 
2004. While the 27th Article of the Law makes all military and militia establishments 
illegal that are not under the control of the Iraqi Transitional Government, the exception 
stated in the same article gives the Kurdish groups the right of preservation and control 
over their own police forces and internal security formations. This has weakened the Iraqi 
Transitional Government’s control over these Kurdish Militias.205 Furthermore, this kind 
of legal arrangement has created de facto legitimacy for other ethnic or religious militias 
and has made the disarmament of militia capacities of other ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or 
political factions much more difficult for the Iraqi Governments in the post-war era.   
2. Assessment of the Post-War Security Policies  
Disbanding the former Iraqi Military completely was one of the most discussed 
and criticized policy decisions of the CPA in post-war Iraq. Besides causing a security 
vacuum in a period with increasing security problems and providing human resources and 
armament for the insurgents, terrorist organizations, or militia groups of the ethnic, 
sectarian, tribal, or political factions, the dismantlement of the former Iraqi Military also 
damaged the new Iraqi government’s (Iraqi Interim Government) ability to provide 
security and assert its authority over the entire country. This policy or expansion of de-
Baathification in a broader view was seen by the Sunnis as the exclusion of Sunni Arabs 
from the process. This situation was also exploited by the radical groups or terrorist 
organizations, which have emerged or expanded in the post-war era, provoking the Sunni 
Arab population against the CPA and the Iraqi Interim Government. 
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Dissolving the former Iraqi Military also eradicated initial plans or expectations 
of the U.S. planners to provide security in the post-war era that assumed employment of 
some units of the former Iraqi Military, particularly from the regular military, after the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of them in a relatively short period and with relatively 
fewer resources when compared with the resources spent in the current process of the 
reconstruction of the security services in Iraq. In particular, it is apparent that most of the 
officer corps of the regular military, particularly the ranks from lieutenant to colonel, 
could have been employed by the new Iraqi Military and security services instead of 
insurgents, terrorist groups, or ethnic, sectarian or party militias. This would have solved 
the leadership problem of the new security forces in the field, as also stated by Larry 
Diamond:206 
The CPA [and also the Iraqi Governments (transition and Interim) 
constructed in post-war era] lost the opportunity to reconstitute some 
portions of it to help restore order, and it left tens of thousands of armed 
soldiers and officers cut out of the new order and prime candidates for 
recruitment by the insurgency. 
In an environment of deteriorating security conditions, the force structure of the 
U.S.-led Coalition has not been appropriate to achieve the stability missions. It was not 
only the quantity problem. The type of forces and tactics and doctrines used in stability 
operations were also problematic in providing security without hurting or at least 
reducing damage to the civilian population in urban areas. The tactics employed by the 
coalition forces, especially in urban areas with a high density population, such as 
helicopter and air assaults, have not only damaged the legitimacy of the Coalition Forces 
from the perspectives of most of the Iraqis, but also increased the support of the 
population for insurgencies and terrorist actions against the Coalition Forces and 
deprived the Coalition Partners of the support of local entities. 
In facing intensive security problems, the Coalition Forces have had to rely on the 
existence of militias or they created new ethnic or sectarian militia formations, while the 
reconstruction process of the Iraqi security services continued. Even though the militias, 
particularly the Kurdish Peshmargas and INC militias (Free Iraqi Forces), were employed 
by the Coalition Forces, their use was expanded after the Fallujah insurgencies and 
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SADR uprisings in April 2004. The increasing tendency of the U.S.-led Coalition Forces 
in exploiting the militia capacities of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political 
fragmentations of Iraq was evaluated by Milt Bearden, former CIA chief of the 
Afghanistan operation, as a kind of ethnic playing card with a similar policy conducted 
by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.207 Consequently, the militia 
capacities of each group have become one of the main concerns of Iraq in terms of an 
ethnic or sectarian based civil war.  
Besides enhancing the possible escalation of the hostilities amongst the factions 
of the country, the militia policy of the Coalition in Iraq makes providing state authority 
in the entire country more difficult. Dissolving the militia capacities of each group has 
been more problematic in an environment that creates a lack of confidence amongst the 
ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political communities of Iraq. In this environment, “the United 
States has returned sovereignty to a new government [Iraqi Interim Government headed 
by Iyaad Alawi] in Iraq, but power on the ground [has] remaine[d] in the hands of local 
and regional militia,”208 as contended in a report of the Washington Institute issued just 
after the hand over of the authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004. 
B. THE NEW IRAQI SECURITY SERVICES  
Even though the policies conducted by the U.S.-led Coalition do not confirm it, 
the main intention of the U.S. for the post-war era in Iraq was “to encourage and enable 
Iraqis to defend, guard and police Iraq for themselves,”209 according to Wolfowitz’s 
statement. This was an appropriate approach, but it required providing the necessary 
means for the post war Iraqi Government to have a state capacity that would ensure 
‘sustainable security’ in a short period with less cost. This kind of a policy would also 
make the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis easier. However, it was difficult to create 
a state capacity in order to provide security and in order to assert the monopoly of the use 
of force in the entire country from the zero level. Therefore, it was essential to exploit 
some institutions of the former Iraqi regime or to employ their members in the new 
services. The Iraqi Military, particularly the regular military, was one of these institutions 
                                                 
207 Richard Sale, “Iraq Edges towards Civil War.” 
208 “Report: Militias still control Iraq,” World Tribune.com, July 2, 2004. Available at 
http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_iraq_07_02.html accessed on 1/24/2005. 
209 “Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,” p. 2.  
83 
pointed out by the military planners and scholars who are experts on the Middle East 
region and Iraq before the Second Gulf War. These include Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. 
W. Andrew Terrill, who emphasized in a report issued by the U.S. Army war College just 
before the beginning of decisive operations of the second Gulf war, that “the United 
States should recognize that the Military is a national institution and one of the few forces 
for unity within the country.”210 Dr. Crane and Dr. Terrill also proposed a mission matrix 
displaying the phases of post-war operations, a timetable, critical tasks that should be 
done in each phase and a possible proportional decrease in Coalition Forces in each phase 
of the post-war period.  
According to the proposed timetable, the U.S.-led Coalition should have been in 
the third phase of ‘Building Institutions,’ just before the January 2005 elections, and 
should have been continuing the state security and military reorganization, if this 
proposal had been realized. Additionally, the size of the Coalition Forces should have 
been half of the initial force structure, if everything had occurred as intended.211  
However, the post-war strategies did not realize prewar suggestions or assumptions. 
While the security circumstances were relatively encouraging just after the decisive 
operations in May 2003, the security situation began worsening in August 2003, three 
months later after the U.S. president George W. Bush declared that the major combat 
operations ended in Iraq. Moreover, the CPA dissolved the entire military, despite the 
initial planning assumptions and recommendations, via a decree issued on May 23, 2003, 
as mentioned in the second part of this chapter. By the same decree, the CPA announced 
its intention to construct “a new Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self 
defense capability for a free Iraq.”212 As a result of the U.S. strategy that aimed at the 
improvement of a state capacity for Iraq to provide security, the U.S.-led Coalition began 
the realization of strategy that envisaged the transition of security responsibilities to the 
Iraqi Security Organizations in four stages: 
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(1) [A]n initial phase, called mutual support, where the multinational force 
establishes conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi 
forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area 
assume responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where 
Iraqis are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic over 
watch, where Iraqi Forces on a national level are capable of maintaining 
security environment against internal and external threats, with broad 
monitoring from the multinational force.213 
As a part of this strategy, the U.S.-led Coalition has started to develop the new 
security capacity of the country.  In this context, the CPA started the reintegration and 
reorganization of the Iraqi Police Service, which was the only security institution that the 
CPA “decided to reform …, rather than to rebuild it from scratch,”214 and started the 
establishment of the new security services of Iraq comprising ‘the new Iraqi Army’ 
created by the CPA Order Number 22 issued on August 7, 2003; ‘Department of Border 
Enforcement’ created by the CPA Order Number 26 issued on August 24, 2003; ‘Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps’ created by the CPA Order Number 28 issued on September 4, 2003; 
and ‘the Facilities Protection Service’ created by the CPA Order Number 27 issued on 
September 3, 2003. While these services were being created by the CPA, the only 
ministerial structure was the Ministry of Interior that had administrative control over 
some of these services, since the Ministry of Defense had been dissolved by the CPA 
Order Number 2 and was created by the CPA Order Number 67 on March 21, 2004,215 
interestingly seven months after the announcement of the construction of the new Iraqi 
Army. Moreover, the CPA created the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as a militia force by 
relying on local recruitment and interestingly kept this structure under its own control 
without connecting into the new Iraqi Military or Iraqi Police Service until April 2004.  
This section of Chapter IV will examine the new security structure of Iraq under two 
ministerial organizations, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, and the 
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Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, separately by showing the structural changes and 




Figure 1.   Iraqi Security Services 
 
1. The Security Services under the Control of the Ministry of Interior 
In the initial stage of the establishment of the new security structure, the Ministry 
of Interior was the only ministerial organization of Iraq that had administrative, but not 
operational control, over three security services of the country: the Iraqi Police Service 
(IPS), the Department of Border Enforcement, and some elements of the Facilities 
Protection Service. Recently, additional units, the Civil Intervention Force, Special Police 
Commando Units, and Emergency Response Unit (ERU), have also been added as a reply 
to the emerging requirements of the worsening security conditions, growing insurgencies, 
and increasing terrorist attacks.  
Among these, the new security services under the control of the Ministry of 
Defense, the IPS has been the largest security organization in Iraq, with the exception of 
the Facilities Protection Service, which can be considered in a different category. In this 
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or on hand, in reply to planning objectives and a number of 135,000 was projected.216  
The main reason for the IPS achieving a relatively high number of recruitments in 
comparison to other security services recently created in the post-war era was that the 
CPA did not choose to dissolve it but to reform it, contrary to what happened to other 
institutions, in particular the military, in order to exploit it to “deal directly with the Iraqi 
population in a drive to enhance security, and take pressure off Coalition troops who 
were coming under guerilla-style attack in an ongoing low-intensity campaign.”217  
The recruitments for the IPA have been made locally. Even though the local 
recruitment was a result of the structure of the former Iraqi Police Service and the 
necessity of local personnel with the knowledge and experience on the local areas for the 
effectiveness of the security services, the local recruitments also caused a dilemma in 
terms of the effectiveness of the IPS by “making them susceptible to intimidation by 
insurgents in restive areas. [Such as] About 75% of the 4,000-person police force in 
Mosul fled an insurgent offensive in November 2004.”218 In addition to the local 
recruitment, the training and equipment shortages have also appeared as  severe obstacles 
to the effectiveness of the IPS. As an indicator of insufficient training, a report issued by 
the CPA displayed that “only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy 
training.”219  One of the reasons for this failure in training has been the time limitations 
on the basis of the enhancing requirement of the CPS for the support of the Iraqi Security 
forces in the worsening security circumstances. In this context, while the initial intention 
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was an eight-week training period for the IPS and some part of the IPS were and still are 
trained in academies in Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, a majority of the IPS 
personnel on duty was trained in a shortened program conducted in three weeks in the 
local areas according to a curriculum named the ‘Transition Integration Program.’ 
Another reason for the training failure of the IPS has been the dissimilarity between the 
training subjects and realities in the field.  While the training program of the IPS 
recruitments included “basic police training in such subjects as basic human rights, 
firearms familiarization, patrol producers, and search methods,”220 it was not sufficient to 
provide essential skills for the IPS members in the fight against well-armed terrorists and 
insurgents in the urban area. In addition to training failure, there have been critical 
equipment problems in the IPS. As an instance of this indicating the level of equipment 
shortages in the IPA, on March 28, 2004, just before the beginning of the insurgencies in 
Fallujah and Najaf, the Iraqi Police Service had “41% of its required patrol vehicles, 63% 
of its required uniforms, 43 % of its required pistols, and 21% of its required hand 
radios.”221 
In late June 2004, the second Iraqi Interim Government started to establish 
another police unit attached to the Iraqi Police Service, the Civil Intervention Force 
(CIF), which would be a three-battalion force with 4,920 and equipped with the light 
armored wheeled vehicles, in order to deploy against mass demonstrations, riots, and 
insurgencies. According to a report issued in September 2004, “the CIF had taken 
delivery of an estimated 50 ex-Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) BTR 94 8x8 Armoured 
personnel carriers.”222 The Civil Intervention Force has been organized as two sub-
services, ‘Public Order Battalions (POB)’ and ‘Special Police Regiments (SOR).’ As 
stated by the program manager of the CIF, U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Greg Kleponis, the 
CIF would comprise nine POBs and two SPRs, and “most of the battalions [would] be 
recruited  from  the  areas  where  they  [would] be assigned.”223 . In this respect, the first  
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recruitments for the POBs were made in October 2004. As to the final number, the CIF 
has developed approximately 2,900 by January 19, 2005 according to the statistics of the 
U.S. State Department. 
The Emergency Response Unit, also attached to the Iraqi Police Service, has been 
another police force under the supervision of the MoI. The establishment of the 
Emergency Response Unit was started in June 2004 with the intention of creating a 
special unit similar to American Police SWAT teams in order to “provide a national, 
high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high risk search, 
arrest, hostage rescue, and crisis response operations.”224 The personnel of this unit were 
preferred among the candidates that completed the standard eight-week basic training 
course or three-week transition integration program and were trained by the Civilian 
Police Assistance Training Team. As to the 270 required, the number of the Emergency 
Response Unit has increased to 205 by January 2005.225  
The Department of Border Enforcement was established as another department of 
the Ministry of Defense to “monitor and control the movement of persons and goods to, 
from and across the borders of Iraq.”226 The number of Border Enforcement Troops has 
developed to approximately 15,000 whereas 28,630 are required.227 The effectiveness of 
the Border Enforcement Units has been problematic as has occurred in the IPS. In this 
respect, the local recruitment has been a major factor for the poor performance of this 
service. It has been observed that the personnel having been recruited from the local 
tribes or families condoned illegal transition from the borders because of their loyalty to 
tribal or family affiliations, particularly at the Iraq-Syrian and Iraq-Saudi Arabia borders. 
Indeed, it was seen in some incidents that some personnel of these units directly 
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participated in illegal incidents, such as smuggling.228 Eventually, even though a 
department was created with the monitoring responsibility of the borders, the leaking 
borders of Iraq have been problematic in terms of illegal transitions, including terrorists 
and other criminals. 
The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was established by the CPA on September 
4, 2003 to maintain the security of the office and properties of the ministries and other 
governmental organization and strategic infrastructure of the government, such as 
pipelines, oil fields, electric pylons, etc. In reality, the FPS has been under the 
supervision of individual ministries and governmental organizations. The reason to 
examine this service in the section of the Ministry of Interior is that the MoI has been the 
authorized and responsible ministerial organization in describing and issuing the 
standards in training, uniform, equipment, etc. for “all members of the FPS whether 
contracted or employed directly by the governmental agency.”229 While the initial 
number was 14,500 in December 2003, the number in this service is 74,000, as planned 
in the beginning, with mostly tribal based employment in local areas by June 2004.230 
2. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (The Iraqi National Guard) 
Almost along with the creation order of the new Iraqi Army, the CPA declared 
construction of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as a new security service on 
September 3, 2003. It was established as a temporary formation and dramatically was not 
connected to either the Iraqi Police Service or the new Iraqi Army. Instead, it was 
announced that it would be under the direct authority of the CPA and operate under the 
supervision of the Coalition Forces. It was also announced that it would not exercise 
internal law enforcement functions. However, it was apparently a domestic security 
service as seen from its task areas described by the CPA Order Number 28, it was 
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inevitable for the ICDC not to engage in domestic law enforcement missions.231  
Additionally, it was a kind of militia force, which could be turned into a dual military 
formation because of its separate structure from the police and Military.  
The numbers of the ICDC developed rapidly when compared to other security 
services, and particularly the new Iraqi Military. While the initial number of the ICDC 
units was approximately 15,000, including the Political Battalion with its 800 members 
mentioned in the second part of this chapter, this number developed to 32,000 during the 
severe uprisings in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbala. This was a natural result of local and 
tribal based recruitment and employment of the militia capacities of ethnic or religious 
parties. However, this kind of expansion resulted in quantity and efficiency problems. 
Furthermore, the loyalty of these troops to their former ethnic/religious/tribal command 
chain was problematic in terms of both their effectiveness on duty and log term 
challenges of this loyalty for the future of Iraqi State. It also caused exclusion of some 
ethnic/religious groups in participation in the ICDC units, particularly in Sunni Arab 
areas. Ultimately, the ICDC Units were employed in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbala during 
the April 2004 uprisings and gave a poor performance against insurgents. One of the 
main reasons for the poor performance of the new established ICDC units was the 
pressure of the local insurgents on the soldiers and officers of the ICDC troops, and their 
families, 232 along with insufficiencies in training, equipment, and leadership. In this 
context, while the intention to exploit recruiters with their knowledge about the local area 
and its residents seemed a proper policy, the CPA officials ignored the significance and 
likely influence of traditional ethnic, religious, and tribal connections on these militia 
forces.  
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After the Fallujah uprising, the CPA transferred the ICDC under the authority of 
the new established Iraqi MoD and it became an element of the Iraqi Armed Forces. 
Despite this organizational change, the CPA kept the ICDC under its operational control 
together with the other services. Its recruitment system did not change. Moreover, the 
exploitation of indigenous troops by the Coalition Forces increased. The employment of 
the local elements, mostly from the Kurds, by the American 101st Airborne Division for 
operations in the summer of 2004 was a remarkable instance of the deployment of 
ethnically formed units.233 It is remarkable that the security problems in the northwest, 
particularly in the area of Mosul became more problematic after this cooperation and 
deployment. Additionally, the Iraqi National Guard troops have been primary targets of 
the insurgents and terrorist attacks. While the shortages in training, equipment, and 
discipline of these units was a main reason for the increasing attacks and causalities of 
the Iraqi National Guard Units, the ethnic friction and the rising hostilities against these 
units, particularly against their offensive approach to the other ethnic, religious, or tribal 
factions, was another reason for these attacks. 
After the transfer of the authority from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government, 
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi changed its name to the ‘Iraqi National Guard’ and declared 
that the improvement of the capacity of the Iraqi National Guard would be one of the 
priorities of the new Interim Government in the development of the Iraqi Security 
Services. However, the Iraqi Interim Government dissolved the Iraqi National Guard by 
incorporating it into the regular Iraqi Army as the last reorganization within the Iraqi 
Armed Forces before the national election in January 2005, on January 7, 2005. The 
official reason for disbanding the ING and integrating it into the regular Army was 
announced as “to ensure unity of command and effort to meet the security challenges 
[Iraq] currently face[d]”234 by Iraqi General Babakir Al Zibari, the Chief of Staff of the 
Iraqi Armed Forces. Even this was an acceptable and proper reason for the integration of 
the ING into the Iraqi Regular Army. Another reason was most likely the increasing 
causalities of the ING units because they were ill-disciplined paramilitary forces with 
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insufficient training.235 It is notable that after the decision of the abolition of the ING and 
the integration of its units into the regular Iraqi Army, the resignation of soldiers from the 
ING has increased suddenly in comparison to other previous desertions. 
3. The New Iraqi Military and the Ministry of Defense Establishment 
The Ministry of Defense structure of the Former Iraqi regime was dissolved along 
with all its entities on May 23, 2003 by the CPA as a result of the de-Baathification 
policy, as mentioned in the second part of this chapter. By the same decree, the CPA 
announced its intention to construct “a new Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a 
national self defense capability for a free Iraq.”236 The main intention of the Coalition 
planners was to construct a national institution that would mobilize national unity in 
Iraq.237 As a consequence of this intention, the CPA started the construction process of 
the new Iraqi Army under the administrative and operational authority of the CPA 
without establishing a new Ministry of Defense organization. In order to fill the 
administrative gap of the lack of a national ministerial institution, the Defense Support 
Agency was established under the authority of the CPA for the administrative and 
logistical support of the New Iraqi Army on September 19, 2004.238 The new Iraqi 
Ministry of Defense was established by the CPA Order number 67 on March 21, 2004, 
seven months after the creation of the new Iraqi Army, “to operate under the authority, 
direction, and control of the Administrator of the CPA”239 until the transfer of power to 
the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Army was renamed 
as ‘the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF)’ and the IAF, together with the Defense Support 
Agency were transferred to the administrative control of the new Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense. As the next step, the ‘Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was created with 45 
battalions and 40,000 soldiers as a temporary institution to provide security and “to 
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perform operations that exceed the capacity of police,”240 all were transferred to the 
Ministry of Defense on April 22, 2004 as a part of the IAF, Consequently, the MoD of 
post-war Iraq has comprised the Iraqi Armed Forces consisting of Army, Air Force, 
Coastal Defense Force, the Iraqi National Guard (the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps with its 
first name), the Military Special Operations Force and the Intervention Force. 
The construction of the new Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) began in August 2003 with 
CPA Order Number 22 for the creation of the new Iraqi Army.241 According to initial 
planning objectives, the main intention of the CPA was to create a small force, 
particularly when compared to the former Iraqi Military, comprising 27 light infantry 
battalions organized as nine brigades and three divisions, “a small coastal defense force, 
and a small air transport unit-totaling something like 35-40,000 personnel.”242 While the 
creation of the new Iraqi Army was announced in August 2003, the recruitment process 
already began in July 2003 in four principle cities of the country, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, 
and Erbil. According to initial planning objectives announced by the CPA, the 
construction of the new Iraqi Army would take two years. However, this period was 
shortened to one year. In this respect, while the initial plan for the training period of the 
new recruits was eight weeks, this was reduced to three weeks by relying on an 
assumption that the personnel joining the new Iraqi Military would be mostly from 
soldiers of the former Iraqi Military with basic military training and experience.  
The training of the new Iraqi Army began in September 2003 under the 
supervision of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) at the Kirkush 
Military Base located 70 miles west of Baghdad. The first Iraqi Army Battalion 
accomplishing its training process in October 2003 was deployed in Kirkuk under the 
operational control of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division Mechanized. The 2nd battalion trained 
by the CMATT was based at Taji after the completion of its training period in early 
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January 2004. The 3rd battalion completed its training process in late January 2004 and 
was employed in the Mosul Area.243 The initial problems appeared during the training 
period of the 1st Battalion. More than half of the Battalion Personnel abandoned their unit 
because of “low pay, inadequate training, faulty equipment, ethnic tensions and other 
concerns”244 as stated by the Coalition Military officials.  
One of the main reasons for the resignation of the recruits from the new Iraqi 
Army was the problems in personal matters. Low salary was one of these problem areas. 
The average salaries of soldiers in the new Iraqi Army were lower than police officers. In 
fact, the salary of a private enrolled into the new Iraqi Army was “about half the amount 
paid to the people who fill sandbags around the Baghdad headquarters of the U.S. led 
occupation authority”245 according to the Coalition military officials in charge of the 
training of the new Iraqi Army. Another issue that caused displeasure among the recruits, 
particularly the officers of the former Iraqi Military joining the new Iraqi Army, was that 
all candidates were enrolled as mere soldiers to be promoted according to their 
performance during the training period. This recruitment policy motivated possible 
human resources negatively, particularly the former officers, who joined the new Iraqi 
Army.246  
The tension among the soldiers from different ethnic and sectarian communities 
was another factor contributing to the resignations and initial poor performance of the 
new Iraqi Army. In the planning phase of the construction of the new Iraqi Army, the 
Coalition planners envisaged creating a force architecture comprising personnel from all 
ethnic and sectarian varieties of Iraq. Most likely, and also appropriately, the main reason 
for such an intention was to create an institution that would symbolize an Iraqi identity 
comprising the entire sub-identities of the country. In this respect, the 1st battalion was 
formed according to this principle and included personnel from all ethnic and sectarian 
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communities. However, “about 100 Kurds quit in the first few weeks of training after 
their tribal leaders objected to the battalion’s ethnic mixture.”247 The opposition from the 
ethnic/sectarian/tribal chiefs for ethnic or religiously intermingled Army troop 
compositions was, and still is an obvious indicator of the possible future attempts of the 
ethnic, sectarian, and tribal structures and particularly the leaders of these structures. As 
could be easily observed in this case, their aspiration for the construction of the Army (or 
other security services) troops as ethnically or religiously separate units is to be able 
penetrate and influence these institutions of the new Iraqi State and particularly the new 
Iraqi security and defense formations in order to exercise their authority over the 
communities. 
Despite the ethnic tension emerging amongst the personnel of the new Iraqi Army 
Battalions, the idea to form intermingled units was an appropriate approach when the 
long term interests of Iraq and Iraqi society was considered. However, the main mistake 
at this point resulted from the methods used in the recruitment process. One of the 
primary principles in CPA order number 22 that created the new Iraqi Army was that the 
new Iraqi Military would not be involved in domestic politics. However, by making a 
crucial mistake that would result in another type of polarization and politicization, the 
CPA relied on the candidate lists formed or controlled by the local authorities in the 
recruitment process. As a result of this process, the loyalties of the new recruits to the 
Iraqi State have been doubtful. As an instance of this kind of debate, some Iraqis drew 
attention to the declarations of some Kurdish leaders affirming these debates: 
…one should follow the principle of each one on his own territory. No 
Arab soldier should be assigned to Kurdistan [northern Iraq] and no 
Kurdish soldier should be assigned to the Arab regions. Soldiers from 
Ramadi [a Sunni Arab region to the west of Baghdad] ought to patrol the 
border with the Saudi Arabia. And the North is too cold for Arab 
soldiers.248 
According to the first declaration of the CPA, the missions of the New Iraqi Army 
would be limited to national defense and internal relief operations and would not include 
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internal law enforcement functions.249 Despite this initial intention, as a consequence of 
the insufficiencies of the Coalition Forces against deteriorating security problems, 
“recently formed army units have been deployed domestically”250 along with the 
Coalition Forces and other Iraqi security services, the IPS and the Iraqi Civil Defense 
Corps (ICDC). However, initial performance of the New Iraqi Army, and also other Iraqi 
Security Units was poor and discouraging. In this respect, the 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi 
Army, having been based at Taji, refused to fight during the Fallujah uprising in April 
2004 against the insurgents. As stated by the U.S. DOD officials, besides the weak 
leadership, insufficient equipment and poor training, “the belief of the soldiers, reinforced 
by briefings during their training, they would never be used as an internal security force” 
251 was a significant contributing factor for their shocking performance.  
Coinciding with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense on March 2004, the 
new Iraqi Army was transferred to the administrative control of the new Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense and renamed “the Iraqi Armed Forces. After that, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, 
which was under the authority of the CPA, was transferred to the Ministry of Defense 
supervision and became a part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.252 After the transfer of the 
power of the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June 28, 2004, the Ministry 
of Defense and the Iraqi Armed Forces were transferred to the authority of the new Iraqi 
Interim Government by the last order of the CPA issued on June 28, 2004. CPA Order 
Number 22 that declared the construction and principles of the New Iraqi Armed Forces 
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preventing it from involving itself in domestic law enforcement functions was revised as 
“[e]xcept as authorized by orders or regulations of the Iraqi Interim Government as well 
as duly promulgated legislation or regulations of any subsequent Iraqi government, the 
Iraqi Armed Forces shall not have, or exercise, domestic law enforcement functions.”253  
Just before the handover of sovereignty from the CPA, Ayad Allawi, the Prime 
Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, declared their desire to utilize 
the Iraqi Armed Forces for providing internal security on the basis of the worsening 
security circumstances threatening the stability of the country.254 In July 2004, after the 
transfer of the authority, the new Iraqi Interim Government started the establishment of 
the Iraqi Intervention Force (an army branch of three brigades with 6,360 planned 
personnel for the missions of fighting against insurgencies and terrorists particularly in 
urban areas)255 and the Military Special Operations Force (comprising the Military 
counter-terrorist force with 764 personnel and the commando battalion with 829 
personnel) to deploy against the most elusive terrorists by the MoI according to the 
authorization of the Ministerial Committee for National Security. Additionally, the Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps was renamed the Iraqi National Guard to enhance its capacity and 
operation area from the local security missions to the static security tasks. 256 In addition 
to these changes and new establishments, a limited number of the Iraqi Coastal Defense 
Force (for the protection of the coast of Iraq from illegal activities) and the Iraqi Air 
Corps (for surveillance and providing operational mobility to the Iraqi Army) was 
constructed and attached to the Iraqi Armed Forces. 
After the end of the administration of the CPA and transfer of the sovereignty to 
the new Iraqi Interim Government, the absolute control of the Iraqi Security Services was 
also transferred to the new Iraqi Government. At this point, the position and operational 
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function of the Multinational Forces was, or at least should have been challenging in 
terms of relations with a sovereign state and it should have been inquired and revised 
from this perspective. However, the Iraqi Security Forces, both military and police, were 
insufficient as to both quantity and quality. Therefore, it was stated by Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz addressing the statements of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and 
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari declaring the insufficiencies of the Iraqi Interim 
Government in providing security and their necessities for the support of multinational 
force that “the objectives and functions of the Multinational Force after the transfer of 
sovereignty [would] remain as it has been, except that it [the Multinational Force] 
[would] now coordinate with the sovereign Iraqi government through agreed consultative 
mechanisms.”257 As could be seen apparently, the only problem from the perspective of 
the U.S.-led Coalition was coordination. As a solution to this problem, in addition to the 
administrative organization of the security forces, a ‘Joint Operating Center,’ was created 
with the participation of “representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Defense 
and the Interior, the Multinational Force Commander and the Chief of the Office of 
Security Transition” 258 in order to make the connection and coordination between the 
Ministerial Committee for National Security functioning on a political level and the Joint 
Command Centers that were created for the enhancement of the coordination of the Iraqi 
security services on a tactical and operational level, particularly by the participation of 
the representatives of the Iraqi police, Iraqi National Guard and Multinational Forces, in 
order to increase their speed and effectiveness.259 
After the handover of authority, Prime Minister Allawi declared that “the highest 
priority in developing the Iraqi Armed Forces would be the establishment of units to 
combat the persistent guerilla insurgency in the country.”260 As a result of this priority, 
the new Iraqi Interim Government expressed its priorities in terms of the future progress 
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of the Iraqi Security Forces as the Iraqi Intervention Force, the Special Operations 
Forces, the Iraqi National Guard, and the regular Army units. The training and equipping 
of the Iraqi Armed Forces continued in this respect. The number of completely trained 
Iraqi Security Forces (military and police) on duty was declared as 100,000 by both Iraqi 
Prime Minister Allawi and U.S. President Bush (U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had 
also declared the same number approximately ten months ago, on November 4, 2003).261 
While the training process continued, the units of the Iraqi Armed Forces 
completing their training period have been engaged in military operations against 
insurgencies and terrorist groups conducted in Samarra, Babil, Fallujah, Mosul, and 
Baghdad along with the Multinational Forces and the Iraqi Police Service. In this context, 
2,000 Iraqi Forces from the Iraqi Army and National Guard participated in operations 
under the control of U.S. Forces in Samarra on October 1, 2004. The Iraqi Special Forces 
took part in a counter insurgency campaign conducted by U.S. troops in the Babil 
Province on October 5, 2004. In November 2004, during the Fallujah Operations, 
approximately 2,000 Iraqi Forces from the Iraqi Intervention Force and Regular Army 
units were deployed along with 10,000 U.S. troops against insurgents.262 A regular Army 
Brigade accomplishing the training process has participated in operations in the Mosul 
province and “another Regular Army brigade and Intervention Force Brigade have [been] 
deployed to Fallujah to relieve units currently deployed.”263 Finally, the Iraqi Armed 
Forces has reached an operational capacity of 18 battalions (six regular Army battalions 
and 12 Intervention Force Battalions) and an additional 42 Iraqi National Guard 
Battalions, totaling 45,000 troops in January 2005. Additionally, the construction of the 
first elements of the 1st Mechanized Brigade of the new Iraqi Army was completed before 
the January 30, 2005 elections. 
Despite the progress in construction of the new Iraqi Armed Forces, it is not 
sufficient for the current requirements of Iraq. The number of the Iraqi Armed Forces, 
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considered along with the security services under the control of MoI, is not sufficient 
when the estimate number of insurgents, terrorists, and their active supporters is 
considered. Additionally, the militia problem is still a threat. In addition to quantity 
shortages, there are still ongoing training and equipment problems. Despite the great 
enthusiasm of the second Iraqi Interim Government to develop the capacity of the Iraqi 
security Services, economic inadequacies to achieve planning objectives are a major 
obstacle for the Iraqi Government. In this context, the final budget allocated to the Iraqi 
Ministry of Defense in 2005 fiscal year does not match the proposed requirements of the 
Iraqi Ministry of Defense.264 Therefore, it is predictable that development of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces and other security services will still be an essential, but difficult task for 
the third Iraqi Interim Government and they will still need financial, technical, and 
training support of the international community during this process.  
Despite the initial intention to create an institution reflecting the national unity of 
Iraq, there is skepticism about the current situation. In this context, even though the 
Coalition Military officials assert that there is no ethnic or religious discrimination in the 
new Iraqi Armed Forces, there is another claim that “key units and leaders are clearly 
dominated by Shiites and Kurds.”265 The problem is not individuals and their ethnic or 
religious sub-identities. However, from this perspective, the problem, which can be 
evaluated as the most severe one in some respects, is how this domination will influence 
the performance of the new Iraqi Armed Forces in case the new Iraqi Government had to 
use it to uphold its authority against their former chiefs. It is also questionable how these 
units will respond to likely demands of their former leaders aiming to exploit them 
against other factions or against the Iraqi Government in order to achieve their political 
agendas. Additionally, it is significant that this domination is a result of the current 
circumstances or will it be a permanent episode within the new state structure and its 
institutions, as occurred in Iraq during the period of 1921 to 2003? The efforts of the 
Allawi Government to improve the capacities and capabilities of the Iraqi Security 
Services, including the Iraqi Armed Forces were appreciable and should be continued by 
the next government.  In this context, incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the 
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Iraqi Army in January 2005 was one of the most substantial steps because it dissolved a 
militia structure, which could be exploited as a dual military structure on the basis of its 
close ethnic, religious, and tribal ties. However, still doubtful is how much time this 
integration will take to remove all the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal ties of these units. 
Additionally, it is doubtful that the next government will have enough power and/or 
willingness to conduct these kinds of policies without the support and/or enforcement of 
the U.S.-led Coalition and international community. 
4. Performance, Capacity and Capability Assessment 
Performance of the new Iraqi Security Institutions can be assessed from two 
perspectives: from the point of the view of the Iraqi People and according to the 
evaluation of the civil/military experts and/or Iraqi politicians. From the first perspective, 
according to the results of research conducted by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Iraq, which relied on media resources, public and official sources, 
polls, and interviews with Iraqis, Iraq is in a ‘danger zone’ in terms of security, such that 
the daily life of the people in Iraq is still affected by terrorist actions, ongoing 
insurgencies, and other types of violence and crime. Yet, encouragingly, Iraqis have 
reacted positively to the presence of the Iraqi security forces. In this context, results of a 
poll taken in March 2004 displayed that “the Iraqi police received the most positive rating 
of the seven government institutions surveyed: 79 percent of Iraqis gave the police a 
positive rating, while 61 percent gave the army a positive rating.”266 It is certain that 
these kinds of polls or research are significant to ascertain the general situation or 
tendencies. However, when considering the poor performance of the Iraqi Security 
Services, particularly in Fallujah, Najaf, and other problematic areas in the first and 
second quarter of 2004, just after the polls, it is also evident that psychological factors 
also influenced the public view. From this perspective, the more important result of this 
research in terms of the view of the Iraqis about the Iraqi Security Services was that 
Iraqis felt themselves safer “when U.S. Forces [were] not around and when Iraqi police 
                                                 
266 “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 2004, p. 21.  
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf accessed on 10/14/2004. 
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patrol[ed] their neighborhoods.”267 This point can be, and should be exploited in order to 
assess the significance of the Iraqi security Forces in providing security. 
The assessment of the performance, capacity, and capability of the new Iraqi 
Security Forces from the perspective of civil/military experts or Iraqi politicians 
governing Iraq is certainly different. In this context, it is significant to make an accurate 
evaluation about the adequacy of the current Iraqi Security Forces in offering necessary 
capacities for the new Iraqi Government that will be formed after the elections in order to 
provide security in a highly problematic security environment with ongoing insurgencies, 
terrorist actions, and potential of ethnic and sectarian tension with a highly politicized 
and large ethnic/sectarian/political militia capacity, which could encourage a civil war. 
The military Coalition experts and the officials of the Iraqi Government stated 
that the performance and capacity of the units of the Iraqi Armed Forces participating in 
counter insurgency operations was encouraging and enhancing. However, they also 
declared that the recent operations indicated inabilities and weaknesses of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces and other security services. The Security Services including the new Iraqi 
Armed Forces progressed since the autumn 2003 both as to quantity and quality, even if it 
was limited. Nevertheless, the insurgents and terrorist organizations have also expanded 
in Iraq and they have had increasing support from the Iraqi population. In this context, 
while the final number of the Iraqi Security services has been approximately 125,000268 
instead of the 227,000 required according to the initial planning objectives, the estimated 
number of insurgents (as fighters and active supporters) has been 200,000 according to 
Iraq’s new Intelligence Chief, General Muhammad Shahwani.269 Additionally, the party 
militias have continued their existence. It is also remarkable that all parties that will form 
the Transitional National Assembly have their own militias. Therefore, it is really 
speculative as to how they will solve the militia problem. Moreover, it is significant as to 
                                                 
267 “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” p.21. 
268 This number includes the all security services under the control of MoI and MoD, but not the 
‘Facility Protection Service’ operating under the control of individual ministries. The number of the Iraqi 
armed Forces has been declared as approximately 52,000 (Army: 7,598; National Guard: 36,827; 
Intervention Force: 5,884; Special Operations Force: 674; Air Force: 145; and Navy: 495) in return to 
required/planning number of 96,000. For details see “Iraq for Weekly Status Report” of U.S. State 
Department, p. 5.   
269 Nordland and Dickey, “Tribes versus Tribe.” 
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whether they will attempt to use their militias to dictate their political agendas to the 
other factions, which will be represented or not represented in the Transitional National 
Assembly and in the third Iraqi Interim Government. When this political environment, 
security circumstances, and shortages of the Iraqi Security Services, along with the other 
essential state institutions, are considered, it is evident and also declared by the Iraqi 
officials, such as Iraq’s Interim President Ghazi Yawer, Defense Minister Hazem 
Shaalan, and Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib,270 that Iraq and the third Iraqi Interim 
Government will need the support of the international community and the existence of 
Multinational Forces, until the factions of Iraq have reached a consensus for the future of 
the Iraqi State and until the Iraqi Government has enough security instruments to provide 
security and state authority in the entire country.  
C. CONCLUSION  
The reconstruction and stabilization stage of Iraq after the Second Gulf War has 
encountered similarities when compared to the period of the British mandate. As the U.K 
after the end of the First World War, the United States and U.K. led Coalition has not had 
enough military forces to provide security in the country, which is the foremost priority 
of an occupation force. However, contrary to the U.K. in 1920, the Coalition had an 
opportunity to reorganize and exploit the former security structure of Iraq. Indeed, the 
initial intention of the U.S. planners was to rely on the former Iraqi Military, at least the 
Regular Army, during this time. This was an appropriate approach in terms of creating a 
state capacity in a relatively short period with relatively fewer costs. It was a fact that the 
former Iraqi Military and its officer corps had been humiliated and made ineffective by 
means of the harmful and non-democratic control mechanisms of the former Iraqi 
Regime. However, it would have been easier to reorganize the former (Regular) Iraqi 
                                                 
270 Just after the elections, these three officials declared that Iraq did not have necessary means to 
provide security in an environment with ongoing insurgency and political indefiniteness. In this context, 
President Yawer stated that the leave of the coalition troops would cause a vacuum of power and chaos and 
the number of multinational forces could be reduced by year-end. Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan’s 
explanation was specifically addressed insufficiencies of the Iraqi security Services. In this context, he 
frankly stated that “they [multinational forces] will leave when security is stabilized and there is a strong 
army and police force.” See “Iraq rules out US troop pullout,” in BBC News, February 1, 2005. Available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4227253.stm  accessed on 2/2/2005. Announcement of the 
Interior Minister was more optimistic than Defense Minister’s. He contended that the Iraqi Security Forces 
will be ready to provide security without foreign forces in eighteen months. See “Iraq ‘Can Take Over in 18 
Months,’” BBC News, February 2, 2005. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4231323.stm  accessed on 2/2/2005. 
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Military than the construction of a new one from scratch. It is most likely that the new 
Iraqi Government would have had its Security Mechanisms in a short period and at less 
cost in this manner. However, by ignoring the pre-war planning assumptions and 
recommendations, the CPA dissolved the entire security and defense organizations of the 
country (except the Iraqi Police Service). This policy not only resulted in a security 
vacuum in Iraq, it also increased the anxieties of a main ethnic/sectarian community of 
Iraq, the Sunni Arabs, who had already grave fears about the post-war era on the basis of 
their prominent role in the former regime. These anxieties, combined with the 
implementation of an excessive de-Baathification policy, contributed to the spread of 
radical thoughts and an increase of insurgents and terrorists against the Coalition and the 
new Iraqi Governments in the post-war era. It is also a fact that the excesses of de-
Baathification resulted in the de facto disenfranchisement and/or reluctance of the Sunni 
Arabs from the reconstruction process, as similarly occurred during the British mandate 
for the Shiite Arabs.  
After disbanding the former Iraqi Military, the U.S.-led Coalition addressed some 
traditional strategies, which were also conducted by the British during the mandate. In 
this context, the U.S.-led Coalition employed militia capacities of ethnic, religious, and 
tribal factions. The Kurdish Pehmargas and INC Militias were directly employed by the 
Coalition Forces, as the British relied on Iraqi Levies mostly from the Assyrians, during 
the British Mandate. This reliance encouraged the Kurdish Groups to implement their 
political agenda with a demand for autonomy at least or independence if possible, 
although ‘the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’ has 
declared that the federal system shall not be based upon origin, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, or confession271 and additionally, the U.S. officials have often emphasized 
that the U.S. government favors a unified Iraq. Even the January 30 election turned into a 
referendum for the Kurdish groups who voted also to display their preference for the 
future of Iraq.272 This is also another similarity with historical facts when compared to 
                                                 
271 “The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 4. 
272 Coinciding with the January 30 elections, a referendum was conducted by the Kurdish groups by 
offering three options to the people that would vote for this referendum. As stated by the Kurdish Groups, 
approximately 2 million Kurds voted for independence rather than a Federal Iraq or unified Iraq. See “2 
milyon Kürt bağımsızlık istedi,” in Hürriyet Daily Newspaper, February 6, 2005. Available at 
http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~3@nvid~533342,00.asp  accessed on 2/6/2005. 
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the autonomy desires of Assyrians and their revolt during the last period of British 
Mandate and in the first years of an independent Iraq.  It is uncertain how these kinds of 
desires will influence the future security environment and affiliations amongst the ethnic 
and sectarian factions of Iraq. It is also another concern that the improved militia 
capacities of these factions will be a multiplying factor of ethnic or religious conflict risks 
that Iraq faced in the post-war era. 
Considering the historical experiences of Iraq since the British Mandate, military 
establishments and dual military structures (the popular militia, Iraqi Levies, the 
Communist Party Militia, the National Guard, Republican Guard, Special republican 
Guard were well known instances), even these were under the supervision of the 
government, posed security challenges and political instability. Construction of these 
kinds of militia forces, such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Iraq’s 36th (or named as 
political battalion), in the post-war era was a repetition of this historical catastrophe. 
Fortunately, the Allawi Government ignored this mistake by incorporating the militia 
type Iraqi National Guard (the Civil Defense Corps as named initially) into the Iraqi 
Army. Despite practical difficulties in terms of the power of the Iraqi Government to 
complete this process, it has been a positive step that should be encouraged to establish a 
unified force structure, which will have loyalty to the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi 
people.  
The construction of a new security structure for Iraqis by the Iraqis has been a 
positive strategy. This would have made the stabilization stage shorter and easier at less 
cost. However, the several mistakes made during this process (as well as disbanding the 
former Iraqi Military) increased the cost (financial, political, and military) while 
decreasing efficiency: 
• Reliance on local recruitment gave the opportunity to the ethnic, religious, 
and tribal authorities to influence the process. The abandonment of the 
recruits of the 1st Army Battalion according to their local leaders’ desires 
was an indicator of this influence. These kinds of attempts can be assessed 
by comparing the resistance of the tribal elements and religious leaders for 
conscription during the Monarchy. While the real reason of the tribal 
chiefs and religious leaders to resist conscription was their worries about 
loosing their power against the state, the resistance of the Kurdish Groups 
for the assignments of their recruits in intermingled Army troops and for 
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the assignments of Army Units including Arab soldiers can be evaluated 
from the same perspective. 
• Local assignments influenced the performance of the new recruiters due to 
the ethnic, religious, tribal, and family affiliations, loyalties and 
intimidations of insurgents and terrorists over the recruits and their 
families.  
• Low salaries (which was another interesting similarity with the salaries of 
the privets during the British mandate and general reluctance to enroll in 
the Army for this reason) and deficiencies in the protection of the security 
service members and their families in a very problematic environment 
influenced the recruitment process and performance of the security 
services negatively. 
• Deployment of the troops with insufficient training and equipment for the 
highly risky tasks under stress not only resulted in poor performance of the 
security services, but also affected the motivation of people who were 
neutral between the insurgents and Coalition led security services.273 The 
poor performance of the security services most probably injured the 
esteem of the Iraqi population on the Iraqi Security services. Additionally, 
causalities of the security services caused difficulties in recruitment by 
affecting the motivation of the people willing to enroll into the new 
security services. 
• Leadership problems, particularly for troops in the squad, company, and 
battalion level in the field became another factor resulting in the 
ineffectiveness of the new Iraqi Security Services. Considering the 
problems and difficulties of urban guerilla warfare, note that leadership of 
the squad, company, and battalion level troops will be more important. 
Consequently, the U.S.-led Coalition has failed to provide the necessary 
circumstances and instruments for the Iraqi People, for the new elected Assembly, which 
will write a draft of the permanent constitution for Iraq, and for the third Iraqi Interim 
Government that will be assigned by the Assembly and rule the country. The third Iraqi 
Interim Government will have to rule in an environment with more powerful insurgents, 
terrorist organizations, and ethnic/religious militias than the state security services, as the 
Hashemite Monarchy had to rule despite well-armed tribal elements. The new 
government will not have the necessary means to provide security and to claim a 
                                                 
273 Despite the positive view of the Iraqis for the Iraqi Security Services according to the poll 
conducted by Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 2004 and issued on September 2004, 
actual view of the Iraqi Population should be re-searched and re-assessed after the performance of the 
security services since April 2004. It should be considered that the Iraqi Army constructed during the 
British Mandate increased its prestige after its successful campaign in repressing Assyrian revolt and Shiite 
and Kurd uprisings.  
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monopoly on the use of force in the whole country, at least without the support of the 
multinational forces and international community. Therefore, along with shaping the 
future of Iraq, the construction of a state structure with all its organizations, institutions, 
norms and principles will be the main obligation of the third Iraqi Government; but it is 
an obligation that will be carried out under fire and will need continued international 
support. As the last, but not least concern for the future of Iraq after the January 30 
election, the reluctance of the parties that will dominate the Iraqi politics to share power 
with all factions and their possible attempts to politicize the state institutions and 
particularly internal security services, judiciary, and Iraqi Armed Forces would result in a 




























Before the Second Gulf War, the U.S Government had two factions with different 
visions in terms of their post-war reconstruction objectives and the end state for the future 
of Iraq. While one group represented by Paul Wolfowitz visualized a macro 
transformation under the administration of the United States, the other group comprising 
Secretary of State Colin Powel and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in favor of 
a minimal approach envisaging the removal of the leadership with its high level staff and 
exploiting the rest of the state structure for the establishment of a new order and 
stability.274 It is not clear which approach was favored by the Bush administration. 
Nevertheless, when the post-war policies are examined, they justify neither macro 
transformation nor the minimal approach. The U.S.-led Coalition ruled Iraq directly via 
the Coalition Provisional Authority between the periods of May 2003 to June 28, 2004. 
Even though there was an Iraqi Government, the first Iraqi Interim Government was only 
a showcase and did not have real authority, either officially or practically.  
The over de-Baathification, which caused de facto disenfranchisement and 
reluctance of the Sunni Arabs to join the reconstruction process, was the most remarkable 
incident of the first months of this era. Disbanding the former Iraqi military was the most 
questionable part of this policy because of security concerns in Iraq. Considering the de-
Baathification policy of the CPA, it can be seen that the U.S. Government was favoring 
Wolfowitz’s approach. However, the military capacity of the CPA was not sufficient to 
conduct this policy while facing a deteriorating security condition. Thus, the CPA had to 
rely on indigenous sources. Despite the fact that the U.S. officials declared their ‘for 
Iraqis by Iraqis’ intention several times, to create a new security formation having enough 
capacity and capability from zero was not possible in a short period.  Therefore, the CPA 
used traditional means, ethnic and religious militias, as the British used during the 1920s, 
despite the long term challenges of this policy for the stability of Iraq. Additionally, the 
CPA started the construction of a new security formation, including the Iraqi Police 
Service, the new Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was a militia type 
security formation. The units of these services were on duty when serious uprisings 
                                                 
274 Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and History Denied, pp. x-xi.  
110 
occurred in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbal in April 2004. However, their performance and 
capacities were problematic. This ignited a new debate about the effectiveness of the 
policies conducted in construction of the new security structure of Iraq. In June 2004, the 
CPA transferred its authority to the second Iraqi Interim Government. Nevertheless, this 
was a handover mostly on paper, since the new Iraqi Government did not have the 
necessary means to govern Iraq and provide security. Therefore, it had to rely on the 
Multinational Forces.  
Despite the efforts of the Coalition and the second Iraqi Interim Government, they 
neither provided security, nor created a state capacity including an efficient security 
architecture. Just before the January 2005 elections, Iraq faced an ongoing insurgency, 
increasing terrorist actions, and a huge militia capacity of ethnic and religious parties 
compared to 127,000 security troops with questionable effectiveness. This portrait with 
an increasing ethnic tension threatened a civil war. Providentially, an ethnic or religious 
clash did not occur during the elections despite the terrorist provocations. However, some 
groups asserted that there were abuses in the elections by some parties and their militias, 
even in the form of Iraqi Security Services.275 Moreover, the election was to construct a 
Transitional National Assembly that will write a permanent constitution for the approval 
of the Iraqi People and assign the third Iraqi Interim Government. This means that the 
real debate is now starting in Iraq with ongoing violence, enhancing ethnic and religious 
tensions, and a divided society ethnically, religiously, and politically with their strong 
militia capacities. In such a period, the third Iraqi Interim Government does not have a 
sufficient state capacity consisting of an effective security service, a working judicial 
system, a functional bureaucracy, and a powerful military. In such circumstances, to 
improve these four functional areas has been the inevitable responsibility of the Iraqi 
Government and the Coalition. Amongst these four institutions, improvement of the 
                                                 
275 The major disputes and objections on the abuses in elections have been in the north and northwest 
area of Iraq. According to Turkmen and Arab groups, the Kurdish Groups brought a huge number Kurds 
(according to some sources 100,000) to vote in elections in Kirkuk. The people under the age of eighteen or 
even dead have been registered and voted. Besides, some people voted in two different election centers. 
Moreover, lots of Turkmen and Arab voters have been prevented from voting on the basis of some 
restrictions employed by the Kurdish parties, including the use of the Kurdish peshmargas and National 
Guard of Kurdish Origin. For details see ‘Press Release on the Iraqi National Elections’ of the Turkmen 
Front issued on January 31, 2005. Available at 
http://www.siatec.net/bloggersperlapace/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=740 
accessed on February 2005. 
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security services, and particularly the Iraqi Armed Forces, will be the foremost priority of 
the third Iraqi Government as a natural consequence of the current security conditions. 
The major challenge on this issue is that the third Iraqi Government has to do it under 
fire. Therefore, it needs the substantial support of the international community. 
The thesis argues that the Iraqi Armed Forces will be the foremost institution to 
achieve a state capacity in Iraq and according to current security circumstances; it will 
have an inevitable role in providing internal security and stability in the country. On the 
other hand, the Iraqi Armed Forces, as a traditional way of seizing authority in Iraq, will 
be addressed by the factions competing to achieve their political agendas. Therefore, the 
new Iraqi Military, which should be built without domination and reflection of any ethnic 
or sectarian group and particularly whose officer corps will have loyalty to a unified Iraqi 
Government and constitutional order, will be the main institution that would provide and 
protect the stability and security of Iraq in the state building stage. Additionally, a 
military structure that would rely on institutionalized norms and procedures will 
contribute to long-term democratization and nation-building efforts in Iraq.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The multiethnic and multi sectarian structure of Iraq is the most challenging 
characteristic of the country if it is going to construct a stable future. Despite the fact that 
the ongoing insurgencies and terrorist actions also pose a serious danger for Iraq, the 
most crucial influence of those insurgents and terrorist organizations will be to ignite an 
ethnic or religious clash by provoking the factions. A possible desire to build a religious 
based state structure according to the Shiite belief or to construct an ethnic based Federal 
state structure, or secessionist demands are all possible challenges for Iraq with its 
multiethnic and multi sectarian population. Can Iraq face these kinds of demands in the 
next period while writing a permanent constitution?  
The historical facts of Iraq have displayed that ethnic and religious groups can 
tend to enforce their political desires on the Iraqi governments by means of their well-
armed militias. Additionally, opposition groups attempt to make connections with 
security services and particularly with the Army to provoke and to exploit it against the 
Iraqi government and state authority. Understandably, not only government, but also the 
opposition can have a tendency to use undemocratic ways and violence in order to 
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archive their political agendas. Therefore, the Iraqi military, along with other security 
services will be a target of groups desiring authority or achieving their political interests 
in the country during the next period. As another historical tendency, the future 
governments can try to dominate the Iraqi military to assure the survival of their authority 
by exploiting it against their political rivals. To achieve this, they can attempt to abrade 
the rules and procedures in the military and they can seek to politicize the new Iraqi 
officer corps. Such an affair can result in another authoritarian regime dominated by an 
ethnic or sectarian group in Iraq. 
The huge militia capacity of ethnic or sectarian groups is a serious danger for the 
stability of Iraq. The exploitation of tribal militias was a general way of providing 
security in local areas and suppressing local incidents in Iraq’s history. However, this was 
an episode with its long term challenges for the state authority and stability. In return for 
their alliance to the government, tribal authorities also exploited the state and expanded 
their power in the past and this resulted in a dilemma for Iraq. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led 
Coalition made the same mistake. While exploiting the ethnic or religious party militias, 
it also condoned their expansion. This policy has made disbanding the party militias more 
difficult in Iraq. Consequently, the CPA and the second Iraqi Interim Government could 
not manage to dissolve the party militias and these militias emerged as one of the most 
influential actors in Iraq under the control of their ethnic or sectarian authorities. In the 
post-election period, it is most likely that the political groups, which are not satisfied with 
the results of elections or the results of the negotiations about the permanent constitution, 
may attempt to mobilize their militia capacities to enforce their political agendas. 
Therefore, dissolving these militias will be one of the most fundamental tasks of the next 
Iraqi Governments, to achieve state authority and to reach sustainable security in the 
country. However, it is obvious that the third Iraqi Interim Government will not have 
enough power to realize this process without international support. Furthermore, 
considering that the political actors of the new era will be the leaders of ethnic and 
sectarian political establishments, which have the real authority over these militias, it is 
also doubtful that these political elites will have the desire to loose these powerful and 
traditional tools. Even if they have to dissolve their militia structures, they will most 
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likely attempt to integrate these militias into the new security services but as units not 
individuals, to keep their authority over those elements.  
The natural resources of the country offer both economic opportunities and severe 
tensions for a possible conflict for the future of Iraq. One of the highlighting post-war 
disputes has been territorial desires of the Kurdish Groups particularly in Kirkuk. This 
was not a new occurrence. Two main reasons for the uprising of the Kurdish Groups in 
the 1970s, despite given autonomy by the Ba’ath Government in 1970, were their desire 
to control Kirkuk and its oil revenue, and to keep their militia capacities. Considering 
these historical episodes along with the recent occurrence and disputes, it can be easily 
assessed that the Kirkuk and Mosul provinces and the share of the oil revenue of these 
two areas will be problematic for the security and stability of Iraq with their huge oil 
resources and intermingled population. A possible attempt to dominate these two 
provinces and their oil fields by the Kurdish groups or other ethnic groups can result in 
chaos and civil war. 
A radical religious movement, either from the Sunnis or Shiites will be another 
risk factor that can ignite a sectarian war. At this point, the Sunni militancy increasing in 
the post-war period constitutes one part of the puzzle. The Sunni Arabs were evaluated as 
the most secular Arab Community in Iraq. However, post-war anxieties and de facto 
exclusion of the Sunni Arabs provided suitable conditions for emerging terrorist 
organizations to gain support from this community in the post-war era. The January 30 
elections deepened this situation. As a result, the exclusion of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs from 
either the political process or state institutions, similar to disenfranchisement of the 
Shiites in 1920s, has emerged as one of the challenges to a stable Iraq. The other part of 
the puzzle, where some Shiite Clerics, particularly Moqtada al-Sadr can pose a threat by 
insisting on a Iranian type regime in Iraq. This is also problematic in a country with an 
approximately 40% Sunni population. Additionally, this is also a source of tension within 
the Shiites. Besides current challenges, radical religious elements would pose a threat for 
the stability of Iraq after the establishment of a working state structure based on a 
moderate ideology. Now and in the future, these radical elements will attempt to spread 
to the security services and particularly to the Iraqi Armed Forces and its officer corps.  
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As historical episodes indicated, the Iraqi Military was the most substantial 
institution in Iraq in terms of providing state authority and internal security. However, 
according to findings, the former Iraqi Military also failed to be an institution that unified 
all the factions of Iraq, as the Iraqi State failed. Sunni dominancy in the key positions and 
high ranks, dual military establishments, un-institutionalized procedures, relying on 
tribe/family affiliations and personal loyalties, unfitting ideologies, and politicization of 
the officer corps were influential in this period. Considering the requirements of the 
current security environment and competence of the other security services compared to 
the size of insurgents, terrorist organizations and party militias, it evidently seems that the 
Iraqi Military will be once more one of the foremost institutions of the Iraqi government 
in order to seize authority and provide security in the country. From this perspective, 
starting to build a new security structure was a suitable step to create a state capacity and 
to reduce the cost of stabilization. However, the creation of a militia type Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps (the Iraqi National Guard) and the Iraq’s 36th were attempts at ignoring 
catastrophic historical examples of Iraq with dual military establishments and militia type 
force structures, as could be seen in the National Guard, Republican Guard, or Special 
Republican Guard examples during the Ba’th Party and Saddam Hussein period. 
Exclusion of some groups such as the Sunni Arabs, Turkmens, or Assyrians from the key 
positions and dominancy of the Shiites and Kurds in the Armed Forces, or in other state 
institutions, according to ethnic and religious concerns will be a repetition of the same 
mistake made by the British and Iraqi Governments between the periods of 1921 to 2003. 
While creating a new Iraqi Army, several mistakes during the process delayed the 
development of the constitution and challenged the long term effectiveness of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces and stability of the Country. Among these, insufficiencies in the 
recruitment system and relying on local authorities, inadequacies in salaries and other 
benefits (particularly insufficient force protection for recruits and their families), 
assignment of recruits in their hometowns, employment of troops with insufficient 
training and equipment, the early decision of the CPA not to use the new Iraqi Army in 
internal security, and leadership problems in squad, company, and battalion level troops 
based on excessive de-Baathification have been the most underlining errors during the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces. In addition to these shortages, to use the Iraqi 
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Security Forces under the control of the Multinational Force after the handover of the 
authority to the Second Iraqi Interim Government damaged the prestige of the Second 
Iraqi Interim Government and legacy of the operation of the Multinational Forces. 
The CPA favored an all-volunteer system in recruitment for the new Iraqi Armed 
Forces. Considering the circumstances, this decision could be evaluated as a proper 
policy, because there could be difficulties in the implementation of conscription on the 
basis of possible resistance from some ethnic or religious factions. On the other hand, the 
benefits of the recruits should have been appealing to people based on the security 
situations. However, salaries were low compared to other services. Additionally, there 
were security problems for the recruits and their families. The members of the security 
services became one of the primary targets of the terrorist attacks. These problems made 
recruitment difficult and influenced the performance of the units. Moreover, assignments 
of the new recruits in their hometowns also resulted in the poor performance of these 
units against insurgents and other criminals on the basis of the pressure of the 
ethnic/religious/tribal/family affiliations on the personnel.  
One of the suitable decisions in the construction of the new Iraqi Army Units was 
to form ethnically and religiously mixed units reflecting the factions of Iraq. The main 
reason for the formation of these kinds of mixed units was to improve the interaction 
amongst the ethnic and sectarian diversities of Iraq. Additionally, to recruit from only one 
ethnic or sectarian group would be another way of creating ethnic or sectarian fractions 
within the Iraqi Military. This kind of an approach could result in a clash between the 
Army units. The intention to build intermingled units was damaged by ethnic leaders 
because of the wrong recruitment policies that increased the influence of those local 
authorities and political parties on the system. Consequently, this episode displayed that 
ethnic, sectarian, or other local authorities will want to be decisive within the Iraqi Armed 
Forces just as it occurred in the past.  
Insufficiencies in training and equipment are a big failure. However, employment 
of the troops with insufficient training and equipment was bigger than the first one. This 
failure resulted in the poor performance of these units against insurgents and terrorists, 
and caused high rate casualties.  Also, the weaknesses of the units in the field encouraged 
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insurgents and terrorists, and most probably discouraged the people from enrolling in the 
new security services. Moreover, these weaknesses most likely injured the respect of the 
population towards the new Iraqi Security Forces. The leadership problem was, and still 
is another factor for the insufficient performance of the units. This was a result of 
disbanding the officer corps of the former Iraqi Military. Even though it has been decided 
to accept these officers for the service, they have been recruited as enlisted personnel but 
not officers with their former ranks to promote their ranks according to their performance 
during the training process. This discouraged these former soldiers from enrolling. Also 
most likely, these disappointed officers preferred joining insurgencies or terrorist 
organizations. 
Despite the initial intent of the Coalitional Provisional Authority not to use the 
new Iraqi military for internal security concerns, it has been recently seen that it is 
inevitable not to use the Iraqi Army for internal security on the basis of intensive security 
problems. The early decision not to deploy the new Iraqi Army in domestic security had 
good intentions, but it was not fitting for the current security circumstances of the 
country. In view of its discouraging experiences in its history, it can be argued that the 
use of the military for internal security problems would be harmful in the long term 
democratization process. However, there are practical examples, even in the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s displaying that the Army units can be employed for 
internal security when the capacity of the internal security services could not respond to 
the incidents. Moreover, it should be thought that the foremost priority of Iraq is not to 
build a democracy, but to construct a functioning state structure that will provide enough 
capacity for the Iraqi government to maintain security and also that will comprise all 
factions and be respected by almost all the population. 
As the last finding, after the handover of the authority from the CPA to the 
Second Iraqi Interim Government, the existence of the Multinational Force inevitably 
continued. In fact, the real authority in Iraq, at least in terms of security, was the 
Multinational Force. However, except for some declarations by Iraqi officials, there was 
not a signed agreement or ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that would authorize this 
situation between the second Iraqi Interim Government and the countries constituting the 
Multinational Force. Despite the fact that there was no official objection to this situation, 
117 
this was injurious to the sovereignty and prestige of the second Iraqi Interim government, 
and legacy of the existence and operations of the Multinational Force in Iraq. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the fact that the main purposes of this thesis is to examine the 
reconstruction process of the Iraqi armed forces and possible influences of the ethnic and 
religious factions and tribal structure of the country in this process, this part of the thesis 
will comprise the recommendations not only about this main topic, but also the 
recommendations to respond to the security challenges emanating from the factions of 
Iraq, because these challenges directly influence the main subject of the thesis. 
Considering an appropriate flow, first it will offer some recommendations on providing 
security until the Iraqi Government has a capacity to provide security for itself and Iraq 
has a sustainable security during or at the end of the period of negotiations amongst the 
factions of Iraq. After that, it will present a set of suggestions about the ongoing 
reconstruction process of the Iraqi Armed Forces.   
1.  Recommendations on Providing Security 
It is evident that the third Iraqi Government does not have enough state capacity 
to provide security and authority in the entire country. Therefore, the Multinational Force 
should continue its mission in Iraq until the construction of the Iraqi Security Forces is 
completed. On the other hand, it is apparent that there is an increasing anger, and indeed 
hostility against the U.S.-led Multinational Force within the population. Improper tactics, 
such as helicopter and air assaults particularly in urban areas with high density 
populations, increases these hostilities. Therefore, the Multinational Force should revise 
its tactics; particularly in urban areas, not to ignite mass revolts.  
Considering that Iraq has a sovereign government, an agreement that will 
authorize the existence and operations of the Multinational Force should be signed 
between the Iraqi Government and the countries having troops within the Multinational 
Force. This kind of an agreement would increase the legitimacy of the existence of the 
Multinational Force and the prestige of the Iraqi Government in and outside of Iraq. 
Additionally, a civilian should be assigned, by the U.N. by preference or by the Coalition, 
in order to provide coordination between the Multinational Force and the Iraqi 
Government. While designating operational and legal responsibilities, the transfer of the 
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area responsibilities between the Multinational Force units and Iraqi Security Forces 
should be within the framework of a timetable for the Iraqi Security Services.  
The best way for providing a sustainable security in Iraq is to encourage all 
factions to reconcile their differences about their political agendas. Territorial unity, the 
principles of the new Iraqi State (religious or secular), the autonomy desire of the 
Kurdish Groups and their territorial demands on Kirkuk, share of the oil revenue, 
disbanding the militias, and exclusion of some ethnic or sectarian groups, particularly the 
Sunni Arabs, seem to be the most problematic subjects that will influence security and 
the stability of Iraq. The following policies should be conducted in this context. 
• The international community, and particularly the U.S.-led Coalition, 
should endorse negotiations and inspire all factions that an ethnic or 
religious based federation will incite the security problems and hostilities 
amongst the groups. All parties should be persuaded, and politically 
compelled if needed, for an agreement on a unified Iraq; 
• Despite the claims, the main reason for territorial demands on Kirkuk is its 
rich oil resources. To remove the tension on this issue, initially Kirkuk 
should be cleaned from the militia and militia origin Iraqi Security Forces 
and should be put under the sole control of the Multinational Force until 
enough Iraqi Army Units take security responsibility. After that, the share 
of the oil revenue of Kirkuk and all other oil rich areas should be decided 
according to an equality principle; 
• Ethnic based nationalist views and a state structure based on religious 
belief are not proper ideologies and will be a source of instability in Iraq.  
Therefore, the groups favoring a state structure based on a nationalist view 
of citizenships that will assure the cultural and political rights of all ethnic 
groups and a secular view that will guarantee the rights of individuals for 
their belief should be supported by the international community; 
• Since disenfranchisement of the Sunni Arabs will result in political 
instability and increase security problems, the Sunni Arabs should be 
included in the negotiation and drafting of a permanent constitution 
process; 
• All militias must be dissolved according to a DDR program. However, it is 
obvious that the third Iraqi Government does not have enough power to 
achieve this. Therefore, the international community should plan and carry 
out this process in coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi 
Government. This process should also include the security units under the 
control of the Kurdish Groups defined in the ‘Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the transitional period.’ Consequently, all armed units 
should be under the control of the Iraqi Government. The militias that will 
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participate in the Iraqi Security Services should be transferred to these 
services as individuals, but not whole militia units. Besides, it should be 
observed and insured that these transferred militias will not continue their 
loyalties and command ties with their former leaders in the political 
parties. This kind of a connection would result in the politicization and 
polarization of the Iraqi Security Services. Despite difficulties, it should be 
the aim to complete this process before the referendum of the permanent 
constitution in order to prevent this referendum from possible influences 
by these militias.  
2. Recommendations on Reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces 
Considering the current security circumstances, insufficiencies of the Domestic 
Security Services, and the intention of the second Iraqi Interim Government, it seems that 
the Iraqi Armed Forces will be one of the main institutions of the Iraqi Government for 
providing state authority, internal security, and long term stability. However, as the other 
services, the new Iraqi armed Forces, and particularly the new Iraqi Army should be 
developed as quality and quantity in a short period as much as possible. Additionally, the 
major factors influencing the performance of these units should be removed.  
The United States and the CPA officials have declared several numbers 
contradicting each other about the development of the Iraqi Security Services. These 
contradictions have decreased the confidence of the public in and outside of Iraq 
concerning the process. Therefore, absolute information displaying the current situation 
of the Iraqi Security Services should be declared by the Iraqi government and the U.S.-
led Coalition. In conjunction with this announcement, a timetable indicating applicable 
planning objectives should be prepared and declared officially. After that, development 
on the construction of the security services should be announced according to the 
timetable. This would remove speculations about the process. 
While formatting the units in the Iraqi Armed Forces, constructing units with one 
ethnic or religious group should be avoided. Doing otherwise would result in the 
construction of ethnic or sectarian armies within the military. Instead, the planners should 
favor intermingled units as initially intended. Considering the initial experiences in the 
first army units, and influence of the local leaders on the recruits, a centralized 
recruitment system that will remove the influence of the ethnic, religious, tribal or 
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political powers on the recruitment process and on recruits should be constituted based on 
objective criteria as in modern militaries. 
A centralized recruitment system is necessary but not sufficient to attract people 
to join the military. For that reason, the personal benefits of the members of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces, such as salaries, government housing, etc. should be attractive to the 
candidates. Those benefits should be exploited to motivate candidates to break off their 
ties and loyalties to their local leaders. Economic problems in the country pose both 
difficulties on this issue in terms of state capacity, but also opportunities for high 
unemployment rates. 
Personal security, along with the security of their families is significant for the 
performance of the units of the Army and other security services, particularly in today’s 
security environment. Considering the ongoing insurgencies and terrorist actions, 
construction of military bases consisting of government houses can be a way of providing 
personal security by mobilizing fewer forces on this issue. These kinds of bases would 
also reduce the pressure of local insurgencies on the recruits. 
Considering the traditional tribe/clan/family ties, the recruits should not be 
assigned in their hometowns. An appointment system that will envisage the employment 
of the soldiers in different provinces according to a rotation would be a useful way to 
accomplish this. However, this appointment and rotation system should be based on 
institutionalized procedures instead of personalized decisions as before. Party militias are 
also a human source for recruitment. However, they should be accepted for the service 
individually. Moreover, their possible ties and loyalties with their former chain of 
command or insurgencies and terrorist groups should be observed and punished 
decisively. 
Returning to leadership problems in small units, the recruitment of the former 
officers should be enhanced. However, these officers should be recruited as candidates 
with their former ranks in the Former Iraqi Military but not as enlisted as implemented 
currently. Training periods should be used to evaluate their ability to execute their 
responsibilities. Considering the significance of the squad, company, and battalion 
leaders against the guerilla type insurgencies and terrorist groups, special training 
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programs should be implemented for the officers from lieutenant to Lt. Colonel. These 
programs should also emphasize the importance of the leadership in ethnically and 
religiously mixed troops and present some principles to the leaders to implement while 
commanding their units. 
The training period and training subjects should be reevaluated and decided 
according to requirements of the current security conditions. None of the units or recruits 
should be assigned in the field without completing the training period. Additionally, in 
order to decrease tensions amongst the soldiers from different factions, a special program 
emphasizing the importance of a unified Iraq with its all cultural varieties and 
significance of a unified military to defeat the current threats should be arranged and 
added to the training programs.   
NATO has started to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Armed Forces. 
However, the number of trainees has not developed as seen in the initial planning 
objectives. In return for the reluctance of some countries to participate in this initiative, 
such as Germany, France, and Greece, individual NATO members should be encouraged 
by the Coalition to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Additionally, the 
Iraqi personnel who have had experience in the field and displayed success compared to 
their fellows should be employed in the training of the units, particularly recently 
recruited officers and new cadets.  
The use of the military in domestic security missions is a specific situation, 
comprising a projection from the riots in urban areas to the guerilla type terrorism or 
insurgencies, and has specific requirements of equipment, training, tactics, doctrine, and 
organization. Additionally, and maybe as the most important, special legal arrangements 
that will prevent the security organizations from violating the international agreements 
and human rights. These legal codifications are necessary and significant both in terms of 
the legality, efficiency, and respect of a government and its military for its own citizens, 
and relations of the country with the international community. As a result of these special 
necessities: 
• Training, equipment, and emplacement of the units of the Iraqi Armed 
Forces that will be allocated internal security missions should be thought 
and planned in this direction. For the training process, the international 
122 
community should increase its support. Particularly, the countries having 
experience in domestic security concerns and the use of the military for 
internal security missions, such as the U.K. and Turkey should be 
encouraged to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Army, and particularly 
its officers and non-commissioned officers who will be decisive in the 
success of these kinds of missions. 
• While placing the Army units in the country, the problematic areas should 
be carefully examined in order to evaluate force planning. In this context, 
Baghdad for its political and historical significance, Mosul and Kirkuk 
with their intermingled population, increasing tension among the 
residential factions, and political and economic desires of the Kurdish 
Groups, particularly on Kirkuk should be assessed in placement of the 
Army units. 
• Deployment of the Army units in domestic security missions should be 
decided by civilian authorities. By considering the personalized decision 
making process in the past, legal arrangements should be made 
designating the use of the Iraqi Armed Forces in internal security. The 
legal arrangements should clearly define the role and responsibilities of 
the presidency, government, parliament, judiciary, MoI and MoD, local 
administrators, and finally, security services. Additionally, coordination 
between the Army and the Iraqi Police Service should be considered as a 
responsibility of civilian administrators. Therefore, it should be considered 
that the Iraqi Government will need not only military, but also civilian 
expertise that will organize these coordination requirements and 
cooperation between the Army units and other services. 
 The measures suggested above are related to the short term requirements of Iraq. 
However, coinciding with these short term necessities, the long term requirements for an 
effective and modern military structure should be considered and the measures should be 
planned and carried out in this direction. As the measures that could be taken in this 
context: 
• The Iraqi Armed Forces, along with the other security services and 
bureaucracy should be available for all citizens of Iraq to enroll in. The 
only way to join the Iraqi Armed Forces should be competition amongst 
candidates according to credible criteria instead of personal favoritism 
and/or ethnic, religious, or tribal affiliations. Moreover, all personnel of 
the Iraqi Armed Forces should have a chance to be promoted to high ranks 
and assigned to key positions. To achieve this, an institutionalized system 
should be constituted aiming at a single State-level defense organization 
including ministerial administration, oversight mechanisms (executive, 
legislative, judiciary, and public oversight), and a decision making process 
on defense and security policies of the country; 
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• The constitutional roles and missions of the Iraqi Armed Forces and its 
relations with other state institutions and governments should be described 
clearly. While doing this, the only concern in terms of the civil-military 
relations should not be a possible intervention of the military via a 
classical military coup, but also protection of the Iraqi Military from the 
possible attempts of the political parties to politicize the Iraqi Military and 
its officer corps. For that reason, an institutionalized personnel system that 
will design recruitment, appointments, promotions, assignments, and other 
benefits of the members of the Iraqi Armed Forces should be realized 
according to the norms and principles employed in modern militaries; 
• In a country with a lack of democratic institutions and a democratic 
culture, to redefine civil-military relations and to put them into practice is 
a process that needs time and education. Moreover, it needs leaders with a 
belief in the need for this kind of institutionalized structure or a strong 
motivation and ongoing monitoring of the international community. Since 
the existence of leadership with this kind of view is doubtful, the 
international community should constitute a monitoring program for 
development in the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as economic assistance 
and international initiatives such as ‘Partnership for Peace’ as used in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.276 
• Education is vital to achieve long term objectives. Therefore, coinciding 
with the normalization in security, an education program should be started 
for the Iraqi Officer Corps and civilian personnel of the Ministry of 
Defense in universities, either in Iraq or outside of Iraq, to provide expert 
requirements of the Iraqi MoD and Iraqi Armed Forces. Additionally, Iraqi 
officers should be sent to military academies or war colleges to improve 
their professional view and to interact with the officers of other countries, 
particularly NATO members. This will also facilitate normalization of the 
civil military relations in Iraq. 
                                                 
276 Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded as a federal after a severe internal conflict. The peace 
agreement ended the clash between the groups. However, the central state could not have a single state 
level defense organization. Two federations still have their armies and defense structure. Cottey, Edmunds, 
and Forster classify Bosnia and Herzegovina  with its weak central state and government institutions, point 
out the existence of multiple armed forces, absence of effective central state/government political control of 
armed forces, and serious ethnic conflict occurred in the first half of 1990s as the main problems of civil-
military relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For details see Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony 
Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” in 
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, p. 31. This kind of structure poses a threat in a country 
with hostilities amongst the groups based on historical incidents. Additionally, it is an obstacle for the state 
to assert its monopoly of the use of force in its territory.  Besides, it is not a fitting situation for NATO 
initiatives in terms of civil-military relations. From these points of the view, a Defense Commission 
comprising local administrators, scholars in defense and civil-military relations field, and representatives of 
strong international institutions and countries, proposed a report including recommended reforms for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a participant of ‘NATO’s partnership for Peace Program’ and “as an 
important step on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road to NATO membership and full integration with Euro 
Atlantic structures.” For details see “The Path to Partnership for Peace: Report of the Defence Reform 
Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Defense Reform Commission, Sarajevo, September 2003.  
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Ultimately, it should be frankly stated that the former Iraqi military had rules, 
laws, and procedures. The real problem was in their implementation. Therefore, Iraq will 
need a period of close monitoring in terms of politico-military interaction, possible 
attempts of the factions of Iraq at politicization and employment of it for several reasons. 
However, the monitoring process needs to be arranged carefully so as not to hurt the Iraqi 
Government and its institutions. It should be considered that excess intervention can 
result in the rise of a radical view within the military as occurred after 1941 on the basis 
of the political, economic, and militarily domination of the U.K. in Iraq. Therefore, 
instead of excess interference, the international community and particularly the United 
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